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Chapter 1
Introduction
Are legislative staﬀ important for the functioning of the European Parliament? This is
the broad question dealt within this dissertation. The essence of every parliament are its
elected representatives and the votes they take on legislative proposals. However, being a
member of parliament (MP) entails more than voting on legislation and includes several
other activities, which are hidden from the spotlight of the plenary. Members of parliament
are responsible to write reports, resolutions and to communicate with the executive and
local authorities etc. Each of these tasks requires several steps for their completion. For
example, writing a legislative report includes negotiating with other members and political
groups1, tabling amendments, writing justifications, drafting legislative resolutions and
organising the final vote. In all of these activities elected representatives need the support
of their non-elected aides, which in many cases represent the majority of the people working
in parliament. This dissertation is about them - the unelected people or legislative staﬀ
who work in the European Parliament.
The concept of legislative staﬀ originated in the literature of the American Congress
and state legislatures (Hammond, 1984; Hammond, 1996). It describes the ensemble of
unelected people working in parliament that are in a position to help the elected members
in carrying out their legislative function. In the study of European legislatures it is an
understudied topic, which has attracted greater scholarly attention since 2009 and the
further empowerment of national legislatures in the framework of the European Union.
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments in the EU have ac-
quired the formal power to examine the application of the subsidiarity principle in EU
legislation and to object to it (i.e. early warning system). Some scholars have assumed
that as a result of this new power, members of national parliaments are confronted with
an increased and complex workload, which they are likely to delegate to respective admin-
istrations (Neuhold, 2014, p. 12). As of consequence, it has been hypothesised that the
empowerment of national parliaments, as a solution to the democratic deficit of the EU,
has lead to more bureaucracy than democracy. Therefore, a need to gather knowledge on
1Throughout this thesis political group (also parliamentary group) refers to the group of individuals
that have been elected to parliament on a political party list.
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parliamentary administrations2 in Europe has appeared.
Why study legislative staﬀ? While the empowerment of national parliaments in EU
legislation explains the increasing interests in parliamentary staﬀ, it does not elucidate why
until now legislative staﬀ in Europe have been so sparsely studied compared legislatures
in the USA and executive administrations in general. One part of the answer can be at-
tributed to the relatively weak role of several national parliaments in Europe compared to
the Congress in the USA. The other part of the answer has to do with the organisational
diﬀerence between the executive and legislative branch of government. While executive
administrations formulate policy proposals almost independently from elected oﬃcials, le-
gislative administrations scrutinise, amend and sometimes formulate policy, but under
a closer control from elected oﬃcials. Accountability control is easier to exercise in legis-
latures, because of the nature of the work, but also due to the smaller size of parliamentary
administrations compared to government ones. For example in the European Union (EU),
which is the case of this dissertation, there are four oﬃcials in the EU executive branch
(i.e. European Commission) for each oﬃcial in the EU’s legislative branch (i.e. European
Parliament) (see Table 1.1). Administrative accountability to elected oﬃcials is therefore
more diﬃcult to achieve in the case of executives than legislatures if only for a reason of
size. As Neuhold (2014, pp. 15-16) and Winzen (2011) discern from their studies on the
role parliamentary administrators in diﬀerent policy areas: the final decisions are always
taken by elected rather than unelected oﬃcials.
Despite the two reasons above, the gap in the research on legislative staﬀ in Europe
remains astounding. From a theoretical point of view, the study of parliamentary staﬀ
embodies some of the most fundamental questions on democracy and the relationship
between the executive and legislature. First of all, legislative staﬀ plays important role
especially considering the limited resources that parliamentarians have to process legisla-
tion compared to ministers. Moreover, parliamentary administration provides members of
parliament information, which is independent from the government and lobbies. In this
way, parliamentary oﬃcials are an important source of parliament’s autonomy. This is
especially important for members of the opposition and the minority, who are less prone
to trust information provided by the executive administration, which is controlled by the
governing coalition or majority party.
Secondly, what is also important is how staﬀ resources are distributed within parliament
among diﬀerent actors. For example, the organisation of parliamentary administration in
the US Congress privileges the majority and oﬃce holders such as committee chairs, party
leaders and whips. On the contrary, staﬀ in European parliaments tend to be distributed
more fairly among the coalition and opposition, the leadership and backbenchers. While
the input from staﬀ makes parliament less dependent on the expertise of the executive and
2Throughout this thesis the term administration is used to denote the ensemble of people that work
in a public organisation. Whenever the term bureaucracy is used, it denotes an administration or staﬀ.
Bureaucracy is not used to denote an ideal type or form of social and political organisation in the Weberian
sense (see Page, 1992, pp. 5-10 for a discussion on the meaning of the term).
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Table 1.1: Number of Staﬀ in the EU Institutions
Staﬀ Commission Council Parliament All
Year N % N % N % N %
1959 1 930 74.0 264 10.0 315 12.0 2 591 100
1969 7 707 85.0 569 6.2 528 5.8 9 068 100
1979 11 649 72.0 1 547 9.5 1 977 12.0 16 162 100
1989 16 309 69.0 2 165 9.2 3 405 14.5 23 483 100
1999 21 603 70.0 2 621 8.5 4 101 13.0 30 814 100
2009 26 209 65.0 3 512 8.8 6 080 15.0 49 919 100
2014 24 944 61.0 3 153 7.7 6 743 16.5 40 772 100
Average growth r. 5.4 5.0 6.3 5.8
Source: EC/EU Budgets and own calculations
interest groups, it can also improve the quality of deliberations and alleviate the members’
workload, which in turn can focus on other priorities such as the control of the executive,
the representation of the constituency, re-election, life in the public eye etc. Overall, an
increased use of staﬀ is supposed to enhance the capacity of parliament and contribute to
its eﬃciency. Therefore, there are several incentives for members of parliament to rely on
their staﬀ and give them the opportunity to participate in the political process.
How are legislative staﬀ important? As described by Fox and Hammond (1977, p. 1)
staﬀ resources are power. However, legislative staﬀ cannot aﬀect legislation directly, be-
cause contrary to elected representatives, they do not have the right to vote (Patterson,
1970, p. 32). As described in the previous paragraphs, parliamentary administrators can
contribute to the functioning of parliament, but only to the extent that members of parlia-
ment empower them to do so. When this is the case, their importance is associated with
their expertise and the nature of the tasks they perform, such as gathering information on
which policy is then based, planning and executing public hearings and drafting amend-
ments and committee reports (Patterson, 1970, p. 26). Hypothesising that legislative staﬀ
are important implies that non-elected oﬃcials in the parliament are active actors in the
political system of the EU.
Why study the EP? Studying legislative staﬀ is a relevant question for democracy,
however why should one study the case of the EP? There are two main reasons to study
the EP. The first reason stems form the position that the EP occupies in the political
system of the EU. The second one regards the organisational characteristics of the EP in a
comparative perspective with other legislatures. The European Parliament is an interesting
case to study, because it qualifies as a legislature with important decision-making powers.
From the 1970s until the entry into force of the Single European Act (1987), the EP had
powers only in the budgetary policy of the European Communities. Throughout a series
of intergovernmental conferences in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon and inter-
institutional agreements, the EP has gradually acquired legislative powers, first through
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the cooperation procedure and then with codecision (i.e. ordinary legislative procedure,
OLP).
The changes codified in the treaties of the EU closed the gap between the roles of the EP
and national parliaments. Like any other national parliament, the EP directly represents
European citizens (since 1979), debates and passes legislation and scrutinises the work of
the European Commission, the executive-like organ of the EU. In doing so the EP is a
policy-influencing legislature (Norton, 1994; Norton, 2003; Kreppel, 2006), because it can
modify, reject and even propose laws via its right of initiative (i.e. ask the Commission
to submit a proposal) and own-initiative reports. The EP can eﬀectively slow down or
actually stop a proposal and force the European Commission and the European Council
to bargain on a policy. This makes the EP a powerful parliament compared to many other
EU member state-parliaments, which do not have such prerogatives.
Also, it is important to note that the party system in the EP is a multi-party or a
‘two-plus-several’ party system, where the two main groups (Socialists and the Christian-
Democrats) hold between 30 and 35 per cent of the seats each (Hix et al., 2007). Neither
of the two largest parties has ever held an absolute majority, which is also a reflection
of the proportional electoral system. Decision-making therefore functions on the basis of
coalitions and simple majorities. However, in contrast to fused parliamentary systems,
there is never a stable coalition in the EP. This is due to the fact that the executive
is not selected within the EP and thus is not dependent on the support from a stable
coalition or majority in parliament. The consequence is that each proposal coming from
the Commission requires building a new coalition. This condition may further enhance
the possibility of staﬀ to influence legislation, because they have several opportunities to
participate in negotiations between political groups and individual members.
The EP is furthermore an interesting case to study, because it qualifies as one of the
biggest assemblies of Europe in terms of members and staﬀ. Although the EP does not
employ as many committee staﬀers as the US Congress (as of 2011 the Senate and House
combined employed 15 907 staﬀ, IPU, 2012, p. 101), it is in this respect an interesting case
to explore compared to national parliaments in Europe.3 In fact, the EP employs far more
civil servants than any other national parliament in Europe (6 743 oﬃcials in 2014, Annual
Budget, 2014). For example, the administration of the German Bundestag counts 2 500
civil servants (Linn and Sobolewski, 2010, p. 131), while the French Assemblée nationale
has capped its civil service to 1 349 oﬃcials (Assemblée nationale, 2013, p. 436).4 The high
number of employees in the EP is justified by the need for translation and interpretation
3According to Smith et al. (2011, pp. 105, 213) in 2005 the Senate and House combined employed 2.200
committee staﬀ and around 10.000 personal staﬀ of senators and representatives. Other non-European
parliaments for which information is available are Mexico (7 257), Philippines (3 922), India (3 691), Japan
(2 989), Cambodia (1 692), Dominican Republic (979), Costa Rica (683), Bangladesh (766), Colombia
(571), United Republic of Tanzania (320), Benin (300), Malawi (151), Rwanda (115), United Arab Emirates
(97), Timor-Leste (91) and Singapore (43) (Situation in 2011, IPU, 2012, pp. 101-103).
4The French Senate and National Assembly employ together 2 381 staﬀ (IPU, 2012, p. 101). Information
is also available for Turkey (2 696), Ukraine (1 127), Spain (844), Hungary (603), Norway (445), Belarus
(245), Croatia (250) and Andorra (15) (Situation in 2011, IPU, 2012, pp. 101-103). When parliaments are
bicameral, the number is for staﬀ in both chambers.
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services in several oﬃcial languages. In spite of this, the number of staﬀ that works on
committee issues and in the personal oﬃce of members is unseen in other parliaments of
Europe (European Parliament, 1997).
Another reason to study the parliamentary administration of the EP is the general
negative image of the EU administration. For instance, most EU nationals (wrongly)
believe the EU administration is the biggest expenditure of the EU budget (European
Commission, 2011a).5 At the same time, the public considers administration the area on
which the EU should spend the least (European Commission, 2011a). Media reports have
exposed the EP civil service in a negative way as well (‘too big, too costly’) (e.g. Brand
2010; Taylor 2010; Banks 2011; Brand 2012).
Finally, an analysis of the EP administration is important also due to public spending
reforms adopted by several EU’s member states after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. These
reforms prescribed general public spending cutbacks including civil service staﬀ reductions.
Under the pressure from member states who have demanded staﬃng cuts up to 12 per cent
(Brand, 2012), the European Commission has put forward a legislative proposal to reform
the EU’s staﬀ regulations, which included the provision to cut staﬀ by 5 per cent before 2018
in each institution and agency of the EU (European Commission, 2011b). This proposal
has been adopted in 2013, but the Legal Aﬀairs Committee of the EP had initially rejected
such an ‘automatic’ reduction across all institutions (European Parliament, 2012c, p. 67).
According to the MEP and responsible rapporteur Dagmar Roth-Behrendt (Socialists and
Democrats), enlargement and the newly acquired competences under the Lisbon Treaty in
2008 require ‘tailor-made’ solutions per institution (European Parliament, 2012c, p. 69).
In summary, the EP is the biggest parliament in Europe. It has influence on EU
policy, since it can draft amendments and propose legislation, which is then dealt upon in
committees. In these political circumstances many parliamentary outputs such as policy
assessments and constituency activities can be traced back to staﬀ. The absence of a stable
majority requires a constant eﬀort for negotiations and coordination of positions, where
staﬀ can also play a role. It is in the line with the developments enhancing the role of the
EP that interest for researching legislative staﬀ in the EP arises. Therefore, it is pertinent
to shed light on the individuals in parliament that assist members in legislative activities.
1.1 Research Statement
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has reinforced its position as a
policy-influencing legislature, which can modify, reject and propose laws. As a result, the
legislative workload in the EP and the complexity of its policy agenda have augmented
5Expenditures for administration were the highest in the late 1950s and early 1960s (approximately 35.5
per cent per year from the total budget). However, the high percentage in administration’s expenditures
is expected for this time, as other EU expenditures such as the agricultural and regional fund did not exist
yet. From 1962 onwards (creation of the agricultural fund) administration expenditures started to fall and
stabilised in the 1970s. Between the 1970s and 2011 administration expenditures varied from a minimum
of 4.3 per cent (1986) to a maximum of 6.0 per cent (1975, 1981, 2006, 2011) (Data based from the EC/EU
Budgets).
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as well. In order to successfully deal with new legislative competences and an enlarged
membership, the EP has at its disposal several resources. Instead of looking at the tradi-
tional parliamentary resources such as, political rights (e.g. right to vote, right to amend
or propose legislation, right to modify parliamentary procedures etc.), this thesis explores
the administrative resources of parliament, individual legislators or group of
legislators. More precisely, the interest is to study their right to employ staﬀ and
to obtain legislative assistance to help them study and draft legislation.
In addition to legislative staﬀ, legislative assistance is a key concept in this thesis. The
simplest way to define legislative assistance is as the activity carried out by legislative staﬀ
or as the activity throughout which members of parliament are assisted.6 The disserta-
tion mainly focuses on the legislative functions of parliament (i.e. the process of adopting
legislation), but it takes into consideration also the control and budgetary functions of
parliament. Therefore, the adjective ‘legislative’ pertains to the EP as a legislature rather
than to its legislative function. The dissertation however does not look specifically into
the so-called administrative services of parliament, such as maintaining the registry of the
parliament, recording the chamber and committee proceedings, etc.
While there has been some attention on how the EP has adapted to changes as a
political institution (e.g. Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Rittberger, 2003; Gungor, 2008), no
study has so far dealt with legislative assistance. In an eﬀort to extend our knowledge
on the EP, this dissertation asks the following question: How does the organisational
form of legislative assistance aﬀect the functioning of the European Parliament?
The question is ambitious, because so little is known about who are legislative staﬀ and
what do they do. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is first to find out what is the form of
organisation of legislative assistance in the EP and second, whether staﬀ play a relevant
role at all.
Following studies which have analysed the political resources of parliament, such as
committee assignments (e.g. Kaeding 2004; Høyland 2006; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009)
and party politics (e.g. Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2003), the underlying assumption of the
thesis is that the way the EP organises itself and uses its own resources aﬀect the internal
political life in the EP as well as the EP’s position within the EU institutional context
(Bowler and Farrell, 1995, p. 220; Kreppel, 2002, p. 2; Bauer, 2008b, p. 630). What a staﬀ
member might say or do, has supposedly lesser consequences than the choices over the legal
basis, the competent committee or the rapporteur for a legislative dossier. Nevertheless,
staﬀ are resources, which if used responsibly can contribute to the resolution of a political
problem. Evidence for this is the case of the US Congress (e.g. DeGregorio, 1994; Romzek
and Utter, 1997) and more recently the EP (e.g. Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold,
2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014).
The main theoretical argument of this dissertation is that the choices the EP makes on
how to organise its legislative staﬀ aﬀect the way legislation is processed and decided in
the EP. The expectation is that the organisation of legislative assistance determines which
6Legislative staﬀ is defined on page 1.
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individuals (legislative staﬀers, i.e. general secretariat oﬃcials, political group advisors
and/or MEP’s accredited assistants) are involved in the activities of legislative assistance
and to what extent. When it comes to intra-institutional relations, research has shown
that political groups are the most important decision-making actors in the EP (Hix et al.,
2009). Through the reforms of the EP’s Rules of Procedures, the main political groups
have strengthened their role on the expenses of smaller political groups and individual
MEPs (Kreppel, 2002). Since political groups are crucial for the functioning of the EP, it
is expected that the resources of legislative assistance benefit political groups the most. In
comparison to political groups, the organisation of an MEP oﬃce with several accredited
assistants is a relative novelty. Hence, the expectation is that the primary beneficiaries of
legislative assistance are first political groups and then individual MEPs. The civil servants
working for the EP’s general secretariat have assisted MEPs since the EP’s beginning as
the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. As a result, they
have been an important resource in all the aspects of MEPs’ work (even comparing to
political advisors). Their role is said to have diminished as a result the EP’s legislative
empowerment from the 1980s onwards (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003). Since 2000s, a reform
process has gradually reshaped the organisation of the EP’s general secretariat.7 Some of
these reforms are very recent (2013). Thus, whether and how these reforms have changed
the role of the EP’s secretariat is diﬃcult to predict. Nevertheless, the expectation is that
the EP’s general secretariat is attaining again an important role in the assistance of MEPs.
In order to gain an insight into the research question, the dissertation is concerned
with the institutional design of legislative assistance in the EP in two diﬀerent
ways. First, the research project explains the organisational form of legislative assistance
in the EP (e.g. departments, units, etc.), how it has emerged and changed over time.
Second, the dissertation investigates the behavioural consequences (i.e. staﬀ’s frequency
of involvement in legislative assistance) of the EP’s administrative institutional form.8
The ambition is first to explain the organisation of legislative assistance and then to link
it to the behavioural consequences of administrative action in the EP. In practice this
means studying two diﬀerent outcomes. The first outcome is the institutional design of
legislative assistance in the EP (i.e. the form, creation and change). The second one are
the behavioural consequences resulting from the institutional form of legislative assistance
in the EP. Legislative assistance is therefore theorised first as a dependent variable (i.e.
the form, creation and change) and second as independent variable (i.e. the eﬀect).
When researching legislative assistance as a dependent variable the questions of interest
are: What has driven the changes in the EP’s organisation of legislative assistance? What
has been the balance of power between the diﬀerent groups of legislative staﬀ in the EP?
Have changes in legislative assistance preceded the evolution of the EP into an assembly
with decision-making powers or the opposite? What is the situation of legislative staﬀ today
and where is it headed?
7Throughout the thesis the EP’s general secretariat is denominated also as the EP’s secretariat.
8The frequency of involvement in legislative assistance is operationalised in Section 9.3.
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When researching legislative assistance as an independent variable the questions of in-
terest are: How and by who are members of parliament assisted in their legislative function?
How does the organisation of legislative assistance aﬀect the way staﬀ assist members of
the EP? What determines the involvement of individuals in the legislative assistance of
members of the EP? Does the organisation of legislative assistance aﬀect in any way the
decision-making process in the EP and the position of the EP in inter-institutional rela-
tions? The following paragraphs summarises the main hypotheses and arguments that will
be explained in detail in subsequent chapters.
Dependent Variable: Institutional Design
This dissertation is written with the view that to understand the eﬀects of an institution
(i.e. legislative assistance), we first need to be informed over its design within the lar-
ger social and historical context. Design includes the form of an institution, its creation
and change. The form refers to the organisation. In the case of legislative assistance,
this includes the organisation of departments, units, recruitment, salary, etc. Form and
organisation are, therefore, used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
The institutional design of EP’s legislative assistance is explained following a new insti-
tutionalist theoretical approach (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2005). A theoretical model
of dialogue is applied, where diﬀerent new institutionalist approaches are considered to
explain diﬀerent aspects of a larger empirical problem. For the purpose of analysing the
institutional design of legislative assistance, the approaches of functional rational choice,
sociological and historical institutionalism are employed. More specifically, the form of
legislative assistance is explained following sociological institutionalism and the functional
model of rational choice institutionalism; while its creation and change are explained with
historical institutionalism and the functional model of rational choice institutionalism.
Hypotheses
The dissertation provides evidence for four main hypotheses (in the following denoted as
H1, H2(a,b), H3(a,b,c) and H4(a,b,c,d,e)). Three of them are researched on the basis
of qualitative data and methods. The fourth one is a statistical hypothesis and it is
consequently tested using quantitative and statistical methods. The word ‘hypothesis’ is
employed for qualitative research as a device for dealing with qualitative data. Rather
than statistical hypotheses they are projected assumptions, which are not tested but in-
vestigated.
Form At the beginning of EU integration, the EP (as the Common Assembly of the
European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC) resembled to a deliberative forum rather
than a state legislature (i.e. any legislature in a modern Westphalian state). However,
in the 1970s, the EP began to acquire prerogatives similar to the ones of national legis-
latures, such as powers over the budget and direct elections of members. The process of
1.1. RESEARCH STATEMENT 23
parlamentarisation - the adoption of the model of representative democracy - continued
with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and most recently in the election
campaign of 2014, when the main European political parties pre-selected their candid-
ates for the post of President of the Commission (i.e. the EU equivalent to the head of
government). In this dissertation, it is assumed that the form of legislative assistance
in the EP has changed through the years as a result of the parlamentarisation of EP’s
political structures. Based on the assumption that the EP has evolved into a state like
legislature, with budgetary and legislative powers, it is expected that the organisation of
the EP’s administration resembles the one in state-legislatures. The following hypothesis
is investigated:
Hypothesis 1: The form of legislative assistance in the EP is organised according
to the form of state legislatures.
Theoretically, the hypothesis relies on sociological institutionalism and the so-called ‘lo-
gic of appropriateness’ (Olsen and March, 1984), where forms of organisation are mimetic
or isomorphic to culturally accepted modes of organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). In order to empirically investigate this hypothesis a com-
parative approach is adopted. In the absence of scholarly literature dealing with the organ-
isation of legislative assistance in parliaments, a chapter of the dissertation is dedicated to
reviewing the systems in the United States’ Congress, the British House of Commons, the
German Bundestag and the French National Assembly. While the selection of these cases
is explained in detail in Chapter 5, here it suﬃces to say that the selected legislatures are
relevant because some of their aspects are reflected in the EP.
After setting a comparative benchmark based on systems of organisation in state le-
gislatures, the dissertation reviews the form of organisation of legislative assistance in the
seventh term of the EP (2009-2014). The seventh term was chosen, since it represented
the most current state of organisation at the time this study was carried out (2011-2014).
The comparison shows that the EP is organised according to the principles found in state
legislatures. However, the EP’s form of legislative assistance does not resemble any state
legislature in particular. Moreover, the EP also shows characteristics of its own.
Creation Politically, the EP has not always exhibited state-parliament characteristics.
Quite the opposite, the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 did not even envisage a parlia-
ment for the ECSC. It was only in the negotiations of the Paris Treaty that a parliamentary
body for the ECSC was devised. However, the Paris Treaty only included the provision
for a deliberative body rather than a full-fledged parliament. Therefore, in order to un-
derstand the form of legislative assistance in the EP, it is not only necessary to take into
account its resemblance to state-parliaments, but also its history. A historical approach
is adopted, because looking at the events that have shaped the EP, places the organisa-
tion of legislative assistance in the political context of the EU. As put by Pierson (1996,
p. 128): ‘Looking at a film discerns more than looking at a photograph.’ Based on the
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historical context, two hypotheses are put forward: one about the creation and one about
the immediate form of legislative assistance.
As already mentioned, the ECSC’s Common Assembly, as the forerunner of the EP,
had only deliberative and control alike parliamentary functions. It did not have legislative,
amending or financial prerogatives. Given the absence of any other legislative function
aside deliberation, it is unlikely that the first administrative structures supporting the
parliamentary activities in the Common Assembly were organised according to the forms
in state legislatures. In respect to the tasks conferred to the Common Assembly, it is more
plausible to assume that the Common Assembly adopted an administrative form fit for its
function in the ECSC. For example, in order to carry out its deliberation, the Common
Assembly presumably had a service for stenography, minutes writing, sittings organisation
etc. On the other hand, it is not likely to find in the Common Assembly specialised
services for matters of parliamentary procedures, privileges and broader political issues.
The following hypothesis, which leans on the functional explanation of rational choice
institutionalism, is put forward:
Hypothesis 2a: The administrative organisation of the ECSC’s Common As-
sembly corresponds to the rational-functional model of organisation.
Despite its limited competence compared to state-parliaments, the Common Assembly
adopted very soon some of the typical structures of state-parliaments. For example, the
first political groups (i.e. state’s party groups in parliament) were established in 1953.
Moreover, the ‘founding fathers’ of the EU envisaged a federal development for European
nations (Monnet, 1978). Cooperation in the coal and steel industries was a springboard
for a federally organised Europe with a federal constitution and institutions (Duchêne,
1994). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the Common Assembly adopted some of
the administrative features similar to state-parliaments already in the 1950. The following
hypothesis is put forward:
Hypothesis 2b: The federal idea of Europe, as conceived by the founding fathers
of the EU, promoted the adoption of state-parliament characteristics for the
organisation of legislative assistance in the Common Assembly.
Theoretically, the hypothesis leans on sociological institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan,
1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). According to which, a form of organisation can
be adopted because it is culturally acceptable (albeit functionally ineﬃcient). In sociolo-
gical institutionalism this is known as ‘decoupling’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), i.e. when
organisation are pressured to adopt a model (‘myth’) that is promoted in the environment.
To sum up, H2a and H2b are about the first form of administrative organisation in
the EP, its creation and immediate development. A historical analysis of documents and
personal accounts is carried out to discover the hypotheses’ plausibility. Evidence shows
that the administrative organisation of the Common Assembly draws from both functional
and cultural considerations prevalent in the 1950s.
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Change The change in the organisation of EP’s legislative assistance is observed from
1958 onwards. In 1958, the early period of the EP as the Common Assembly ceased and
the era of the European Community started. Beginning from the late 1950s, the develop-
ment of the EP has been shaped by several events, notably treaty revisions, membership
enlargements and most recently, the economic crisis. The EP has been one of the European
Community’s institutions that has changed the most (Priestley, 2008). The dissertation
builds on the assumption that the revisions of EU’s treaties have had the greatest eﬀect on
the functioning of the EP. Therefore, it is supposed that the form of legislative assistance
has changed in parallel to (or shortly after) the adoption of the EU’s revised treaties. The
following hypothesis is put forward:
Hypothesis 3a: Since 1958, legislative assistance in the EP has changed in
parallel and as a result of treaty revisions.
Theoretically, Hypothesis 3a leans on the functional explanation of rational choice insti-
tutionalism. According to it, a changing environment induces institutional adaptation to
address eﬃciency concerns.
As already mentioned above, the EP has undergone a process of parlamentarisation
throughout which it has acquired characteristics similar to state legislatures. Therefore,
it can also be assumed that EP’s legislative assistance changed according to the model of
state legislatures. The hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3b: The form of legislative assistance has changed in line with the
model of state legislatures.
Hypothesis 3b implies that legislative assistance adapted to the political evolution of the
EP into a parliament with legislative powers. Compared to Hypothesis 3a, it does not
disclose anything on the pace of change.
In order to do this, the dissertation builds on the argument advanced in Hypothesis
2b, i.e. that the ideas of the ‘founding fathers’ on a federally organised Europe influenced
the organisation of legislative assistance. In the terms of historical institutionalism, such
periods are known as ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier, 2002; Ikenberry, 1994), i.e.
moments that critically mark the form of an institution. In addition, historical institution-
alism supposes that all subsequent institutional changes are extensions of the form that
was determined in a critical moment. Therefore, institutions respond to changing environ-
mental conditions, but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories that are diﬃcult
to reverse, i.e. ‘path-dependency’ (Krasner, 1988; Ikenberry, 1994). Both, sociological and
historical institutionalism, allow to theories legislative assistance as an institution changing
towards the model of state-legislatures. Even though, they invoke diﬀerent logics. Sociolo-
gical institutionalism invokes ‘critical junctures’ and ‘path-dependency’, while sociological
institutionalism invokes the logic of ‘isomorphism’. However, historical institutionalism
can inform us also on the timing of changes. In the functional explanation of rational
choice institutionalism, institutions are swift to respond to environmental changes. On
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the contrary, historical institutionalism supposes that there can be long lags between a
changed environment (i.e. process) and changed institution (i.e. outcome) (Pierson, 1996;
Pierson, 2000a). By combining the arguments of critical junctures, path-dependency and
lagged adaptation, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3c: The form of legislative assistance in the EP has gradually
changed in line with the model of state legislatures.
To sum up, the dissertation observes change in legislative assistance following assumption
in rational, sociological and historical institutionalism. The analysis of the hypotheses is
based on the author’s interviews and secondary resources, such as original documents. The
results show evidence for a functional, isomorphism and path-dependency logics. Thus,
providing evidence for the complementarity of new institutionalists’ approaches.
Independent Variable: The Eﬀects of Organisation
Once the form, origin and change of legislative assistance are known, the dissertation ex-
plores what determines the involvement of individuals in the legislative assist-
ance of members of parliament? The question is analysed on the basis of organisation
theory. The main purpose of organisation theory is to understand the causes of beha-
viour given the organisational context of formal organisations (i.e. the institutional design
as understood here) (Egeberg, 2004, p. 199). In order to understand the behaviour in an
organisation we need to ‘unpack’ these organisational characteristics within which indi-
viduals interact (Egeberg, 2004, p. 201). This dissertation is an attempt to unpack the
organisational characteristics in the administrative system of the EP. Previous empirical
research has demonstrated that formal organisations are more likely to aﬀect behaviour
than the variables. It is assumed that institutional design (i.e. formal choices over organ-
isation) determines staﬀ’s frequency of involvement in the legislative assistance to MEPs
(i.e. staﬀ’s behaviour). The hypothesis put forward is:
Hypothesis 4: The organisational structure of legislative assistance aﬀects the
behaviour of legislative staﬀ.
Five organisational structures are examined: job rank, administrative aﬃliation, functional
specialisation, policy specialisation and political specialisation. The sub-hypotheses are the
following:
Hypothesis 4a: Involvement in legislative assistance increases with the job rank.
Hypothesis 4b: Administrators employed in the general secretariat are involved
more frequently in legislative assistance than the political advisors working for
political groups and accredited parliamentary assistants.
Hypothesis 4c: Staﬀ who follow the work of at least one committee are involved
more frequently in legislative assistance than staﬀ who do not follow the work
of committees.
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Hypothesis 4d: Individuals working on economic and scientific policy are in-
volved more frequently in legislative assistance than others.
Hypothesis 4e: The involvement of staﬀ in legislative assistance depends on the
political group staﬀ work for.
1.2 Methods and Data
In order to provide evidence for the research problem above, the study uses qualitative
and quantitative methods and data. When possible data is corroborated. Depending on
whether legislative assistance is treated as a dependent or independent variable, two defin-
itions of legislative assistance are employed on diﬀerent levels of measurement. The first
part examines the organisation of legislative assistance using a nominal definition of legis-
lative assistance, which describes the phenomena in broad terms given the type of policy
areas the EP legislates on, the decision-making venues in the EP where legislative assist-
ance is needed, and the individuals in the EP who work on legislation. Given these three
features, legislative assistance in the EP is defined as the activity carried out by adminis-
trators in the general secretariat, accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) and political
advisors in political groups; in the policy areas where the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) grants the EU exclusive or shared decision-making competences;
and mainly in the committee setting compared to the plenary. This definition and the sub-
sequent analysis on the institutional design of legislative assistance are mostly based on
qualitative data, which include primary and secondary resources. Twenty-eight interviews
were conducted with staﬀ who are working or had worked in the EP’s general secretariat,
political groups and MEPs oﬃces. A series of oﬃcial documents were collected, which
included qualitative and quantitative data.
The second part of the dissertation analyses the eﬀect of the organisation of legislative
assistance using an empirical model with quantitative data. Such quantitative analysis
requires a precise definition on a high level of measurement. For this reason, the nominal
definition used in the qualitative analysis is further explored with a survey, which was
administered to legislative staﬀ working in the EP in the seventh term. On the basis of
survey responses, legislative assistance is defined with a scale of six items or tasks: advising
MEPs on the line to take on a policy, drafting amendments, drafting legislative reports,
negotiating with political groups, coordinating positions among MEPs and preparing voting
lists. The definition of legislative assistance, which is based on six tasks is narrower than the
nominal one, because it breaks down legislative assistance to six clearly defined activities.
What determines the involvement of individuals in the legislative assistance of members is
then analysed with regression analysis.
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1.3 Contribution of the Study
Even though the subject of this dissertation is an administration, this is not a classical
study of public administration. This has mainly to do with the fact that we are dealing with
the legislative and not the executive branch of government. It is uncommon for the study
of public administration to concern itself with parliaments, mainly because parliamentary
administrations, in contrast to executive ones, are small in size and free from management
responsibilities, such as the implementation of policies. Since legislative administrations
do not manage government policies, there is little scope to analyse their eﬃciency and
performance or to prescribe a set of administrative reforms, as it is the case in the study of
public administration. In addition, questions of administrative control are less interesting
in the case of parliament than the executive. That the study of public administration
mainly deals with the executive is also clear in the field of European studies, where public
administration scholars have mainly dealt with the European Commission and the Council,
the executive like organs of the European Union (for literature on the Commission see
Bauer, 2008a; Trondal, 2011; for the Council see Beach, 2004; Dijkstra, 2010) or with the
adaptation of governmental agencies for implementing EU policies (e.g. Olsen, 2003; Olsen,
2005).
In contrast to this literature, this dissertation is written in the tradition of legislative
studies, which means that by looking at the administrative players (in the EP), the aim is to
acquire new knowledge on how legislatures work. This is also not a study on bureaucracy,
as the purpose is to understand organisation rather than the influence of staﬀ. Moreover,
this thesis contributes first and foremost to the study of the European Parliament. Since
the Maastricht treaty introduced the codecision procedure in 1992, academics have devoted
significant resources to the study of the EP. The result of which has been an unprecedented
advance in the knowledge on the EP. Scholars have focused on diﬀerent areas such as the
position of the EP in the EU institutional context, where scholars have analysed the impact
of the EP on Community legislation given diﬀerent decision-making procedures (Héritier
and Reh, 2012; Kreppel, 2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Tsebelis, 1994), the role of political
groups, where the main focus has been the allocation of resources and the voting patterns
in the EP (Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix et al., 2007; Lindberg et al., 2009; Bowler and Farrell,
1995), the characteristics of MEPs, where the main theme is the role of MEPs (Scarrow,
1997), and the internal political organisation of the EP, where the most attention has been
devoted to the committee structure (Yordanova, 2009; Whitaker, 2011). It is within this
branch of studies on the EP, which examines the forms of legislative organisation, that this
PhD dissertation contributes the most.
However, instead of dwelling on the political organisation, the focus is on the adminis-
trative organisation in the EP and its legislative staﬀ. It is important to note that while
the political organisation of the EP has been the subject of academic attention, rare are
studies that treat the problem of its administrative organisation. The fact that research on
the EP’s administration is limited, reflects also the situation in studies on European na-
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tional parliaments (for exceptions see Schendelen 1976; Ryle 1981; Campbell and Laporte
1981). An exception in the field of legislative studies is research, which has been carried
out on the American Congress (Senate and House of Representatives). Hammond (1984;
1996) has written two articles reviewing this literature. Through the analysis of literature
she shows that scholars have acknowledge legislative staﬀ as part of the political system
and a variable aﬀecting the legislative process.
In contrast to the USA, studying legislatures from the perspective of their adminis-
trations is a relatively new way of thinking about parliaments in Europe. As pointed out
by Christiansen et al. (2014, p. 123) the study of parliament in Europe has focused on
‘formal institutions’ such as the ‘political preferences of elected members, political party
hierarchies, parliamentary speakers and committee chairs’. As this thesis shows, studying
the parliament from an administrative angle does not in any way undermine the literature
on the political structures of parliament. On the opposite, observing administration can
shed new light on what political developments (i.e. changes or reforms) mean for a given
political system and the institutional players therein. As this thesis shows, the political
and administrative developments go hand in hand and are dependent upon each other.
1.4 Plan of the Study
Legislative assistance in the EP is addressed in eleven chapters and two empirical parts.
Chapter 2 and 3 develop the theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter 2 includes
a literature review, while Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical approach underpinning the
dissertation. Chapter 4 gives an overview on the data and methods employed in the thesis.
The empirical results of the dissertation are split into two parts. Chapters 5 to 7 make
up the first empirical part, which can be regarded as the qualitative part of the dissertation,
where legislative assistance is treated as a dependent variable. Chapter 5 asks who are the
providers of legislative assistance and what kind of assistance do they oﬀer. These two
questions are answered given the examples of national legislatures in the United States of
America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and France. Subsequently, some
parallels are drawn between the organisation of the EP and national parliaments. Based
on the conclusion drawn from the fifth chapter, the sixth and seventh chapters then explore
the organisation of legislative assistance in the EP from 1952 to 2013.
Chapters 8 to 10 constitute the second empirical part, which can be considered as the
quantitative part of the dissertation, where legislative assistance is treated as an independ-
ent variable. In the second part, the eﬀects of the organisation of legislative assistance are
tested. Evidence is based on quantitative data, which was obtained with a survey. Chapter
8 develops a theoretical model on the determinants of staﬀ’s involvement in legislative as-
sistance. In addition, the independent variables of the model are operationalised. Chapter
9 develops the concept of legislative assistance as a type of behaviour. Chapter 10 then
tests the empirical model on what determines staﬀ involvement in legislative assistance.
The final chapter is a conclusion, which links the qualitative and quantitative results.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Legislative Staﬀ
Contrary to the books on the European Commission by Page (1997), Stevens and Stevens
(2001) no comprehensive study on the administrative actors in the EP has been pub-
lished so far. Descriptive information over recruitment procedures, promotions, salaries
and representativeness has been collected in a fragmented way as part of greater research
projects on the EP (e.g. Corbett, 2001, p. 90; Corbett et al., 2007, pp. 101, 133, 199; Judge
and Earnshaw, 2003, p. 176; Clark and Priestley, 2012, 363-376, also 7-9, 76-77, 207, 248;
Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012, pp. 274-74, 752-53). Almost all of these works have been
written by people who work(ed) for one of the EU institution. In addition, researchers
have covered specialised topics such as organisation and reforms (Kungla, 2007; Priestley,
2000), administrative autonomy from politics (Camenen, 1995; Costa, 2003), legislative as-
sistance (Neunreither, 2003) and the history of the administrative service (Guerrieri, 2012)
(see Table 2.1). In recent years there has been a revival of the subject on legislative staﬀ
both on the European and national level (e.g. Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013;
Egeberg et al., 2013; Michon, 2014). Theoretically and methodologically the literature is
rich. This can be attributed to the fact that the administration of the EP has been studied
by sociologists, historians and political scientists. In the following paragraphs I review this
literature. The first section recaps studies in political sociology as the most coherent group
of studies. The second section presents studies where the emphasise is on administrators
as participants in a political process.
2.1 Staﬀ as Social Actors
The most coherent group of studies is the one using an interpretative epistemology and a
social ontology (i.e. studying the nature and structure of social reality) (see Kauppi, 2003;
Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010; Ripoll-Servent and Busby, 2013). Most of these stud-
ies have been published by scholars aﬃliated to the research group of European political
sociology at the University of Strasbourg (for an exception see Busby, 2013). This group
of academics has come the closest to providing a comprehensive theoretical approach for
studying administrative players in the EU. Their contributions are inspired by Pierre Bour-
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Table 2.1: Research on EP’s Administration
Subject Examples Methods General finding(s)
Descriptive
information
Corbett et al.
2007; Clark
and Priestley
2012;
Teasdale and
Bainbridge
2012
Documentary
analysis
Insiders’
views
Information on the organisation of work,
demographics and the role of staﬀ.
Organisation
and reform
Priestley
2000; Reck
2003;
Neunreither
2003; Kungla
2007
Documentary
analysis
Interviews
The EP Secretariat has evolved in parallel with
MEP’s role and their powers. In order to provide
autonomous information and technical expertise
vis-à-vis lobby sources of information the EP needs
a strong internal administrative capacities. Reforms
of the EP administration are slow.
Autonomy
from politics
Camenen
1995; Costa
2003;
Neunreither
2003; Perez
2007
Documentary
analysis
Insiders’
views
The EP administration is subject to more
politicisation than national parliaments. It was
independent in the 1950s and 1960s. Gradually the
functions of the secretariat fell under the authority
of politicians.
Role in the
policy process
Winzen 2011;
Dobbels and
Neuhold 2013
Interviews
Case study of
policy
Factors and conditions determining the delegation of
task: The role of secretariat’s oﬃcials is in the
discretion of MEPs and the rapporteurs in
particularly. The secretariat takes over
policy-making tasks in policy cases where the MEPs
do not have expertise or when the policy is not
politically important.
Behaviour
and inter-
institutional
relations
Egeberg et al.
2013; 2014a,
2014b
Survey
Count of
meetings
The behaviour of oﬃcials in the EP reflects
supranational, ideological and sectoral consideration.
Similar organisational patterns facilitate
inter-institutional dialogue.
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Table 2.1: Research on EP’s Administration - continued
Subject Examples Methods General finding(s)
Sources of
information
Reck 2003;
Neunreither
2003
Documentary
analysis
To exert influence on policy, the EP depends on its
expertise sources. Information is therefore the key
source for civil servants to exert influence on MEPs
and policy-making. Increasingly complex and
technical issues require internal and external
expertise. External sources of expertise have better
adapted to the needs of MEPs after the Maastricht
Treaty than in-house expertise. The main issue is
impartiality of information.
Agent
perspective
Michon 2004;
2005; 2008;
2014; Busby
and Belkacem
2013; Busby
2013
Biographical
studies
Ethnography
Conditions to enter the European political space
(education, country of origin, age etc.).
History Guerrieri
2012
Analysis of
primary
resources
Historical account on the development of
administration 1952-1979.
dieu’s agenda of organisational research and in particular Bourdieu’s concept of field as a
set of organisations active in what DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) see as a ‘recognised
area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agen-
cies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products’ (see also Emirbayer
and Johnson, 2008).
The majority of empirical contributions in political sociology deals with elected actors
in the EU (i.e. commissioners and MEPs) and to a certain extent with non-elected oﬃ-
cials working in the European Commission (e.g. Beauvallet and Michon, 2010; Mangenot,
2004; Georgakakis and Lassale, 2004; Georgakakis, 2010b). Less attention has been paid to
administrative actors working in the European Parliament. When such studies exist they
are about assistants working for the members of parliament in the EP. These studies have
generated data describing the daily work of staﬀ, which represents an important source of
information on how administrators work on a daily basis. The objective of interpretative
studies is to investigate the actors or the ‘elites’ that make decisions in the EU. Their
contribution is the investigation of the ‘human dimension’ of policy-making in the EU. In
the words of Kauppi (2011, p. 150): ‘A sociological account makes clear what should be
self-evident: the EU does not do anything by itself; it is people as everyday political agents
who make the EU happen.’
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Although political sociologists take the individual as the unit of analysis, they do not
study people as members of an organisation. This means that people are not treated as
the personnel of an organisation in terms of salaries, recruitment criteria and procedures.
Members of an organisation are first and foremost members of a society. What is important
is the relationship between the individual and society rather than the individual and the
organisation. More precisely, what is researched are the conditions in which power is
produced. By analysing the social capital of agents, sociologists answer questions such as
what does it take to become an MEP, European Commissioner, stagier or legislative staﬀer
in the EP and how diﬀerent social capitals influence someone’s orientation towards Europe
and the EU. Capital is a social relation rather than a thing or material phenomenon.
Hence, the interest does not lie in explaining behaviour or the outcome of decision-making.
Michon as a scholar from French political sociology has, for example, published re-
search on assistants to MEPs (2005; 2008; 2014) and stagiers (2004). He has observed that
the social capital (i.e. education, social origin, age, gender, political experience etc.) of
assistants is important in order to understand them as actors in the European political
space. The specific social capital, which gives them access to EU institutions is acquired
through the process of socialisation. In such a way socialisation is more than the adoption
and internalisation of norms and rules of an organisation (see Checkel, 2005, p. 804), but
also the process of becoming members of a specific social class (Georgakakis, 2010a). The
British scholar Busby (2013) has also conducted research on the assistants in the EP. By
direct observations and other qualitative methods she has observed the every day activities
in the EP. Her argument is that by observing the social life in the EP, one can assess the
importance of diﬀerent actors. By looking at who the MEPs’ assistants are and what they
do, she shows that assistants play an information interface role for the MEP. They serve
as gate keepers, filters and tailors of information (see also Busby and Belkacem, 2013;
Ripoll-Servent and Busby, 2013).
2.2 Staﬀ as Actors in the Political System
In addition to studies in political sociology, some studies have been published in political
science as well. The political science research agenda on (legislative) administration is
not coordinated in the sense that it does not follow a common theoretical framework as
seen in the sociology of political elites.1 It can be said however that their epistemology is
positive in the sense that they engage in hypothesis testing. The focus is on the relation-
ship between members of parliament and staﬀ, the delegation of authority, politicisation
and the outcome of individuals’ behaviour (for example the extent of involvement in the
policy process) rather than the process leading to that outcome (for example individuals
habits and surroundings). While political sociologists show why an individual has become
an EU oﬃcial (because of membership in a particular social group), positivists political
1Most of the research in the sociology of political elites is done at Centre for European Political Sociology
in Strasbourg, France.
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scientists investigate how these individuals act in the policy-process of the EU once they
are members of that organisation. In this way political science poses diﬀerent questions
on administration than sociology, because it analyses questions relating to politics and
governance, which sociology does not (at least explicitly).
2.2.1 Studies in the 1990s and 2000s
Studies published in the 1990s and 2000s are descriptive and theoretically undefined.
Rather than building on a comprehensive theory, these studies lean on theoretical con-
cepts that stem from the principal agent model or a classical theory of behaviour, where
the agent is an instrument to the principal (e.g. Winzen, 2014). One of the concepts that
appears repeatedly is expertise. Information is seen as a key source for non-elected oﬃcials
(and other providers of information) to exert influence on policy-making. For example,
Reck (2003, pp. 45-73) has looked at the role of expertise in the EP. She analyses the
internal (i.e. administrative actors in the EP) and external sources (i.e. expertise outside
the EP organisation) of information available to MEPs. She comes to the conclusion that
internal sources have been slow in adapting to the political changes in the EP. This has
created opportunities for interest groups to influence the EP. Neunreither (2003) also stud-
ies legislative assistance in the EP regarding the collection and distribution of information.
He acknowledges that the sources for legislative assistance have increased since the begin-
nings of the EP, as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community,
and that there is now a market of information. At the same time the importance of inside
assistance has diminished. In such circumstances the main problem is that information on
which MEPs base their decision may be impaired. In order to tackle this problem, both
Reck and Neunreither hint to the necessity of reforms to enhance the internal capacities
of the EP.
Reform in a broad sense is the subject dealt upon in the works of Priestley (2000)
and Kungla (2007). Together with Neunreither’s chapter, Priestley and Kungla contribute
to our understanding of the administrative reform ‘Raising the Game’, which was imple-
mented in 2003. Neunreither and Priestley address the problems facing the EP before
the reform took place. While Neunreither focuses on the problems related to legislation,
Priestley (2000) address the operational problems facing the EP. In his opinion the inef-
ficiencies of the EP’s secretariat are related to its many working places and the linguistic
diversity within the house. He advocates for a modernisation and rationalisation of the
EP’s services. While most of his remarks are technical, he also recognises the need for fos-
tering an ‘état d’esprit’ among the EP’s employees. Kungla (2007) specifically addresses
the content of the reform ‘Raising the Game’ and looks at the organisational change in the
EP from the perspective of public administration theory. In his view ‘Raising the Game’
was the result of internal and external forces. Reform was possible, because of the ex-
ternal pressure coming from the treaty modifications and enlargements, while an internal
consensus over the need for change had finally matured within the EP.
36 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: LEGISLATIVE STAFF
Camenen (1995), Costa (2003) and Perez (2007) mainly deal with the organisation of
the central administration or the secretariat in the EP and ask how autonomous it is vis-à-
vis the political authorities in the EP. On the one hand, they acknowledge the importance of
the secretariat as a technical service; on the other hand, they conclude that the secretariat
is politicised and that it has little leeway for action (Camenen, 1995, pp. 150-153; Costa
2001, pp. 141, 152; Perez, 2007, p. 379). Politicisation in the administrative system of
the EP manifests itself as the submission of the secretariat to political groups, which
influence the secretariat’s organisation.2 Several instances highlight the politicisation and
weakness of the EP’s secretariat. For example, since the first direct election the number
of political group staﬀ has grown faster than the staﬀ of the general secretariat (Costa,
2001, p. 148). It is also reported that oﬃcials act according to partisan preference in order
to be promoted (Camenen, 1995, p. 153; Perez, 2007, p. 380). Camenen (1995, pp. 145-
147) also argues that the EP’s general secretariat exhibits higher level of politicisation than
national parliamentary administration. This is in his opinion surprising given the historical
circumstances in which the EP’s administration developed. Multilingualism, a multitude of
administrative traditions, the relative youthfulness of the EP, absence of decision-making
powers and the absence of full-time MEPs were favourable conditions for the developments
of an autonomous and independent general secretariat. More on the historical development
of the EP’s administration has been documented by Guerrieri (in particular 2000 and 2012,
but also 2008 and 2010). Guerrieri is in particular keen in explaining the set up of the first
administrative apparatus of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European
Economic Communities. As all the literature described thus far his interests mainly lies in
the general secretariat of the EP.
2.2.2 Studies in 2010s
Role Theory and Principal Agent Theory The latest studies in 2010s show greater
theoretical rigour in the direction of agency theory (i.e. principal-agent model) and role
theory. For example, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and Neuhold and Dobbels (2014) do
not solely built on the concept of expertise, but they integrate it in a theoretical approach
of policy roles considering the relationship between the principal(s) and the agent. Their
theoretical framework builds on research on the delegation of competences in executive
bureaucracies. Based on this literature they identify three roles: production, service or
maintenance and steering role (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013, pp. 3-4; Neuhold and Dobbels,
2014, pp. 6-7). The production role means that staﬀ draft briefings and amendments given
clear instructions from MEPs (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013, p. 13). The service role means
that staﬀ use their expertise to draft amendments within the limits set by MEP who gives
less detailed and rigid instructions. The steering role adds to the service role and includes
intervening directly and beyond the instruction of an MEP.
2The influence of political groups, especially the main political groups (Socialists and Christian-
Democrats), is corroborated in Kreppel’s study (2002) on the amendments to the rules of procedure of the
EP, which empowered political groups over the other actors in the EP.
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The purpose of Dobbels and Neuhold (2013, p. 13) was to identify the factors that
influence the roles of staﬀ and thus the types of tasks MEPs delegate to civil servants.
Dobbels and Neuhold based their results on a study of four policy proposals in fisheries
and immigration policy. They showed that the relationship between MEPs and staﬀ varies
depending on MEPs’ expertise, experience or interest. When MEPs posses limited expertise
and when they are not politically interested like in the case of fishery policy, civil servants
play a steering role. For the case of immigration, they observed that secretariat oﬃcials
play a service and production role. They prescribed this role to the low level of agreement
in the EP and between institutions: when a policy proposal is the subject of conflict, the
role of secretariat oﬃcials diminishes. In addition, it appears that the scope of action
for secretariat oﬃcials is larger in consultation files (e.g. fishery and immigration policy),
where the EP lacks decision-making powers.
Subsequently, Neuhold and Dobbels (2014) examined the conditions for delegation
on another set of policy cases and discovered some new findings compared to Dobbels
and Neuhold (2013). They found that expertise does not benefit the involvement of staﬀ,
when a policy proposal is politically important and contested between political groups
(e.g. single permit directive). Contrary to previous findings, they found that secretariat
oﬃcials can also play a substantial role in cases of policy proposal which are deemed
politically important (e.g. novel foods regulation) (Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014, p. 11).
Finally, by studying the adoption of the 2011 annual budget they found out that the
budgetary area is a particular case: while the technicality of the dossier on the annual
budget benefits the role of secretariat oﬃcials, the formalised and multi-policy aspects
of the annual budget limits the role of secretariat oﬃcials to production (Neuhold and
Dobbels, 2014, pp. 13-14). The main argument is that a series of factors determine the
extent to which MEPs delegate competence to staﬀ (i.e. importance of policy proposals,
the degree of politicised competences and unity in parliament) (Neuhold and Dobbels,
2014, p. 15).
Throughout their investigation Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and Neuhold and Dobbels
(2014) show that the role of secretariat oﬃcials depends on MEPs as their principal. This is
also the main finding of Winzen (2011). Winzen uses the principal agent model in order to
explore the role of oﬃcials working in the secretariats of the EP’s committees. His study is
limited to committees dealing with foreign aﬀairs dossiers (i.e. AFET and INTA) and does
not examine any particular policy dossiers. Foreign aﬀairs committees deal mostly with
non-legislative reports and decision-making is consensual with only a few contested votes.
Given the character of reports in foreign aﬀairs committees Winzen assumed that staﬀ in
foreign aﬀairs committees can be importantly involved in the policy-process. Even though
less explicit than Dobbels and Neuhold, Winzen (2011, pp. 28, 30) also uses the theoretical
concept of roles in the sense of technical and political functions carried out by EP oﬃcials.
As political work he classified activities that influence the substance of policy outcomes
by informing the policy process (e.g. researching policy options, providing expertise)
(Winzen, 2011, pp. 30, 33). Technical work is defined as the management of the policy
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process, which includes structuring agendas or the organisation of meetings (e.g. booking
rooms, taking minutes, preparation of documents for meetings) (Winzen, 2011, pp. 30-
33). He concludes that there is no clear-cut between technical and political functions. For
example, committee oﬃcials have the opportunity to influence future committee priorities
by their technical function to prepare the committee agenda (Winzen, 2011, p. 32). His
main finding is that independent whether a task is political or technical the extent of civil
servants’ involvement in the policy process is always determined and conditioned by the
political hierarchy in the EP, i.e. MEPs, chairmen, rapporteurs.
While Winzen demonstrates the principal is in control of the agent (i.e. through the
delegation of authority the principal controls the agent), Dobbels and Neuhold show that
under certain circumstances the agent plays a role that goes beyond the principal’s in-
structions. While Winzen (2011), Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and Neuhold and Dobbels
(2014) all find support for a hierarchy of relationships, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013, p. 13)
also conclude that inter-personal relationships can determine the role secretariat oﬃcials
are delegated. In this way Dobbels and Neuhold show that the relationship between the
bureaucrats and politicians in the EP does not reflect the assumption of the classical theory
of behaviour, where the agent is the instrument of the principal. They do so when explain-
ing how the political procedure and inter-personal relations are also important variables
defining the relationship between MEPs and bureaucrats in addition to expertise, experi-
ence and political interest (see Waterman and Meier, 1998, p. 178). The delegation of tasks
therefore depends on the relationship between the politician and bureaucrat, but also on
the context.
Together these findings importantly contribute to the understanding of the relationship
between unelected and elected oﬃcials. The importance lays in the discovery that diﬀerent
relationship between legislators and civil servants exist given agency assumptions (see
Waterman and Meier, 1998, p. 194). It appears that the bureaucracy of the EP enjoys a
certain level of discretion rather than being completely passive or under control. Moreover,
the role of bureaucrats does not solely depend on the level of information or interests, but
on other variables as well.
Socialisation Even though Dobbels and Neuhold do not explicitly say so, their findings
imply that the theorised relationships between the principal and the agent cannot explain
the role of non-elected oﬃcials in its entirety. In other words rational-choice theories can
only partially account for the role of administrators in the policy-process. Juncos and
Pomorska (2013) have reached a similar conclusion albeit not in the case of the EP, but
for oﬃcials working in the EU diplomatic service (EEAS). In order to explain diplomats’
attitudes towards the EEAS Juncos and Pomorska have combined rational choice and
sociological approaches. Since their research was carried out at the beginning of the EEAS
establishment, when the careers opportunities in the service were uncertain, Juncos and
Pomorska expected EEAS oﬃcials to have negative attitudes towards the new service. On
the contrary, they discovered that oﬃcials nurtured positive attitudes. Their conclusion is
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that positive attitudes towards the EEAS cannot solely be explained by utility calculus on
career prospects, but also through the degree of ones’ identification with the EU. In this
way Juncos and Pomorska (2013, p. 1343) draw attention to the concept of socialisation
as a possible variable outside the principal-agent model with consequences on behaviour.
Several studies have dealt with the socialisation of European actors (e.g. Scheinman
and Feld, 1972; Beyers, 2005; Checkel, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Sauvarierol et
al., 2013). In this literature socialisation is studied as an outcome variable and rarely as
the predictor variable as in the case of Juncos and Pomorska. Moreover, only a limited
number of studies deal with the socialisation of actors in the EP, and when they do, it
is mostly about the members of parliament rather than administrators (e.g. Scully 2005;
Beauvallet and Michon 2010). Only Egeberg et al. (2014b) and Michon (2004; 2008; 2014)
have investigated the socialisation of non-elected actors in the EP. As already explained
before, Michon argues that the social capital of assistants and stagiaires in the EP explains
their presence and positions in the EU institutions. The specific social capital which gives
them access to EU institutions is acquired through the process socialisation. Similarly
to Michon, Egeberg et al. (2014b) researched the eﬀect of nationality, education, future
career plans and gender on oﬃcials views and consideration at work. They labelled these
personal traits as sources of pre-socialisation, which might steer individuals towards specific
behaviour even before entering the EP administration. Unlike Michon, they find little
evidence supporting the hypothesis that pre-socialisation aﬀects oﬃcials’ decision-making
behaviour in the EP.
Formal Organisations Egeberg et al. (2013, 2014a) employed an organisational per-
spective to examine the behaviour of oﬃcials in the EP. This means that they have re-
searched the eﬀects of organisational variables (structures), such as the ideological and
sectoral (functional) specialisation of work, on the behaviour of individuals in the EP.
Egeberg et al. (2013, p. 510) found by using quantitative data obtained with a survey
that oﬃcials in the EP are involved in policy-making tasks such as drafting reports; an
insight, which corresponds to Winzen’s (2011) and Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) argument.
Egeberg et al. (2013) discovered that the EP’s secretariat and political group staﬀ cherish
the European interest above national considerations. In addition, secretariat staﬀ holds
sectoral and expert concerns. Group staﬀ in contrast nourish considerations of ideology,
pays attention to interests groups and sectoral concerns. The division of considerations
fits the theoretical assumption put forward by organisation theory. Both secretariat and
group staﬀ are aﬃliated to a European institution rather than a national one, therefore,
they emphasise arguments of European interests. The secretariat is primarily organised
sectorally, while political groups are organised ideologically (and sectorally), which explains
the diﬀerences among them. Furthermore, the considerations expressed by EP staﬀ corres-
ponds to the behavioural patterns of MEPs, but also to the behavioural patters of oﬃcials
working in the Council and Commission (Egeberg et al., 2013, pp. 496, 511). They con-
clude that administrative behaviour, which is shaped by sectoral and ideological cleavages
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goes against an intergovernmental logic of inter-institutional order in the EP. In another
article Egeberg et al. (2014a) further examine the sectoral, ideological and supranational
considerations to conclude that contacts between EP, the Commission and Council are
facilitated by their similar organisational specialisation and behavioural patterns. They
hypothesize that, since the Council functions on other organisational premises than the EP
and Commission, inter-institutional relationship with the Council are less likely. In sum-
mary, Egeberg et al. (2013, 2014a) show that the way in which the EP administration is
organised aﬀects the role of the EP in its decision-making procedure and inter-institutional
relations.
2.2.3 EP’s Parliamentary Administration in Perspective
That the behaviour of staﬀ depends on a constellation of factors is corroborated by the
findings on Congressional staﬀ in the USA. As in the EP, legislative staﬀ in the Congress
can aﬀect policy to the extent legislators empower them. Staﬀ’s capability to influence
increases if politicians are not experts on the topic (Patterson, 1970, p. 28) and when the
nature of an issues is technical (DeGregorio, 1994).
Besides examining the relations between staﬀ and members, scholars have also looked
at the individual characteristics of oﬃcials. Price (1971) assumed that the activity of staﬀ
varies given their partisan or professional orientation. Partisan staﬀ continuously seeks
opportunities to bring new initiatives and push proposals towards their desired outcome.
Professionals, which are defined as non-partisan experts, prefer to react to the needs of
members by analysing and objectively presenting policies rather than proactively initiating
policies. DeGregorio (1994) discovered that when staﬀ is motivated by loyalty, members
are more willing to involve them in the policy process than when they are motivated by
personal interests (see also Patterson, 1970, p. 29; Butler, 1966, p. 12). Experience and the
characteristics to be anonymous (i.e. to not take a public stance or being associated with
a specific policy) also positively influences the involvement of staﬀ in the policy process
(DeGregorio, 1994; Patterson, 1970, pp. 29-31). Fox and Hammond (1977, pp. 33, 145-
149) have shown how the the role of staﬀ depends also on education, prior experience,
organisational milieu, political values, personality and communications patters.
Besides studying the involvement of staﬀ, scholars have analysed also the profile of
Congressional staﬀ, their career orientations and professions (Romzek and Utter, 1996;
Romzek and Utter, 1997), accountability (Romzek, 2000) and staﬀ turnover (Anderson,
1990; Jensen, 2011). More recently, an increasing number of studies has been published
on parliamentary administration in the US and representative bureaucracy (Wilson and
Carlos, 2013; Wilson, 2013).
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2.3 Conclusions
The chapter has reviewed the literature that has been thus far published on the topic
of unelected oﬃcials in the context of parliaments and the EP/EU in particular. To
sum up, the study of administrative players in the EP has attracted attention since the
1990s. Most of the literature in the early days was descriptive and focused on the role
of the secretariat of the EP. Systematic and theoretically sound research has begun in
2010s. The review has shown that parliamentary administration has been the object of
observations for sociologists, political scientists and historians. As a result, the body of
literature is theoretically and methodologically rich. Researchers have paid attention to
the process of constituting an elite working for the EP and to roles secretariat oﬃcials
play in policy-making. However, scholarly contributions are limited to less than twenty
publications, which means that none of the aspects has been studied extensively.

Chapter 3
Theoretical Approach
This chapter provides an introduction to the theoretical approach that is then applied in
the empirical parts of the thesis. Rather than leaning on one theory, the thesis draws on dif-
ferent perspectives to institutions, namely new-institutionalism and organisation theory.1
New-institutionalism is generally recognised to consist of diﬀerent analytical approaches
(i.e. historical, rational and sociological institutionalism), which overall deal with the cre-
ation and change of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). New-institutionalism is itself
rooted in organisation theory (Peters, 2005, p. 26). Indeed, organisation theory aims to
explain institutional dynamics (e.g. behaviour, decisions, attitudes, beliefs, etc.) by tak-
ing into account organisational structures and designs (Simon, 1997; Egeberg, 2004). The
thesis relies on these two theoretical approaches, because the purpose is to explain legis-
lative assistance as an institutional design and a type of behaviour. As it will be shown
in the subsequent part of this chapter new-institutionalism and organisation theory allow
doing just that.
Defining Institutions While acknowledging that institutions consist also of normative
and cultural elements Simon (1997, p. 2), institutions are in this thesis defined as arrange-
ments, which are explicitly formulated and in place to fulfil a particular organisational
task or specific goal (Scott, 2003, pp. 26-27; Blau and Scott, 2003, pp. 3-8, 37; Kiser and
Ostrom, 1982, p. 193; Scott, 2014, p. 56). Given this definition, the theoretical approach of
the thesis can be described as an institutional take on the instrumental character of organ-
isation, where the main emphasis is on the formal organisation or structure of institutions.
3.1 What Theory and For What Purpose?
The review of the literature on the EP’s parliamentary administration has shown that
legislative assistance, its organisation and participants are all taken as given phenomena.
A similar trend is observed for other studies on the internal political (non-administrative)
1The term theory and approach is here used interchangeably. It is considered that institutionalism is
not a comprehensive theory, but rather an ensemble of approaches.
43
44 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL APPROACH
organisation of the EP (e.g. committees, working groups, procedures, etc.). In this type
of studies the institutional design of an organisation is not addressed directly, but implied
through its functioning (Pierson, 2000c, p. 476). The main question that is asked is what
are the eﬀects of institutions (Peters, 2005), which means that the main interest is the
explanatory power of institutions rather than their explanation.
By contrast, a number of scholars have shown interest also in explaining the choices
and design of one type of institutions over others and the way they subsequently develop.
The purpose of these studies is not anymore to explain the outcome of institutions, but
rather to explain the choice and development of the institution itself. The object of obser-
vation is the institution as a process. Several academic articles have addressed the design
of institutions in the EU. For example, scholars have studied the case of administrative
reforms in the European Commission (Balint et al., 2007), the political structures in the
EP (Rittberger, 2005; Gungor, 2008; Bressanelli, 2014) and other cases in the EU (Héritier,
2007; Rasmussen, 2007; Tallberg, 2010; Héritier, 2012). So far, this kind of study has not
been done for the case of legislative assistance in the EP. This dissertation is hence the
first attempt to do so.
While institutions have been studied as independent or dependent variables, rarer are
the studies that treat institutions as independent and dependent variables. The underlying
assumptions for studying institutions as independent and dependent variables is that in
order to understand the functioning and eﬀects of an institution, we need to be informed
over its institutional design (Shulock, 1998, p. 299, Acharya and Johnston, 2007). Studying
institutions as dependent and independent variables is a sizeable task. It involves the
theorisation of one phenomenon (e.g. legislative assistance) in two diﬀerent ways (i.e. design
and eﬀect) and then an attempt to explain the interaction between the two dimensions
of a phenomenon. While we have fairly good theoretical tools to study institutions as
one-dimensional phenomena (i.e. either as designs or eﬀects), scholarly literature has been
less capable to identify the interaction between the two (Peters, 2005, p. 150; Acharya and
Johnston, 2007, p. 25; Ness and Brechin, 1988, p. 248, Christensen et al., 2007, p. 176).
Given the time and scope of a doctoral dissertation, the present work subscribes to
the view that such design issues are important and should not be neglected (Acharya
and Johnston, 2007, p. 10). The objective of the present study is to gather knowledge
on legislative assistance as an institutional arrangement. The thesis aims to explain the
institutional (or organisational) design of legislative assistance and the eﬀects of design
onto the behaviour of staﬀ in the EP: How does an institution come to be and how does it
influence behaviour? By studying institutions as an outcome and explanatory variable, this
dissertation aspires to provide a comprehensive model for the understanding of legislative
assistance in the EP. In order to do so, the following chapter sketches theories that explain
institutions either as dependent or independent variables. The first part of the chapter
provides an overview of approaches to institutional design drawing on new-institutionalism.
The second part provides an overview on institutional eﬀects based on organisation theory.
The approaches that are presented are then applied in subsequent chapters.
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3.2 Approaches to Institutional Design
Institutional design is defined as the organisation’s plan, structure and mode of opera-
tion (Fairtlough, 2008, pp. 1046, 1054). It includes formal (e.g. legal rules and professional
requirements, etc.) and informal structures (e.g. shared ideas, beliefs and values among
participants) (Acharya and Johnston, 2007, 15; Goodin 1998, 31-4). Studying an institu-
tional design involves investigations over the form, creation, stability, change and decay
of institutions. In the exploration of institutional design scholars are in essence interested
in the processes that have produced an institution. The eﬀects of institutional design on
behaviour are left aside, even if institutions are (purposefully or not) designed to shape or
direct the behaviour of individuals, groups of people, organisations, etc.
The design of institutions is notably addressed within the theoretical framework of
new-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2005). New-institutionalism consists
of diﬀerent theoretical approaches: rational, sociological and historical institutionalism.
These approaches provide diﬀerent arguments as to how institutions are born and change
(e.g. by accident, by evolution and/or as the result of purposive actions) (Goodin, 1996,
pp. 24-25). In the following section the three approaches are described. The purpose of
this review is to lay down the theoretical assumptions of each approach on the formation
and change of institutions. This is followed by a discussion on the complementary aspects
of new-institutionalists’ approaches. The theories are then applied to the EP in Part I.
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism conceives the emergence and change of an institution as
the result of an interaction (e.g. cooperation or conflict) between actors that are rational.
It informs us on how institutions are devised and reformed rather than what specific form
they should take. Actors devising an institution make decisions between the available
alternatives based on the costs and payoﬀs associated with each alternative (Shepsle, 1989;
Shepsle, 2010). Design follows a ‘logic of consequence’ and prior preferences (Olsen and
March, 1989). The alternative that is chosen is an optimal choice given its maximising
utility (North, 1990). Any outcome is rational if it is achieved according to perceived
preferences (Pettit, 1996, p. 63). However, interests perception depends on the evidence
and information that actors have at their disposal. This is known as bounded rationality
(Simon, 1997, p. 72). While the rationality of actors is the most important postulate (Elster,
1986), rational choice theorists have diﬀerent views on how rational calculations play out
and how preferences are formed. Institutions can either be the result of distributive or
functional interests (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 92). The form (i.e. functional or distributive) of an
institution will depend on the strategies that actors decide to pursue.
Functional Explanation When actors seek a solution for a collective problem, they
look for a common benefit, which means finding an arrangement that minimises transaction
costs (North, 1990; North, 1991). The underlying logic is here to achieve a solution that
46 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL APPROACH
is ‘best’ for everyone. The ‘best’ institution in rational choice terms is one that reflects
equilibrium, seeks an overall eﬃciency and allows gains for the collective pool of actors.
To gain as a collective, everyone has to sacrifice something. The game that is played is one
with a variable sum that is distributed according to mutual benefits. This logic is known as
the functional explanation of rational choice and it is arguably the most commonly applied
perspective in rational choice institutionalism (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p. 15).
A wide literature has used this approach in order to explain the legislative organisation
in the American Congress. For example, Cox and McCubbins (1994) studied the institution
of majority party in the US House of Representatives, where the majority party is under-
stood as a common good for all party members. While the party limits the behaviour of its
members (e.g. controls the agenda through the assignments of committee positions or sets
the rules governing the functioning of committees), it serves also as a label through which
candidates are recognised in elections and thus elected. Hix et al. (2009) used a similar
argument to explain the high levels of voting cohesion within EP political groups. Parlia-
mentary committees are another example of institutions, which provide a common good to
both committee and non-committee members (Krehbiel, 1992). Legislators specialise into
committees in order to overcome the scarcity of information and to reduce the uncertainty
of policy outcomes, which should produces better policy. Several studies provide evidence
for an informational logic in the EP on the examples of committee membership and rap-
porteurship assignments (e.g. Whitaker, 2001; McElroy, 2006; Kaeding, 2004; Yordanova,
2009; Whitaker, 2011; Yordanova, 2013). Decision-making procedures can also be seen as
institutions providing collective benefits. For example, Kardasheva (2013) has investig-
ated the adoption of packaged deals between the EP and members states in the Council.
She found out that package deals on legislation with budgetary implications allows member
states to control the financial aspect of legislation, while the EP gains institutional power in
distributive policies. There are several other examples of functional explanations outside
legislative studies, which include studies on regional cooperation (Sweet and Sandholtz,
1997; Caporaso, 1998) and international regimes (Keohane, 1984).
Distributive Explanation An alternative strategy to seeking functional solutions of
equilibrium is for actors to use power for influencing the outcome in the direction of one’s
own benefit (Moe, 1987; Knight, 1992; Knight, 1998; Doron and Sened, 2001). At the
centre of this strategy are the self-interested individuals. Rather than with functional
properties, actors are concerned with the distributional characteristics of an institutional
arrangement. Accordingly, actors engage in strategic bargaining where there is a total
to be divided, i.e. a zero sum game with winners and losers. One’s loss is another’s gain.
Diﬀerent arrangements have diﬀerent distributional consequences, which means that actors
benefit diﬀerently from a solution or cooperation (Stacey and Rittberger, 2003, pp. 864-
65). The form of an institution depends on the distribution of leverage among actors,
where the ones with the most power impose their preferred solution. This approach is
known as distributional rational choice institutionalism. While functional rational choice
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institutionalism sees actors as relatively equal and independent, the distributive approach
assumes that some actors have more power than others and have thus more influence on
institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 952-953).
Employing this approach, Knight (2008) examined the allocation of seats in the Amer-
ican Senate, where each state has two representatives. He found out that the seat distribu-
tion gives small population states disproportionate bargaining powers in the distribution
of federal funds. Knight (2005) also discovered that members sitting in the committees of
the House of Representatives with the power to propose legislation secure projects with
higher spending for their constituency than members in other committees. Scholars have
shown a distributive logic in committee assignments. Here the argument is that committees
with narrow competences and with clear link to particular constituencies are composed of
legislators known as preference outliers (Weingast and Marshall, 1988; for the EP e.g. Yord-
anova 2009; Yordanova 2013 and Kaeding 2004 for the case of rapporteurships).2 Héritier
(2007) has found a distributive logic in the process of legislative empowerment of the EP.
She has described how the EP extended its rights from consultation to cooperation by
exploiting its prerogative to delay legislation and the budgetary power.
To sum up, for rational choice institutionalists the creation of an institution is driven
by considerations over eﬃciency, which benefit almost all actors; and/or considerations
over distribution, which benefit the interests of one actor or one set of actors over the
others. What induces actors to follow one strategy rather than the other? The form of
institutions depends on the availability of information (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 246; Koremenos
et al., 2001, p. 775). In situation, where there is high uncertainty on what the future holds,
an institution is more likely to exhibit functional considerations. In situation of (almost)
perfect information there is less uncertainty and institutions are more likely to exhibit
distributive properties.
Theories of institutional design are not limited to explaining the mechanisms that
devise an institutional arrangement. The interest lies also in discovering how changes
happen. According to the functional explanation of rational choice institutionalism an
institution changes, when a new problem occurs and disrupts the previously established
equilibrium. Change is problem-driven and seeks to restore a situation of collective benefits.
The distributional explanation assumes that change occurs when the bargaining power of
individual actors alters, which lead them to defect from the institutionalised arrangement
and opt for a new solution, which will reflect the new balance of power.
How likely is it for a change to occur? Rational choice institutionalism is flexible in
predicting change. Change is seen as a matter of a pay-oﬀ matrix in the existing institution
(Tsebelis, 1990; Scharpf, 1997). Every time incentives change, an institution is re-designed.
This does not automatically imply a constant adaptation to new problems. Change might
take a long time to occur, which creates the misleading impression of stability (Tsebelis,
2Note that most of the studies on committee assignments include competitive testing on information
and distributive theories. Results show that both theories oﬀer explanations on committee membership
and rapporteurship allocation (see Kaeding, 2004; Yordanova, 2009 or Ringe, 2010 for a clear articulation).
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1990, p. 103). The reason for slow adaptation is the uncertainty surrounding an institution
and the realisation that changing it might be disadvantageous.
Sociological Institutionalism
Sociological institutionalism is the cultural explanation of institutional development. As
rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism defines institutions as the
products of human design. However, institutions are not necessarily the outcome of pur-
posive actions or the product of conscious decisions by instrumentally orientated actors
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 8). According to sociological institutionalism, the form of
an institution can be explained through norms and ideas that are perceived as appropriate
and legitimate by a collective of actors or population (Olsen and March, 1984; Olsen and
March, 1989). Decisions over an institutional design are driven in particular by identity
and norms rather than by interests and expected outcomes. Even when interests are taken
into account, they are not conceived to be stable or exogenous (March and Olsen, 1998,
p. 950). An institution is decoupled from the functional mission of the organisation, even
though legitimacy can be based on the supposition that a form is rationally eﬀective (i.e.
eﬃciency is a norm and thus endogenous to the actors) (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal
and Zajac, 1994).
Sociological institutionalism provides explanation on how change happens and at what
pace. Change is linked to developments in the organisational environment. Legitimacy
rather than functional eﬃciency is the major driving force of change. If and when change
occurs, it is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Therefore, rather than a theory of
change, sociological institutionalism is a theory of adaptation (Buchko, 1994). As ex-
plained by Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1023) sociological institutionalism is a theory
of change insofar it explains change that is convergent rather than radical. Institutional
arrangements endure because they are taken for granted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991,
pp. 19-20) or endorsed by several organisations and thus legitimate (Meyer and Rowan,
1977). Institutions adapt in order to obtain legitimacy. Nonetheless, sociological institu-
tionalism assumes that institutions are stable even when the environment welcomes change
(March and Olsen, 1998, p. 955). In this way, sociological institutionalism provides clues
on why there are institutions, which are ineﬃcient (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 953): insti-
tutions persist, because they are grounded in the perceptions over legitimacy rather than
in eﬃciency concerns (i.e. decoupling).
The power of sociological institutionalism is in the explanation of the similarities (also
isomorphism or mimesis) and stability in an organisational field. The organisational field
is defined as a set of organisations, which make up ‘a recognised area of institutional life’
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148).3 Isomorphism is the homogenisation and convergence
of organisational forms, i.e. an institutional arrangement. In this respect it is a key pro-
cess throughout which ideas, which are seen as legitimate are shared and diﬀused among
3This study is about the legislature as an organisational field.
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organisations that constitute a common field. Isomorphism can be understood also as the
result of actions based on a ‘logic of appropriateness’, i.e. the ‘rules and routines that define
appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations’ (Olsen and March,
1989, p. 160).
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is the approach based on the legacy of the past (Peters, 2005,
p. 63). To explain institutional design, historical institutionalism emphasises the role of his-
tory in determining preferences and shaping outcomes (Steinmo and Thelen, 1998, p. 7).
This means that the impact of institutions is mediated by the historical context (Thelen,
2002, p. 94). The basic assumption is that preferences are historical products. Hence,
historical developments influence the choice that people make. Following this reasoning,
historical institutionalists argue that institutions cannot be explained solely based on as-
sumptions over the rationality of actors and the functionality of institutions (Pierson,
2000c, p. 477). In addition, one must consider how preferences have been induced in spe-
cific times and places. Rationality is therefore context specific. As Pierson describes it,
institutions are not just a question of what, but also of when (Pierson, 2000b).
Yet, historical institutionalism has several points in common with rational choice in-
stitutionalism (Thelen, 1999; Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). Namely, both assume that
preferences aﬀect institutions. The main diﬀerence between the two is in their understand-
ing of preferences’ formation. While rational choice institutionalists take preferences as
exogenous to the institution, historical institutionalists treat them as endogenous. Rational
choice institutionalists understand preferences as stable and transcendent to a particular
time or space. On the contrary, historical institutionalists spend their time uncovering the
formation of preferences. While rational choice institutionalism uses a micro model to un-
derstand the creation and change of an institution, historical institutionalist considers the
macro environment (similarly to sociological institutionalists). Moreover, according to his-
torical institutionalism, preferences, and thus institutions, are not necessarily aﬀected by
interests only, but also by values. In this sense, historical institutionalism has commonal-
ities with sociological institutionalism: behaviour is not necessarily driven by self-interest,
but also by rules that are established and seen to be legitimate (Thelen, 1999, p. 371).
How does change happen? For historical institutionalists, change is the result of a
temporal process. There are rare moments in history, known as critical junctures, which
provide opportunities for institutional change (Collier and Collier, 2002). These moments
situate an institution on a specific (critical) path, which is then diﬃcult to alter. Historical
institutionalism assumes that choices made in the beginning of an institution have a lock-
in eﬀect over all future choices: what one does today depend on what one did yesterday
(Pierson, 2000a). This is known as the argument of path dependency. The lock-in eﬀect
implies that (major) changes are unlikely to occur, because initial institutional decisions
are self-reinforcing (and restrain the choice over alternative designs). Consequently, change
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is never drastic but evolutionary and dependent on the initially chosen path. As a result,
it is more accurate to talk about institutional evolution than institutional change (Peters,
2005; Thelen, 1999, p. 371). By bringing up path-dependence, historical institutionalism
applies a similar logic as sociological institutionalism, where the form of an institution is
influenced by institutional templates (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 954).
3.2.1 Seeking Complementaries
Rational, sociological and historical institutionalism are schools of thought, which explain
a political phenomenon on the basis of institutions. They all apply a logic of action, that
is either driven by consequences of appropriate behaviour, self-interest or values and; they
distinguish on the importance of historical context (March and Olsen, 1998). Each of these
approaches has its strengths and weaknesses.
In dealing with human intentionality, rational choice institutionalism has provided pre-
cise micro-model conceptions on how institutions aﬀect behaviour. Since preferences are
exogenous to the model, rational choice institutionalism is less perspicacious in predicting
change in (anomalous) situations where preferences are ambiguous, not interest-motivated
and/or where it is diﬃcult to identify all the involved actors. In these cases historical and
sociological institutionalism might provide more insightful explanations. The added value
of historical institutionalism is its consideration of large time horizons to provide inform-
ation on the formation of preferences. In this respect, historical institutionalism is more
successful in discerning preferences, because it takes into account the historical context.
However, adding context means that an empirical problem is dealt upon given specific
(contextual) conditions, which sacrifices the potential for generalisation.4 On the contrary,
generalisation based on equilibrium models is one of the strengths of rational choice institu-
tionalism. Although, the degree of details means that rational choice institutionalism has
limited explanatory power of empirical problems or events occurring in real life. Similarly
to historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism adopts a macro model. Instead
of history or interests, sociological institutionalism explains preference through culture,
shared understandings and norms. The problem of sociological institutionalism is that,
when investigating an empirical problem it can overemphasises the cultural environment
to the extent that it overlooks the conflict between individuals (Hall and Taylor 1996,
p. 954; Hallett and Ventresca, 2006).
In response to these interrelated aspects, several scholars have pointed out that the
approaches of new-institutionalism are complementary (Peters, 2005, p. 2; Thelen, 2002,
p. 96; Pollack, 2001; Ostrom, 1991, Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 955, Stacey and Rittberger,
2003, p. 868, Goodin, 1996, p. 19, Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Given the fact that none
of these approaches can explain an empirical problem alone, several scholars advocate for
theoretical dialogue (e.g. Ostrom, 1991; March and Olsen, 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider,
4This is a deliberate choice in historical institutionalism, which is surpassed by comparative case studies
(Thelen 2002, pp. 94-95; Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, pp. 24-25).
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2000; Jupille et al., 2003; Rittberger, 2003; Tallberg, 2010). Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 955)
note that:
[...] each of these literatures seems to reveal diﬀerent and genuine dimensions of
human behaviour and of the eﬀects institutions can have on behaviour. None
of these literature appears to be wrong-headed or substantially untrue. More
often, each seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a
given situation or capturing diﬀerent dimensions of human action [...].
As described by March and Olsen (1998, p. 952) theoretical dialogue is needed, because
humans make decision in consideration of both their interests and identities. The design
of an institution is therefore driven by what is appropriate and in consideration of the con-
sequences. Decisions are made in complex situation where many diﬀerent concerns must
be attended to (Christensen et al., 2007, p. 166). Theoretical dialogue means that a re-
search design draws on diﬀerent types of theories to complement or combine their strengths
and counterbalance their weaknesses, i.e. exploiting theories’ comparative explanatory ad-
vantages as autonomous theoretical constraints (Tallberg, 2010, p. 638; Christensen et al.,
2007, p. 184). Theoretical dialogue is not an attempt to synthesise theories into a super
model, but a way to recognise the added values of separate theories. Jupille et al. (2003,
pp. 19-24; see also Rittberger 2005 and Tallberg 2010, pp. 637-638) have identified four
theoretical models of dialogue: competitive testing, domains of application, sequencing
and incorporation. Competitive testing involves the assessment of explanatory powers
of competing hypotheses for an empirical problem to identify the single most important
explanation. Domain of application and sequencing are models that seek the additive ex-
planatory power of theories. In the domain of application diﬀerent theories are used to
explain diﬀerent substantive parts of a broader phenomenon. This implies that each theory
has its own scope or domain of application. On the contrary, sequencing means looking at
the temporal complementaries of theories, where diﬀerent theories explain diﬀerent phases
of a process. Incorporation means that a theory is used as a subset to another theory in
order to arrive at the greater explanatory powers.
What kind of research design and theoretical approach are best to apply depends in
part on the theory and in part on the empirical problem. Sociological institutionalism
is considered to be particularly useful at explaining the form of an institution (Tallberg,
2010, p. 638, Héritier, 2007, p. 10; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003, p. 864). It is considered
less suitable to explain how and why changes occur (Finnemore, 1996, p. 339), where logics
pertaining to rational choice institutionalism are more insightful. Historical institution-
alism is equipped to explain the pace and form of an institution, but it is less insightful
on how institutions emerge or aﬀect behaviour (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 950). Depend-
ing on the empirical problem, it has been suggested that when identities and norms are
clear, but the implications of preferences or expected consequences are not, then the lo-
gic of appropriateness prevails (March and Olsen, 1998). Similarly, when information and
power are relatively symmetrically distributed then ideas and norms prevail (Katznelson
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and Weingast, 2005).
3.3 The Eﬀects of Organisation on Behaviour: Organisation
Theory
Organisation theory is a theory on behaviour. Its aim is to explain and understand the
causes of behaviour in structurally developed organisations by taking into account the
structure and design of organisations (Pfeﬀer, 1997, p. 25; Christensen, 2012, p. 150). This
includes organisational characteristics such as personnel, technology, structure and the
environment. As a study, it involves the observation of characteristics that are formal (i.e.
regulated in the organisation) and informal (i.e. unregulated characteristics and day-to-day
practices).
There are diﬀerent perspectives in organisation theory depending on which organisa-
tional characteristics are observed and believed to aﬀect behaviour in the most significant
way. Scholars have observed formal structures (e.g. working units, legal status), demo-
graphic characteristics or informal structures (e.g. education, gender, ethnicity) and contin-
gency factors (e.g. size). Depending on how behaviour is operationalised (e.g. considerations,
attitudes, understandings, activities, etc.) empirical testing has demonstrated that formal
organisational structures explain the behaviour of individual to a larger extent than in-
formal structures (e.g. Child 1973; Baker and Cullen 1993; Egeberg 1999; Jacobsen 2006;
Egeberg 2007; Trondal 2011).
In the field of legislatures, organisation theory has been applied since the late 1960s and
mostly in the case of the US Congress (e.g. Cooper, 1971; Hedlund, 1984). Organisation
theory, or at least some of its features, has also been applied to study of EP. Some ex-
amples include the study of legislative organisation (e.g. committee, parliamentary groups,
specialisation in committees and parliamentary groups, etc., e.g. Bowler and Farrell, 1995;
McElroy, 2006; Whitaker, 2011; Bressanelli, 2014), rules of the game (e.g. formal rules and
informal norms on decision-making, e.g. Kreppel, 2002; Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Gungor,
2008) and most recently the organisation of staﬀ (e.g. Egeberg et al., 2013). Studies on
legislatures, which aim to explain behaviour, emphasise organisational characteristics and
thus diﬀer from studies, where the emphasis is on rational calculus and cost-benefit analysis
(e.g. re-election calculus).
This dissertation studies the formal organisational structures determining the organisa-
tion of legislative staﬀ in the EP. The question that is addressed is to what extent formal
organisational structures determine the behaviour of individuals as members of an organ-
isation (Egeberg, 2004, p. 200). The objective is to understand the eﬀect of organisational
structure in order to know how behaviour can be changed. This implies an instrumental
view on organisations, where formal structures are in place to meet organisational goals:
how things are done aﬀects what is done. An instrumental perspective also means that
formal organisational structures are understood as mechanisms, which channel behaviour
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in certain directions, thereby creating patterns of behaviour.
3.3.1 Formal Organisational Structures
Formal organisational structures (i.e. organisational structures, formal structures or formal
norms) are defined as the rules that specify who shall do what and how regarding the al-
location of tasks, responsibilities and authority in a given organisation. As such, they
determine the boundaries of individual action. Formal structures are enshrined in formal
documents such as staﬀ regulations, contracts, job descriptions, codes of conduct, constitu-
tional codes, rules of procedures, etc. (e.g. Scott, 2003, pp. 26-27; Meyer and Rowan, 1977,
pp. 341-342; Egeberg, 2012, p. 157; Galbraith, 1987). They consist of diﬀerent structural
components, which describe the complexity, formalisation, centralisation and configura-
tion of the organisation (e.g. the units and subunits, the arrangement among units such
as autonomy or hierarchy). Goals are broken down into tasks, which are grouped into
departments or units. The ensemble of departments makes up the form of an organisations
(i.e. organisational structures) to fulfil its function in the environment.
When studying organisational structures the initial assumption is that formal organisa-
tional structures determine the behaviour of the members of an organisation. How formal
structures determine behaviour was firstly described by Weber through his notion of au-
thority, which creates a system of legitimate control through legal norms (Weber, 1958;
see also Blau and Scott 2003, p. 30). Organisation structures are constituted through the
process of vertical and horizontal specialisation.
Vertical Specialisation Vertical specialisation refers to the level of authority from
which an oﬃcial receives orders. The function of vertical specialisation is to avoid a situ-
ation where an oﬃcial is subject to the instructions of more than one superior, which can
create confusion and ineﬃciency (Gulick, 1937, p. 9; Simon, 1997, p. 31). The purpose of
vertical organisation is to make administrative action more predictable (Page, 1992, p. 63).
Hierarchy is the most persistent mode of organisation, which consists of a vertical rank
ordered system of superiors and subordinates. It establishes a relation among the members
of an organisation by establishing an unequal distribution of power, privileges, tasks and
duties. There is ample evidence in history that people obey authority as soon as they
become part of an organisational hierarchy (see Diefenbach, 2013, p. 11).
Horizontal Specialisation Rather than the organisation of work under diﬀerent
levels of authority, horizontal specialisation implies an organisation based on activities
and functions. The most famous horizontal principles of specialisation are process, client,
purpose and location (Gulick, 1937, p. 16). Specialisation by purpose brings together all
of those who are at work to render a particular service. For example, a school employs
teachers, administrators, janitors, cleaners for the overall purpose of educating pupils.
Specialisation by process brings together members of a profession. For example, the de-
partment of infrastructure employs engineers that deal with roads, railways and naval
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infrastructure. Specialisation by clientele brings together people who are working with a
given group of persons or a given set of things. For example, a department store consists of
food, furniture, clothing and other departments to serve the consumer. Specialisation by
place brings together all of those who work in a limited area, such as the colonial govern-
ment, where the local departments act as representatives of the central department. These
types of specialisation are not mutually exclusive and in reality coexist, because they are
in place to meet diﬀerent organisational goals.
3.3.2 The Eﬀect of Formal Organisational Structures
The underlying mechanisms to understand why and how formal structures aﬀect behaviour
draws heavily on the work of Herbert Simon (1997), who is considered the pioneer scholar
in administrative decision-making behaviour. Simon developed a theory of administrative
behaviour as a critique of the model based on an all-knowing individual who seeks ways
to maximise self-interest (Scott, 2003, p. 10). In Simon’s view, economic rationality can-
not explain human behaviour completely, because individuals are cognitively limited and
living in an environment where complete information is unavailable, i.e. bounded ration-
ality (Simon, 1997, p. 72; March and Simon, 1993). As individuals cannot assess all the
alternatives to make decisions, it is the role of organisations to limit the scope of decisions
through formally devised structures. Following this logic, Simon was the first in linking
the bounded rationality of individuals with the features of organisational structures (Scott,
2014, p. 29).
The basic assumption leading the study of organisational structures is that once indi-
vidual decides to participate in an organisation, their behaviour starts to be framed by the
organisation (Fry, 1989). Through its structures, the organisation takes from individuals
some of their decisional autonomy to replace it with the logic of the organisation. This
happens though organisational structures, which supply oﬃcials with the value premises of
decisions, i.e. goals, ends or objectives of the organisation on what ought to be achieved (Si-
mon, 1997; Blau and Scott, 2003, p. 37). Therefore, formal structures aﬀect the behaviour
of individuals by limiting or expanding the opportunities of choice (Fry, 1989; Barnard,
1938).
Organisation theory allows theorising the properties of a structure. This is diﬀerent
compared to economic models of full rationality, where the study of behaviour is based on
the relationship between the principal and agent. As explained by Mitnick (1992, p. 81):
‘There is more to organisational life than choice under risk and uncertainty,’ and that
‘[..] we need to face up to the fact that we are dealing with organisations, not superior-
subordinate dyads’ (Mitnick, 1991 in Waterman and Meier, 1998, p. 178). Assumptions
over the relationship between the principal and the agent cannot account for behaviour
alone, because of the externalities that condition this relationship. When conducting re-
search under assumption of economic rationality, the influence of a structure is excluded
(Waterman and Meier, 1998). For example, what interferes with the relationship between
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the politician and the civil servant is not only the asymmetry of information and the diver-
gence (or consensus) of goals, but also structures or the characteristics of the organisation.
The challenge lies in controlling diﬀerent variables (i.e. the relationship and the structure)
at once. Organisation theory is about controlling for structures and investigating how to
design structures so that the agent does not bypass the principal.
Formal Structures and Informal Structures
Since the objective of organisation theory is to understand behaviour rather than only the
eﬀect of formal structures, it is important to control for other explanatory variables when
possible (Pfeﬀer, 1997, p. 25). Therefore, an organisational approach does not concern
itself only with the formal structure, but with the organisational context more in general.
Organisations are composed of formal and informal structures. While an instrumental
perspective focuses on the formal properties of organisation, a cultural perspective looks
into the informal norms of organisations. Selznick (1948) was the first to argue that formal
structures are only one aspect of organisational life and that organisational life depends
also on informal structures (Blau and Scott 2003, pp. 30, 38). Organisations are profoundly
influenced by ‘hard’ regulation and ‘soft’ concepts that provide meaning to participants
(Fairtlough, 2008, p. 1046). Formal structures are patterned with the wider environment,
so that the actual functioning of a structure is only loosely coupled with its formal design.
Besides formal internal rules, organisations have a physically location, they are com-
posed of people with diﬀerent backgrounds and can develop their own organisational cul-
ture. These are all organisational variables, which can be summarised as organisational
demography, locus and institutionalisation (Egeberg, 1994). Together they constitute the
informal norms and values, which are acquired either through the daily work in the organ-
isations or as members of the wider society. In order to understand the behaviour in an
organisation we need to ‘unpack’ these basic organisational characteristics within which
individuals interact (Egeberg, 2004, p. 201). The concept of informal structures is theoret-
ically close to political sociology, where the context of organisational behaviour is not just
the organisation, but life in the wider society.
Demography Demography refers to the personal characteristics that an individual brings
into the organisation such as age, sex, nationality, education, etc. (Pfeﬀer, 1997, p. 83).
Demographic characteristics are sources of pre-socialised behaviour, i.e. norms and values
that have not been acquired in the socialisation period of the organisation, but rather
some time before that. They are examples on how norms of behaviour are constituted
exogenously from the organisation and outside the control of the organisation’s principals.
According to Lawrence (1997), individual attributes generally fit into three categories:
attributes that describe immutable characteristics such as age, gender, and ethnicity; at-
tributes that describe individuals’ relationships with organisations, such as organisational
tenure; and attributes that identify individuals’ positions within society, such as marital
status. These characteristics form the organisational composition of an organisation. The
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cultural explanation of behaviour assumes that demography aﬀects individual’s behaviour
in organisation, i.e. as the demography of an organisation changes so does the organisation.
Locus Organisational locus or location refers to the physical dimensions on where an
institution is placed. Whether two departments are physically close or far is supposed to
aﬀect the organisation, as it can reduce or increase face-to-face contact and co-ordination.
The organisational locus is empirically under-researched, but empirically simple to opera-
tionalize. Organisational locus or location refers to the physical dimensions on where an
institution is placed and the place-specific context (Kuus, 2011; Egeberg, 2004, p. 203).
Institutionalisation Institutionalisation refers to the process throughout which rules
and procedures of an organisation are impregnated with value (Selznick, 1948). When in-
voking institutionalisation one refers to all the practices that are unwritten, but observed
by the members of an organisation (e.g. organisational culture. Institutionalisation occurs,
because human behaviour is dependent on the social and cultural environment of an or-
ganisation (see Christensen et al., 2007, p. 37). Once a rule is institutionalised its purpose
goes beyond instrumentality. Institutionalisation is related to socialisation, when the lat-
ter is defined as the ability of an organisation to induce its agents into its institutional
environment of norms and values (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). As a concept it is not related to
the socialisation into formal structures and roles, because informal norms are constituted
exogenously from the actors in the organisation. Before the socialisation of actors into
norms can begin, an organisation needs to first become an institution. Therefore, from the
start institutionalisation is never the result of socialisation. Empirically it is diﬃcult to
measure the extent to which an organisation is institutionalised.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has theorised the design of formal structures and the eﬀect of formal structures
on the behaviour of people that are members of an organisation. What are the parallels
between institutional theory and the study of organisations? Both institutional theory
and organisation theory observe an outcome. Theories of institutional design study the
organisation (its form, design, arrangement), organisation theory looks at behaviour as the
product of design. Diﬀerent perspectives in institutional design and organisation theory
consider elements of rationality, culture and history. It has been suggested that organ-
isational structures can be the result of purposive rational action, cultural circumstances
and/or historical context. An instrumental perspective on organisation theory resonates
with rational choice institutionalism. The standard approach in rational choice institution-
alism is the principal-agent model of delegation: a principal authorises an agent to act on
its behalf and reserves the right to rescind the agent’s authority in case of ineﬀectiveness
or misconduct. The purpose of organisation theory is to see how structural attributes con-
tribute to the accomplishment of goals based on how organisations are formally shaped.
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Organisational structures as informal norms can also be understood in a sociological sense.
When this is the case organisation theory resonated with sociological institutionalism. In
the following part of the thesis organisation theory is employed following the rational of
behaviour.
In Parts I and II the approaches, which were overviewed here are applied to the case
of the EP. Two diﬀerent outcomes are studied. The first one is the institutional design of
legislative assistance in the EP. The second one is the behavioural consequence resulting
from the institutional design chosen for the legislative assistance of the EP. The institu-
tional design for legislative assistance is therefore theorised first as a dependent variable
(i.e. design) and second as independent variable (i.e. eﬀect).

Chapter 4
Data and Methods
This chapter describes the collection of data and methods of analysis. In order to analyse
the phenomenon of legislative assistance in the EP, the study follows a mixed method
research design in three phases.
4.1 Data Collection
The set up of the research design was primarily driven by the fact that legislative assistance
is an under-researched topic. For this reason the first phase of the study consisted of an
exploratory phase where preliminary semi-structured interviews with respondents from the
observed population were carried out. The purpose of the preliminary interviews was to
identify tasks pertaining to legislative assistance, to develop and implement a quantitative
instrument, such as the survey. Based on these interviews, the second phase involved
collecting data with a survey administered among the staﬀ in the EP. Together these two
datasets, one qualitative and the other on quantitative, are the basis for testing Hypothesis
4. In the third phase another round of semi-structured interviews was conducted. The
interviews of the third phase diﬀered from the ones of the first. While in the first phase
interviews addressed the current aspects of assisting MEPs in legislation, the third phase
asked respondents how assisting MEPs has changed over time. The ensemble of all the
interviews constitute a qualitative dataset, which is used to test Hypotheses 1, 2(a,b) and
3(a,b,c). In addition to the original qualitative and quantitative data, the study builds on
primary and secondary resources. The collection and processing of data has been registered
with the National Commission for Data Protection of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
4.1.1 Qualitative Data
4.1.1.1 Preliminary Interviews (May to September 2012)
Interviews were conducted with secretariat oﬃcials, political group advisors and MEP
assistants. Speaking with individuals with the direct experience of working in the EP
allowed identifying the most common tasks they perform. Besides detailing their profes-
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Table 4.1: First Phase Interviews: Respondents’ Profiles
Profile Number
APA 2
APA ! Administrator 1
Political Group Advisor (Lower Ranks) 1
Political Group Advisor ! Secretariat Administrator 2
Secretariat Administrator (Lower Ranks) 3
Secretariat Directors or Secretary Generals 4
Secretariat SNE 1
Total 14
Note: The arrow indicates mobility from one profession to the other
sional background, respondents were asked to describe their job and the type of tasks
they do. The interviews took place either in Brussels or Luxembourg between May and
December 2012 (seventh parliamentary term). Overall 14 interviews were carried out. Four
of the interviews were conducted in Luxembourg, the remaining ten in Brussels. All the
interviews were transcribed. The interviews covered seven diﬀerent professional profiles as
summarised in Table 4.1.
4.1.1.2 Interviews (September to November 2013)
The purpose of the second round of interviews was to collect data to explore the historical
evolution of legislative services in the EP. Twelve interviews were conducted in Brussels, one
in Luxembourg and one in Oxford. Table 4.2 summarises the profiles of the respondents.
The interviewed accredited parliamentary assistants (APAS) have been working in the EP
for at least two parliamentary terms. All the other interviewees have been working for the
EP for more than eight years and two of them were retired. All of the interviews were
transcribed. Interviews were semi-structured and included questions such as: How has
your job changed over time? How has the working relationship with MEPs developed over
time? What has in your opinion aﬀected your job since you started working in the EP?
Table 4.2: Second Phase Interviews: Respondents’ Profiles
Profile Number
APA 2
Political Group Advisor (Lower Ranks) 1
Political Group Advisor ! Secretariat Administrator (Higher Ranks) 1
Political Group Advisor (Higher Ranks and Secretary General) 4
Secretariat Administrator (Middle Ranks) 2
Secretariat Administrator (Lower Ranks) 1
Secretariat Directors 3
Total 14
Note: The arrow indicates mobility from one profession to the other
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4.1.2 Quantitative Data: Survey
The tasks that were identified with preliminary interviews were then included as answer
options in a survey. The survey asked EP staﬀ to rate on an ordinal scale from one to five
(i.e. never, rarely, sometimes, regularly and very often) how often they do the thirteen tasks
while working on a legislative proposal. An open-end option was added, where respondents
were able to describe any other tasks they might be involved with. Appendix A provides
a copy of the survey.
4.1.2.1 Estimating the Population
Determining the population of legislative staﬀ in the EP is not a simple task due to
the existence of diﬀerent staﬀ categories and employment regulations. The EP does not
formally distinguish between legislative and non-legislative staﬀ. For these reasons, the
estimation of the population was conducted in the absence of a good sampling frame
(Vaus, 2002, p. 71). The result is an approximate rather than an exact number of the
legislative staﬀ population. The approximation is based on the available statistics on the
staﬀ in the EP as a whole.
In 2013, the total number of staﬀ working in the EP was 8 308: 5 602 employees worked
in the EP’s secretariat, 1 016 in political groups and 1 690 in MEPs’ oﬃces located in Brus-
sels (Annual Budget, 2013 and EP website). Not all of these employees were employed in
the EP for the purpose of assisting MEPs on legislative issues. In fact, less than half of
the employees in the secretariat (2 595) and two fifths of the employees in political groups
(415) belonged to the so-called AD category, which is responsible for legislative assistance.
Even though translators and interpreters are also AD employees, they are excluded from
the studied population on the assumption that they are not assigned legislative tasks or
work directly with MEPs. There is no current available data on how many administrators
in the secretariat are translators or interpreters, but the establishment plan for 2004 shows
that in that specific year there were 619 AD oﬃcials in the secretariat who were not lin-
guists. From secondary resources it is known that the group of administrators working on
legislative files in committees is less than 500 individuals, and that the number of political
group advisors has always been lower than the number of committee administrators (Neun-
reither, 2003). Statistics published by DG Personnel also show that as of 2013 the targeted
administrative units in the survey (IPOL, EXPO, Presidency) employed a total of 616 AD
staﬀers (European Parliament, 2013f). Based on these information, it was assumed that
in 2013 the targeted population comprised approximately 2 700 people. The largest group
consisted of APAs, followed by administrators in the secretariat and political advisors.
4.1.2.2 Sampling
In order to ensure that the sample is representative, a random sampling method similar to
the stratified sampling method was employed (Vaus, 2002, p. 74). When a good sampling
frame is not available, as in this study, stratifying sampling assures more representative and
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accurate samples compared to simple random sampling. The procedure involved selecting
a stratifying variable and then determining the sample size based on the separate categories
of the stratifying variables.
First Criterion In this study, the sample was drawn based on the horizontal (functional)
specialisation of staﬀ, where a distinction is made given the administrative aﬃliation of
staﬀ within the EP. This meant that employees were selected given their aﬃliation to the
EP’s central secretariat, political groups or MEPs’ personal oﬃces. The aﬃliation-based
specialisation of staﬀ was selected as the stratifying variable, because based on organisation
theory, behaviour was expected to vary the most on this specific variable (Vaus, 2002,
p. 81). However, not all administrators, political advisors and APAs work on legislative
issues. For this reasons two additional sampling criteria were implemented.
Second Criterion The first additional criterion distinguished between administrator
(AD) and assistant (AST) employees, where only the former were eligible to participate.1
The main diﬀerence between the AD and AST category of staﬀ is the level of education.
While AD staﬀ are required to have a university degree, AST staﬀ can be engaged with a
secondary diploma (Staﬀ Regulations, 2013, Article 5). Among the AD employees the ones
performing a linguistic function (i.e. translation and interpretation tasks) were excluded.
Third Criterion The second additional criterion targeted individuals who hold a pos-
ition involving work in committees. As already specified in the introduction, committees
are the most important venues where legislation is shaped. In order to identify the services
that are related to committees, I have collected the organisation organigram for the EP’s
secretariat and political groups. Based on organisational charts, preliminary interviews
and secondary resources I determined that the relevant committee services in the EP in-
clude committee secretariats, policy departments, delegations secretariats, research units
and the legal service. Whether a potential participant belonged to one of the above men-
tioned category was determined by looking at the website of the EP and political groups,
oﬃcial directories and committee minutes.
The EPP and S&D have a similar division of work to the EP secretariat, but less elab-
orated. In these cases I was able to select respondents working on legislation based on the
information available on their websites. For smaller groups this was not possible, because
they do not have an extensively developed organisation chart. The lack on information on
the specific tasks of political advisors for certain groups was not treated as problem. For
example, even when a political advisor is mainly responsible for press and communication,
he or she will also be involved in other group activities as well. This is true for the biggest
political groups and also for smaller groups, where a high degree of specialisation is not
1In 2013, when the survey was prepared and administered, only the AD and AST staﬀ categories existed.
A new staﬀ regulation entered into force in 2014 (Regulation 1023), which introduced a third category.
The new category, named AST/SC, introduced additional levels of responsibility in the AST category.
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possible (Interview R, 2013). Assistance to national delegations is sometimes organised on
a voluntary basis and in certain cases even AST employees in political groups do legislative
work (Interview ZB, 2013).
Table 4.3: Sampling Criteria
Sampling criteria
1 Aﬃliation in the EP Administrators, Political advisors, APAs
2 AD/AST and
Linguists/Non-linguists
Only AD which are not linguists
3 Committee services Committee secretariats, legal services, research service etc.
4.1.2.3 Problems
The first and second criteria were straightforward to implement. Although incomplete
and disorganised, the data on who is an administrator in the secretariat, advisor in a
political group or APA is available on the EP’s and political groups’ websites. Whether
an employee belongs to the AD category is formally defined in the Staﬀ Regulations of the
EP. However, the AD-AST division only applies to administrators in the EP secretariat
and political advisors in political groups (CEOS, see Title II, Article 15). Assistants to
MEPs are not ranked into AST and AD categories, because their employment is governed
by Title VII of the CEOS. The organisation of assistants’ work varies depending on the
MEP employing them. MEPs can employ up to three full time accredited assistants. It is
also known that an AD employee in the secretariat or political group has to have at least
a Bachelor degree. Due to the lack of information on the type of education and the kind
of work assistants are required to do, the entire population of accredited assistants was
eligible to participate in the study.
Control Question Given the problems mentioned above and in order to avoid including
individuals, which are not involved in legislation, the survey included a question asking the
respondents whether they followed the work of at least one committee. All the respond-
ents including administrators and political advisors were asked this question. However,
the committee question was primarily for APAs. While for administrators and political
advisors I was able to employ other criteria to determine their involvement in legislation,
this was not possible for APAs due to the lack of information on how MEPs organise their
oﬃces. Whether individual APAs qualified as legislative staﬀ was determined ex post to
the implementation of the survey.
4.1.2.4 Procedure
The survey was sent to 2 293 email addresses out of the approximate population of 2
700 people. The email addresses were found on the websites of the EP, political groups
websites, in the online and print versions of the Oﬃcial Directory of the EU. The survey
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was active from February to March 2013. Two reminders were sent. Table 4.4 reports the
number of email recipients, the number of respondents and the final response rate, which
equals to 19.83 per cent or 391 responses.
Table 4.4: Response Rate
Category Recipients Respondents Response rate
Secretariat 431 127* 29.50 %
Accredited assistants 1 437 192** 13.0 %
Political groups
ALDE 47 7 15.00 %
ECR 41 5 12.00 %
EFD 38 6 16.00 %
EPP 99 9 9.00 %
Greens/EFA 47 19 40.00 %
GUE/NGL 41 5 12.00 %
NA 17 2 12.00 %
S&D 95 11 12.00 %
Unknown 7
Total 425 71*** 17.00 %
Total 2 293 391 19.83 %
Notes:
* This figure includes 72 staﬀ in committee secretariats, 11 legal service staﬀ, 21 policy department staﬀ,
8 delegation staﬀ, 2 other staﬀ that reported to follow at least one committee, but are not employed in a
committee secretariat and 12 other staﬀ.
** This figure includes 192 accredited assistants that reported to follow at least one committee.
*** This figure includes 61 political group advisors that reported to follow at least one committee and 6
political group advisors that reported the opposite. Five political group advisors did not answer the
question on whether they follow at least one committee.
4.1.2.5 Outcome
Representativeness The sample matches the characteristics of the population in sev-
eral regards. APAs (N = 192) are the most represented in the population and in the
sample; they are followed by administrators (N = 127) and political advisors (N = 72). In
the sample there are overall more men (54 per cent) than women (46 per cent). Only in the
category of APAs are there more women (55 per cent) than men (45 per cent), which is also
true for the population. The ratio between men and women in the secretariat and political
groups is 3:2, which is valid for the population in political groups. The population ratio
of men and women in the secretariat is equal, but it includes more administrative units
than the sample. In terms of citizenship, the sample mirrors the population to a great
extent. The top three most represented countries in the population (Germany, France
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and Italy) are also the top three in the sample. Citizens from the EU-15 countries (i.e.
member state before 2004) are more numerous than citizens from young member states
(i.e. member states after 2004). In the sample of administrators, 80 per cent of them have
citizenship from one of the EU-15 member states, while 20 per cent hold citizenship from
one of the young member states, which is a 10 per cent variation compared to the popu-
lation. Citizens from young member states tend to occupy lower ranks than citizens from
old member states in the population and the sample. The average age of the population in
the secretariat is 45 years old, while it is 43 in the sample. The average age for assistants
is 34 and for advisors 42 years old. Women and citizens from new member states are
younger than men and citizens from old member states in both the population and the
sample. Finally, at the time of the survey the majority of respondents worked in the EP
on a full-time basis, while only two per cent of them worked part-time. Given these basic
characteristics, the sample was deemed representative of the population.
(Sub) Sample Size The size or the number of observations in the sample and subsamples
is important for the reliability of analysis results. Text books specify diﬀerent minimum
requirements for using statistical analysis. Most researchers suggest using a minimum of
30 (Salkind, 2004; Pett, 1997), other consider a minimum of between 10 and 20 (Warner,
2008). The total number of observations in the sample is 392. The smallest subsamples on
which comparison is done count between 30 and 40 observations. All the other subsamples
have more than 50 observations. Given the number of observation, the sub-sample sizes
were not treated as a problem.
4.2 Methods
Because the study builds on both qualitative and quantitative data, a variety of methods
were used.
4.2.1 Analysing Qualitative Data
Content Analysis All the interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed using the
open source software TAMSAnalyzer. These codes described a professional profile: ad-
visors, negotiator, drafter, communicator, researcher or informer etc. Some of these codes
were further broken down. For example, when respondents reported to advise MEPs, they
was asked on what topic they advise (e.g. procedures, legal questions, politics and policy
or vote). While very important for the overall functioning of the EP, some of the tasks that
were identified in the coding phase (e.g. translating and public relations activities) were
left out from the final selection, because they were deemed inconsequential for legislative
assistance as defined in this study. This meant that legislative staﬀ in the EP performs
also duties which are not strictly related to committee work. The final selection included
the following tasks: giving advice on diﬀerent issues (policy, procedure, law and vote), as-
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sisting in negotiations either with political groups or EU institutions, coordinating MEPs
positions, contributing with ideas and drafting document.
4.2.1.1 Analysing Quantitative Data
Descriptive Statistics and Chi-Squared Contingency Tables Survey responses on
the frequency of tasks were first analysed at an individual/item level, using contingency
tables (also referred to as cross-tabulation) to provide a first impression. The results using
this method are presented in Table 10.2. For the purpose of the analysis the ordinal five-
point scale was recoded into a three level scale (never/rarely, sometimes and regularly/very
often). The significance of the relationships was determined with the Chi-Squared stat-
istic. When the independent variables were nominal, the strength of the relationship was
estimated using the Cramér’s V measure of association. A relationship was determined
to be weak when Cramér’s V was less than 0.2 and moderate when Cramér’s V ranged
between 0.2 and 0.4. When the independent variables were ordinal, the strength and form
of the relationship was estimated using the Kendall’s taub (⌧b). A relationship was con-
sidered weak when the absolute values of Kendall’s ⌧b ranged between ±0.05 and ±0.20
and moderate when the absolute values of Kendall’s ⌧b ranged between ±0.20 and ±0.40.
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, other tests than the Chi-Squared
could have been used, such as the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test
and Kruskal-Wallis test of the median (Corder and Foreman, 1972). The Chi-Squared test
is here used because it works for both ordinal and nominal independent variables whether
they have two groups or more. In addition, the purpose of cross-tabulations was to in-
vestigate the data and to provide a first impression, for which cross-tabulation meets the
purpose. Finally, ordinal logistic regression could have been applied to measure the likeli-
hood in cases where dependent variables were individual tasks. Since the individual tasks
were then converted into an interval scale variable, linear regression analysis was used to
determine the eﬀect of the independent variable.
Principal Component Analysis Following the analysis using contingency tables a
principal component factor analysis (PCA) was carried out. The purpose of PCA is to
develop a scale or measure where a limited number of items, consisting of one dimension,
represent the core of a set of items (Acock, 2012, p. 334). It is a statistical procedure for
exploratory purposes. It is used under the argument that a set of items measures one
concept. Hence, PCA develops a measure for a concept.
In this study, PCA included thirteen variables measuring the frequency with which
individual tasks are performed. In order to take into account for the most of the frequency
diﬀerences, the ordinal five-level scale was used. Following PCA, legislative assistance was
defined as a scale composed of the following items: oﬀering political or voting advice,
contributing to policy ideas, preparing amendments and reports, participating in the ne-
gotiations with political groups, coordinating MEPs’ positions and preparing voting lists.
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All these tasks were included in the construction of an interval scale variable measuring
the frequency of involvement in legislative assistance.
Regression Analysis Multiple linear regression models were used to test the hypo-
thesised relationships. Several other factors that can simultaneously aﬀect the dependent
variable were controlled for. Linear regression was used on the interval dependent variable,
which was developed with PCA. In order to test for multicolinearity, the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) was calculated. None of the regression models that are reported in this
dissertation has a colinearity problem.

Part I
The Design of Legislative Assistance:
Form, Origin & Change
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Chapter 5
The Form of Legislative Assistance in
the EP
This chapter is about the form (also design or organisation) of legislative assistance in
parliament. It precedes the chapter exploring the origin of legislative assistance at the
time of the ECSC Common Assembly, since it introduces and describes the basic forms
of legislative assistance. The first part discusses legislative assistance by comparing the
organisation of the British, American, French and German legislatures. The second part
of the chapter turns to the case of the EP and provides evidence for Hypothesis 1. The
exploration of legislative staﬀ in the UK, USA, France and Germany reveals that: 1)
democratic parliaments employ staﬀ providing legislative assistance; and that 2) legislative
staﬀ consist of at least three diﬀerent sub-categories or administrative structures: the
central administration or the own-administration of the parliament; the personal staﬀ of
members of parliament (MPs), which are recruited by members of parliament; and the
leadership staﬀ or group staﬀ of the parties, which are represented in parliament. The
comparison of state-legislatures with the EP shows that in most aspects the organisation
of legislative assistance in the EP resembles the one in state-parliaments, while other
aspects are exclusive to the EP.
5.1 Theory Application
Sociological Institutionalism Drawing from the literature on the history of the EP
(e.g. Kreppel 2002; Rittberger 2005; Priestley 2008; European Parliament 2009a), it is safe
to say the EP has changed in a significant way from its beginning as the Common Assembly
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later on as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the European Communities (EEC). From an appointed body consisting of
representatives selected from national parliaments, the EP developed into a directly elected
parliament with veto power in several policy areas, which today include even the policy
areas in the so called ‘third pillar’ of the European Community.
In particular from the 1970s onwards, the EP began to acquire prerogatives similar to
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the ones of national legislatures, such as powers over the budget and the selection of rep-
resentatives through direct elections. From obtaining budgetary powers (1970s), to direct
elections (1979) and further legislative powers (1980s to 2000s), the EP has developed into
a policy-influencing legislature, which can modify, reject and even propose laws via its right
of initiative (Norton, 1994; Norton, 2003; Kreppel, 2006), This evolution means that the EP
has steadily acquired prerogatives similar to a state-legislature, i.e. the EP underwent par-
liamentarisation or the institutionalisation of representative democracy (Rittberger, 2005).
Therefore, it is rare in today’s literature to find an analysis that compares the EP to an
international parliamentary assembly (Rittberger, 2005; Rittberger, 2012; Kreppel, 2006;
for an exception see Cofelice and Stavridis, 2014). For this reason, the following chapter
explores the form of legislative assistance in the EP based on the institutional design that
is found in state-parliaments. The hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The form of legislative assistance in the EP is organised according
to the form of state-legislatures.
The assumption draws on sociological institutionalism as presented in Section 3.2. The
EP is expected to comply with administrative practices and formal structures that are
taken for granted as a parliament. According to sociological institutional, a unit (i.e. EP)
in the population (i.e. parliaments) starts to resemble other units that face the same set
of environmental conditions (Hawley 1968 in DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 149). This is
known as the ‘isomorphic explanation’, where organisations tend towards a homogenous
design. Isomorphism implies that the organisation of legislative assistance in the EP is
decoupled from its mission (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal and Zajac, 1994).
Functional Rational Choice Institutionalism On the opposite, the functional ex-
planation of rational choice institutionalism portrays the mission or goal of an organisation
as the most important factor. Functional rational choice institutionalism assumes that the
design of legislative assistance in the EP strives towards the most eﬃcient form independ-
ently on whether the organisation at hand is a parliament or not. While in sociological
institutionalism the design is decoupled from the EP mission as a parliament, in the func-
tional explanation of rational choice institutionalism the organisation is decoupled from the
environment or the system of organisation (i.e. organisational field, DiMaggio and Powell
1983, p. 148) the EP operates is (i.e. parliament).
Distributive Rational Choice Institutionalism Distributive rational choice institu-
tionalism represents another option to the isomorphic explanation. A distributive explana-
tion of legislative assistance in the EP looks at the distribution of administrative resources
among the actors in the EP. These actors (e.g. political groups, their leaders, MEPs, etc.)
are autonomous and seek to increase their leverage by pulling administrative resources
towards their personal benefit. In contrast to functionalism, benefits are not mutual. Con-
sequently, the expectation would be that the administrative resources in parliament are
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unevenly distributed. The distributive logic has been observed in the case of amendments
to the Rules of Procedure of the EP, where a series of new rules benefitted political groups
over individual MEPs and larger political groups (especially S&D and EPP) over smaller
political groups (Kreppel, 2002). Following this finding, a distributive logic in the organ-
isation of legislative assistance would manifest itself through the empowerment of political
groups. For instance, it can be expected that political groups have relatively more human
resources than individual MEPs. Camenen (1995) and Costa (2003) have assumed that
since the general secretariat has historically been the only permanent actor, it is likely to
be better developed than political group secretariats. The evidence they collected shows
the opposite, which leads to the expectation that political groups are relatively strong
administrative actors compared to the general secretariat and APAs.
Why Sociological Institutionalism? To sum up, the design of legislative assistance
is investigated given the premises of sociological institutionalism. This choice is made
on the assumption that parliamentarisation has been the most important development
in the EP. Therefore, the study seeks evidence for a parliamentary organisation. There
are clear scopes for applying the functional and distributive approaches of rational choice
institutionalism. However, this is not the choice of the dissertation, due to two reasons.
First, the EP has throughout its history sought to obtain legislative powers rather than
to conform to the function of an inter-parliamentary assembly, which here stands for the
functional form. Second, for cases on administration politics information on power politics
is scarce and incomplete, since conflict is hidden from the public. While there might be
evidence for power imbalances, it is diﬃcult to research them systematically. Therefore, the
choice is to focus on sociological institutionalism as the theoretically and methodologically
most viable option.
5.2 Legislative Assistance in State-Legislatures
The purpose of this first part of the chapter is to determine the typical form of legislative
assistance in state-legislatures. In this dissertation a state-legislature refers to any chamber
of parliament that operates in a system of representative democracy in a modern West-
phalian state. In order to determine the form of legislative assistance in state-legislatures,
an inductive approach is adopted, where diﬀerent legislatures are compared.
Case Selection The considered parliaments are the German Bundestag, the French As-
semblée nationale, the British House of Commons and the American Congress (Senate
and House of Representatives). The cases were selected based on administrative traditions
and the legislative process in each parliament. The cases of Germany, France and the
UK were chosen because studies of public administration have shown that the form of the
European Commission has taken up elements of the German, French and British system
(Page, 1997, p. 33). For example, the civil service of the EU is regulated with an extensive
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legal framework, which includes hierarchical bureaucratic structures, such as the ones in
France or Germany. In line with the UK model, the EU system provides for flexibility
based on administrative handbooks and code of conducts, which are easier to modify than
laws. The main reason for selecting the US Congress is its political resemblance to the
EP in terms of a strong committee system. In this respect, the three European legis-
latures are also relevant. In line with the EP and US Congress, the German Bundestag
processes legislation in committees. The German Bundestag is also considered the most
powerful legislature in Europe (Aberbach et al. 1981, p. 231; Beyme, 1998). Relatively to
committees, the chamber takes an important role in the British House of Commons and
in the French National Assembly. The French parliament is considered to have a weak
impact on the government’s legislation. It is assumed that the organisation of legislative
assistance will diﬀer given the importance of the committee or the chamber. On a final
note, the American, British, German and French parliaments are the best-staﬀed parlia-
ments and the ones on which most information is available.1 Given the diversity of these
four parliaments, a review of administrative support should give a broad picture on the
administrative organisation of parliament in general. The comparison is based on primary
and secondary literature resources.
5.2.1 Central Administration
The central administration is the permanent administrative organ responsible for the daily
operations of parliament. It can be referred to also as the institutional administration,
because it serves the parliament as an institution and independently from parliament’s
political composition. A big share of human resources in the central administrations is
usually allocated to administrative services, which aid members in their managerial or
non-legislative activities. When it comes to legislative services, the central administration
is in charge of maintaining the registry of parliament, recording the chamber and committee
proceedings, distributing documents, advising members on parliamentary procedures and
legal issues.
Statute It is common for the employees in European central administrations, or at least
a part of them, to have the same status as government oﬃcials, or to benefit from similar
working conditions. The existence of diﬀerent working conditions between parliamentary
and executive administrations is in line with the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Diﬀerent statuses for government (e.g. the Crown’s civil service in the case of the UK)
and parliamentary oﬃcials can be found in France and in the United Kingdom. Distinct
statuses are justified by the need for parliaments to have their own source of information in
order to remain independent from governments. As a result, independence and autonomy
from government are essential characteristics of French and British systems (Campbell
1Comparative information is available in European Parliament (2000), Annuaire européen
d’administration publique (2007) and in the IPU’s report ‘The changing nature of parliamentary rep-
resentation ’(2012).
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and Laporte, 1981; Ryle, 1981; Perez, 2007). In Germany, the parliamentary civil service is
covered by the same legal framework as the federal administration. According to Schramm
(1965 in Blischke, 1981, p. 525) this stimulates expertise and mobility between parlia-
mentary and executive services. In Europe, it is common to recruit parliamentary oﬃcials
through competitions as a way to ensure a professional and politically neutral service. In
the US, the staﬀ of the central administration consist of public employees, who do not,
however, benefit from a special status, because they are mainly engaged in non-legislative
and, thus, politically non-sensitive issues. On the contrary, the recruitment of committee
staﬀ is to a great extent in the hands of individual members of Congress, committee chairs
and party leadership. Especially the recruitment of legislative staﬀ is done on the basis
of being at the right place at the right time and by ways of personal network (Fox and
Hammond, 1977).
Legislative Assistance As already mentioned, in the US Congress the central admin-
istration mainly provides non-legislative support. Only a small proportion of oﬃces oﬀers
legislative services such as the Legislative Counsel (drafting service), the Parliamentarian
(procedural advice), the General Counsel (legal advice) and units with the House Clerk and
Senate Secretary which record the parliament proceedings and take care of the distribution
of documents, etc. (Schneider and Koempel, 2012, pp. 122-123, 142-144). In contrast to
European legislative service, the heads of these departments are elected - and not appoin-
ted - oﬃcials. While Congress provides committees and individual members with staﬀ, it
has been reluctant to establish a central drafting service (Rogers, 1941).
In Europe on the contrary, the central administrations of parliaments are at the core
of both the managerial and legislative activities of parliament. The fundamental diﬀerence
between Congressional and European systems is therefore the extent to which legislative
services for committees and members are centralised. For the purpose of legislative as-
sistance the British House of Commons has set up a ‘Directorate for the Chamber and
Committees’. This directorate includes oﬃces assisting select and public committees in
the scrutiny of government and in the detailed consideration of bills (House of Commons,
2012; Rogers and Walters, 2006). A separate unit is in charge for assisting members in
the financial scrutiny of the government. Parliamentary diplomacy is facilitated by the
Oversees Oﬃce, which provides secretariats for delegations and international assemblies.
Together these oﬃces have a staﬀ of 360 individuals (Rogers and Walters, 2006, p. 62).
A similar administrative organisation is found in the German Bundestag, where a gen-
eral directorate (Parliament and Members Directorate-General P) is composed of three
directorates: Parliamentary Services (PD), Services for Members (PM) and Committees
(PA) (Linn and Sobolewski, 2010, pp. 134-137; German Bundestag, 2014). In terms of
legislative assistance, Directorate PA is the most important, since it staﬀs all the twenty-
two committee secretariats of the Bundestag. The employees of committee secretariats
provide administrative, organisational, technical assistance and policy expertise. They are
directly responsible to the committee chairperson. Directorate PD services the plenary,
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the governing bodies (e.g. the Council of Elders) and it includes the Law Research Service.
Directorate PA is in charge of administrative issues such as remuneration, staﬀ salaries,
and party financing. It is not known how many civil servants work in these legislation spe-
cific departments, but overall the Bundestag spends 111 million euros for the employment
of around 2 500 civil servants (Linn and Sobolewski, 2010, pp. 131, 133; see also European
Parliament, 2000).
The secretariat of the French National Assembly is also split between administrative
and legislative services. About half of all the employees of the central administration work
in legislative services, where they are in charge of supporting committees and delegations.
Overall, the French legislative services have a workforce of 174 administrators from a
total of 1 349 civil servants and additional 100 contractors. The legislative services were
reformed in 2006 and organised into what is known as the ‘six operational poles’: legal
aﬀairs, cultural and social questions, economics and scientific assessment, public finances,
European aﬀairs, international aﬀairs and defence (Assemblée nationale, 2013, pp. 475-
478). Each of these departments staﬀs at least a committee secretariat and includes a
study and monitoring unit. A department known as the ‘Table Oﬃce’ is responsible for
plenary issues and it includes a Law Unit.
The Congressional system of legislative assistance is diﬀerent from the one seen in the
House of Commons, the Bundestag and the French National Assembly, since committee
assistance is decentralised from the Congressional central administration. In the US Con-
gress committees act as entities that hire staﬀ. For this reason, recruitment practices diﬀer
from committee to committee and between the Senate and the House. Each Congressional
committee has its own budget, which is prepared by the Chairman and submitted for
approval to the House Committee on House Administration or the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration. The Chairman has the right to hire and dismiss staﬀ. Until
the 1970s, the Chairman exercised a great degree of freedom in doing so. This can be
problematic, since all the chairmanships in the US Congress are held by majority mem-
bers, which can thus completely control the staﬀ in committees. Today, an informal rule
commands that the minority in the committee must be treated fairly, which means that a
third of the total funds allocated to a committee is expected to be granted to the minority
party (Schneider and Koempel, 2012). As a result each committee includes a majority and
minority committee staﬀ, which are led by two distinct staﬀ directors. Only a few com-
mittees have a common non-partisan staﬀ. The staﬃng and financing of subcommittees
is not automatic and it depends on the committee chairmen to which subcommittees are
aﬃliated. While the first committee staﬀ were recruited already in 1865, the current sys-
tem of permanent and professional staﬀ for each committee was set up in 1946 at the time
of the Legislative Reorganisation Act. Today the Senate and the House employ around
4 900 committee staﬀ (Schneider and Koempel, 2012, p. 131). They perform a series of
tasks, which are very similar to the ones of committee staﬀ in Europe, such as drafting
legislation, planning hearings, writing committee reports and conducting investigations.
Congressional committee staﬀ are more likely to provide political advice, because of the
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way they are recruited. Since the central administration of Congress is weak, committee
staﬀ are also likely to advise members on procedures and to provide other basic services,
which are, in European parliaments, taken care of by the central administration.
Research Research resources are organised diﬀerently across the surveyed parliaments
(Dietrich-Schulz, 2008). Some parliaments have organised a research service (RS) consist-
ing of units dealing with distinct policy areas. A RS can either be part of the central
administration or organised into a separate agency. It can form a separate unit or be
integrated into the library. Research can also be organised horizontally, which means that
diﬀerent functions (i.e. research, committee support, legal support, etc.) are merged in a
policy field. Except for the US Congress, the bicameral parliaments of France, the UK and
Germany have separate research departments.
The best-staﬀed RS in Europe is found in the German Bundestag (Directorate Research
Services WD). The German RS deals with MPs’ individual inquiries on topics that are
relevant at the federal level. The work is divided into eleven sections, which together
comprise a staﬀ of approximately 60 researchers (Linn and Sobolewski, 2010, p. 137). Part
of the studies are made available to the public via the Bundestag’s website. In addition to
the RS, the Bundestag also includes one of the largest parliamentary libraries in the world.
The French National Assembly has had a separate RS (known as the Research and
Assessment Department) until 2005. This department included also the Parliamentary
Oﬃce for Scientific and Technological Assessment (i.e. a joint service of the Senate and
National Assembly, which was set up in 1983). The French RS produced studies on the
request of individual MPs. In 2006, the research services were reformed from a vertical to
a horizontal structure, where committee secretariats and research services were organised
under the same roof given the policy area. For example, the Legal Aﬀairs Department
consists of a unit staﬃng the committee in legal aﬀairs, but also a study unit, which is
responsible for research in the legal aﬀairs area. De facto, the French National Assembly
does not have an integrated RS service, since research is scattered across diﬀerent depart-
ments. In addition to the study and monitoring units, the National Assembly also has a
library, which qualifies as one of the best libraries in France.
Similarly to France, the House of Commons does not have a separate RS. It is the
Library of the House of Commons that undertakes research activities. The library has a
staﬀ comprising 60 researchers working in eight policy sections (House of Commons, 2012,
p. 65). The House of Commons has had a library since 1818, while a research department
was set up in 1946. The only clients that are allowed to request studies from the library
are individual members of parliament.
The most famous research service is probably the US Congressional Research Service
(CRS), established already in 1916. The CRS is not, however, part of the Congressional
central administration, but operates as a legislative agency within the Library of Congress.
The overall number of staﬀ in the Congressional Research Service amounts to 850 employ-
ees, 420 of which are policy analysts and research professionals (Strom, 2009). More than
78 CHAPTER 5. FORM OF LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE
100 million dollars per year are spent for the functioning of the Congressional Research
Service, almost 90 per cent of the budget is spent for staﬀ salaries (Congressional Research
Service, 2012, p. 28).
Research services operate as non-partisan services, which are generally set up to serve
the parliament as their only client. Their main duty is to provide support to members of
parliament with objective information. As described by an employee of the Congressional
RS (quoted in Tolchin, 1984): ‘[The Congressional RS] is a place to stand back and take
a look at what’s going on. It’s the place where you come as close to finding all sides of
an issue.’ The House of Commons RS holds the same reputation. As described by Rogers
and Walters (2006, p. 63): ‘When a member says in the Chamber “the Library have told
me”, what they have said is unlikely to be challenged.’ Both in the American and British
systems, there is also an emphasis on the confidential relationship between the member
and RS, whose staﬀ are not to disclose any information about the work undertaken for
individual members. In the USA, it is up to the members to make the CRS reports publicly
available. As a result, the reports of the CRS are not freely available to the public. This
has caused uproar from some non-profit groups, who claim that the CRS reports should
be made public, since they are financed with public money and are often the basis for
legislation (Strom, 2009). As of 2014, Wikileaks and other groups have published over
10.000 CRS reports, which are otherwise inaccessible to the public by law.
Heads of Parliamentary Administrations The last characteristics of central admin-
istration that requires attention is the parliament’s head of service, which can hold diﬀerent
titles, such as the Secretary General (Germany and France) or the Clerk or Secretary (the
USA and UK). Heads of the central parliamentary administration are recruited either by
appointment or election. The French Assemblée nationale is headed by two secretary gener-
als (one of the Assembly and Presidency, who oversees the legislative services and the other
of the Questure, who deals with administrative and financial questions). The Bureau of the
Assembly appoints both and together they head a common service (Assemblée nationale,
2013, pp. 445-446). The British Clerk is similarly appointed, but by the Crown. While
in France and the UK the heads of the central administrations are permanent oﬃcers, in
other countries they are elected oﬃcers for either one legislative term (e.g. Germany) or
an unlimited time (American House Clerk and Senate Secretary) (European Parliament,
2000; Rogers and Walters, 2006; Schneider and Koempel, 2012; House of Representatives,
2011; US Senate, 2013). In most of the cases it is not unusual for the heads of adminis-
tration to have devoted their entire career to the parliament and once they become heads
of the services they qualify as the most senior oﬃcers. As such, they supervise day-to-day
operation. They are responsible for keeping the minutes and records of the parliament
and for providing all non-partisan services in support of the legislative process. In gen-
eral, European administrative systems tend to emphasise political neutrality more than
the USA (Page, 1992). This means that European systems lean closer to the Weberian
model of bureaucracy than the American system.
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5.2.2 Political Group Staﬀ
Political group staﬀ (also ‘group staﬀ’ or ‘political advisors’) refers to individuals, who
are recruited by parliamentary parties in order to aid their members. The US Congress
has a decentralised way of financing group staﬀ. This means that political groups (i.e.
majority/minority parliamentary group) do not have the authority to hire staﬀ as it is the
case in several European parliaments. Entities that can hire staﬀ in the US Congress are
committees, the leadership and members (Petersen, 2008, p. 2). There is no separation
between committee and group legislative staﬀ. For this reason we cannot speak about
group staﬀ in the Congress, but only about the majority and minority staﬀ. Many oﬃcials
that are employed in committees and especially those employed in the leadership oﬃces
tend to have a strong political aﬃliation (European Parliament, 2000, p. 226).
The British House of Commons has put in place a specific grant (i.e. short money),
which is available for opposition parties only. The purpose of the allowance is to help the
opposition carry out its parliamentary duties. Most of the money is spent on research
support for frontbenchers, spokesmen, assistance in the whips’ oﬃces and staﬀ for the
opposition leader (Kelly, 2011, p. 4). In 2011/12, a total amount of 6.5 million pounds of
short money was allocated to opposition parties.
In France and Germany, all parliamentary parties are eligible for a grant from the par-
liament’s budget. The grant is used to set up group secretariats and hire staﬀ. In France,
parliamentary groups do not have the legal authority to employ staﬀ and therefore they do
not act as formal employers. In place of political groups, there is an association consisting
of chairmen of the political groups, which is registered as the employer. However, this
is merely a formality. In the German case, political groups employ a total of 800 staﬀ,
which are responsible for providing administrative assistance and policy advice (Linn and
Sobolewski, 2010, pp. 132-133). Overall, parliamentary groups receive around 75 million
euros from the Bundestag’s budget for their expenditures. In France, the central admin-
istration helps political groups to manage their administrative aﬀairs, while the groups
themselves employ around 100 assistants for legislative assistance only (situation for the
XIII legislature (2007-2012) Assemblée nationale, 2013, pp. 513-514).
Party staﬃng is probably one of the most distinct character among European and
American legislative systems. Political groups in the US Congress do not have hiring
authority. In fact, recruiting power is in the hands of individual members. Each political
party elects its own party secretary (i.e. Secretary of the minority and majority), who
is selected among the party partisan staﬀ. The role of party secretaries is to aid the
party leaders when members of parliament meet or caucus together. They mainly assist
leadership positions. The situation is a reflection of parties’ weak position vis-à-vis the
individual members and oﬃce holders (e.g. whip, majority leader etc.). On the contrary,
in selected European countries, such as Germany, parties have been traditionally strong.
This strength is manifested also in their capability to recruit staﬀ. Due to the strong
position of political groups, individual oﬃce holders do not need specific assistance. For
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example, the political groups in the German Bundestag are expected to take a unanimous
stance (Linn and Sobolewski, 2010, p. 11). There is no general need to continuously seek
support for individual bills as in the case of the US Congress. Therefore, there is less scope
of action for a whip or committee coordinator’s staﬀ.
What becomes evident from the description above is that in majoritarian systems,
such as the USA and the UK, the opposition requires special attention and assistance,
due to the dominant position of the majority. In the proportional system the coalition
and opposition parties are given similar privileges. Disregarding the political system, the
groups and members of the governing party(ies) will always have an information and staﬀ
advantage compared to the opposition, because the governing party controls the executive
administration.
5.2.3 Personal Staﬀ of the Members of Parliament
The four parliaments surveyed for this study grant their members a staﬀ allowance. The
purpose of these funds from the parliament’s budget is to allow members of parliament to
employ a number of assistants. The job of an assistant is not a nine to five job, it requires
long hours and weekend work. The duration of the job is linked to the term of the member.
For these reasons, the individuals who take up the job of personal assistants tend to be
young, recent university graduates who have little prior job experience.
The activities of personal staﬀ vary between and within diﬀerent parliaments. The
job of assistants depends on their abilities and the needs of a MP. A study of the EP,
which compared the situation of members’ personal staﬀ in fifteen member states of the
EU, defined assistants as ‘persons who provide to members, in the exercise of their man-
date, personal assistance distinct from that provided by the services and the oﬃcials of
the parliament’ (European Parliament, 1997, p. 5). It can be said that the role of a per-
sonal assistant is to help MPs to carry out their responsibilities as elected oﬃcial. This
includes secretarial tasks (e.g. keeping a diary with appointments, answering the telephone,
arranging meetings, etc.), legislative tasks (e.g. monitoring legislation, assisting members
in committees and the chamber, meeting interest groups, providing representation within
the political group, speech-writing, drafting, etc.) and activities related to the representa-
tion of a constituency (e.g. answering constituents mail, keep contact with the community,
etc.).
This dissertation looks at legislative staﬀ and, therefore, only personal staﬀ, which
are responsible to assist members in committee and plenary activities (i.e. legislation and
scrutiny rather than the representation function) are treated. It has to be said however that
MPs spend a significant part of their allowance to set up local oﬃces in home constituencies
(IPU, 2012). In both the UK and France, two thirds of the personal assistants are based in
local oﬃces, while the remaining one third is based in Westminster and Palais de Bourbon
(Rogers and Walters, 2006, pp. 65-67; Assemblée nationale, 2013, p. 518). In Germany,
the proportion between constituency and Reichstag staﬀ is even (German Bundestag, 2012,
5.2. STATE-LEGISLATURES 81
p. 131). Legislative staﬀ in personal oﬃces tends to be highly educated. Whether personal
staﬀ is partisan or not varies per member, but in the UK for example it is not unusual to
find staﬀ that does not identify with their member’s political views.
Congress members are prime examples of how many resources are invested in recruit-
ing personal staﬀ and in keeping contacts with constituents. Studies on the Congress have
identified up to fourteen diﬀerent positions that can be taken up by personal staﬀ: the ad-
ministrator assistant (AA) is the chief of staﬀ and the main political advisor to the member;
the district director has a similar function to the AA but in the constituency; the legislative
director (LD) is the most senior legislative assistant; the legislative assistant (LA) drafts
legislation and amendments; the legislative correspondent takes care of communications;
the case worker helps constituents (e.g. such as veterans, private companies, etc.) to solve
their problems with the federal government or to apply for grants or subsidies; the press
secretary and assistants take care of the media and act as chief spokespersons; and finally
a web master, an oﬃce manager and a scheduler carry out secretarial and other duties
(Schneider and Koempel, 2012, pp. 130-31, Petersen, 2008, p. 4).
There are diﬀerences between the House and Senate. Senators are given two diﬀerent
personnel allowances. The administrative and clerical allowance varies with the population
of the state that a Senator represents and its distance from Washington (Schneider and
Koempel, 2012, pp. 122-123). This allowance, which in 2011 varied between 2.5 and 4.0
million dollars, covers Capitol and state staﬀ. A Senator can employ between 30-50 people
(Schneider and Koempel, 2012, p. 128). In addition, all the Senators benefit from a legis-
lative assistance allowance of 500 thousands dollars to hire three legislative assistants for
committee work. House members benefit from a representational allowance (MRE). The
greatest part of this allowance, more than 60 per cent (897 thousands dollars in 2011), goes
to staﬀ salaries (Schneider and Koempel, 2012, pp. 119-120). The MRE allows House rep-
resentatives to employ a maximum of eighteen permanent and four additional temporary
staﬀ in Washington or in the district. Together, Senators and the House Representatives
employ more than 14 000 personal staﬀ.
The European allowances are less generous than the ones of the US Congress. The
most empowered MPs are the ones in the Bundestag, which have an allowance of 14 712
euros per month (German Bundestag, 2012, p. 131). German MPs employ around 4 500
assistants, many of them work part-time.
France allocates to its MPs a parliamentary staﬀ allowance of 9 138 euros (Assemblée
nationale, 2013, p. 516). The allowance is calculated on the basis of three assistants, but
it can cover up to five people. If members do not use their respective allowance, the
money is either returned to the budget of the Assemblée or MPs can donate the money to
their political group in order to cover the salaries of those employees engaged by the group.
Members of the National Assembly benefit from a secretarial allowance since 1953. In 1968,
a secretarial allowance was introduced, whereas MPs could chose between establishing a
personal secretariat or a collective secretariat with other MPs. The staﬀ allowance was
introduced in 1975. In addition to the parliamentary staﬀ allowance, MPs receive also an
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oﬃce expense allowance of 6 412 euros.
In the UK, the allowance amounts to around 7 000 pounds (Rogers and Walters, 2006,
pp. 65-67). Members can employ up to three full-time assistants. Through the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority, the UK has in place one of the most transparent data-
bases on how MPs’ spend their allowances. Based on this database, the average annual cost
for assistants’ payroll per MP amounted to 120 000 pounds (data for 2013/2014). Overall,
British MPs employ around 1 800 assistants between Westminster and constituencies. In
the UK, MPs’ employees are required to report revenues from other gainful occupations.
In all these cases, it is a member of parliament that is the employer and not the
institution of parliament. As a result, MPs are the ones in charge of the recruitment,
working conditions and salaries. The status of personal assistants is determined by private
law.
5.3 Legislative Assistance in the EP
The purpose of the second part of this chapter is to describe the legislative system of the
EP. Subsequently, inferences are drawn between the state-legislatures presented in the first
part and the EP. Some of the description for the EP goes beyond the information presented
for state-legislatures. This is particularly true for political group staﬀ, since the chapter
deals with diﬀerences between EP’s parliamentary groups.
The assumption is that nowadays the EP has the status of a legislature. For this
reason, it is expected that the design of legislative assistance in EP is similar to the system
described in the previous section. Given the similarities of the EP with the US Congress and
the Bundestag in terms of a strong committee structure (Kreppel, 2006; Bowler and Farrell,
1995, p. 227), it is expected that the EP is likely to invest significant staﬀ resources for
its activities. The data builds on secondary literature, but also on the author’s interviews,
especially for the description of political advisors and accredited parliamentary assistants
for which information is scarce.
5.3.1 Central Administration: Secretariat of the EP
The general secretariat (also known as ‘secretariat’) is the central and permanent admin-
istrative body of the EP. Similarly to other European parliaments and in contrast to the
US Congress, the EP’s central administration is an important source of administrative
and legislative assistance for its members of parliament. The secretariat’s main role is
to enable the functioning of EP’s committees and political bodies by providing services
such as technical support, coordination of legislative work, organisation of plenary settings
and meetings, translation, interpretation and other services related to everyday operations
(European Parliament, 2011a). In order to meet its duties, the secretariat of the EP is
organised in thirteen Directorate-Generals (DGs) and a legal service. The majority of
the DGs are dedicated to the day-to-day management of the EP (infrastructure, logistics,
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technological support, accountancy, human resources and security). Three DGs (Internal
Policies (DG IPOL), External Policies (DG EXPO) and Research Services (DG EPRS) are
fully dedicated to the assistance of members in legislative business, while only part of the
subunits in DG Presidency (Directorate for Legislative Acts and the Directorate for the
Plenary) and part of the Legal Service (Directorate for Institutional and Parliamentary
Aﬀairs, Directorate for Legislative Aﬀairs) are responsible for legislative assistance. This
organisation is very similar to the one in Germany and to a lesser extent to the one in
France and the UK.
The majority of the individuals employed in the secretariat are permanent oﬃcials and
hold the status of European civil servants. Similarly to the situation in Germany, the
conditions of employment are not regulated per institution, but for the EU civil service as
a whole.2 Therefore, oﬃcials working for the EP are covered by the same rules as those in
the Commission or Council. Such legal framework facilitates mobility between services, as
oﬃcials can apply for any job at any EU institution covered by the Staﬀ Regulations.
Oﬃcials working for the secretariat of the EP can either carry out administrator (AD),
assistant (AST) or secretaries/clerks (AST/SC) functions (Staﬀ Regulations, 2013, Article
5).3 The main distinction between these function groups is the level of education, where AD
employees are recruited with a higher level of education (at least a Bachelor degree) than
AST and AST/SC employees (at least a high school diploma). The AST and AST/SC em-
ployees, who comprise more than half of the permanent staﬀ in the central administration,
are not considered in this dissertation because of the secretarial level of their jobs.4
By definition, AD employees perform duties of greater responsibility such as advisory,
linguistic and scientific duties. In the AD category we find professions such as translators,
interpreters, economists, lawyers, medical oﬃcers, scientists, researchers, financial oﬃcers
and auditors (Staﬀ Regulations, 2013, Article 5 and Annex I). The presence of a high
number of translators and interpreters is a particularity of the EP (Perez, 2007; Costa,
2001; Camenen, 1995; Priestley, 2000). In fact, the EP qualifies as one of the biggest
employers of linguists. As the EP membership has expanded to include representatives
from new member states the linguistic services have concomitantly increased. This is
clearly shown in Figure 5.1 (see also Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6). While the number of MEPs
is proportional to the population of member states, the number of linguists depends on the
amount of documents that need to be translated. Since most of the documents have to be
translated in all oﬃcial languages of the EP (i.e. twenty four languages, which diﬀers from
the European Commission, where there are only three oﬃcial languages) the least spoken
languages consist of approximately the same number of linguists as the most commonly
2See Articles 223 and 336 of the TFEU, Appendix E as modified by the Lisbon Treaty.
3There are cases in the secretariat and political groups where individuals recruited on the AST level
perform duties on the AD level.
4The category of AST employees carries out administrative, technical or training activities in terms of
staﬀ management, budget implementation or political coordination (e.g. personal assistant, senior manager
etc.). The AST/SC employees carry out clerical and secretarial tasks, oﬃce management (e.g. filing clerks,
technical attendants, IT attendants, parliamentary ushers, IT operatives and technicians) (Annex I of the
Staﬀ Regulations).
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Figure 5.1: Number of Linguists 1958-2005
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spoken languages. Since linguists are not responsible for carrying out legislative tasks, they
are not further considered in this dissertation.
Recruitment is based on competitions, which are centrally organised for all the institu-
tions of the EU by the European Personnel Selection Oﬃce (EPSO). This means that the
candidates are not selected by the EP (only in the case of contract and temporary agents),
but by the same central oﬃce that selects staﬀ for the European Commission, Council,
Committee of the Regions and other institutions. Candidates must fulfil six basic require-
ments: citizenship from one of the member states, fulfilled obligations regarding military
service, appropriate character, recruitment through competition, physical fitness and know-
ledge of two EU languages (Article 28, Staﬀ Regulations, 2013). Competition results have
to allow recruitment from the ‘broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals
of Member States’ (Article 27, Staﬀ Regulations, 2013). The multi-national composition
of the staﬀ is of course a major diﬀerence compared to national parliaments. However,
as a rule, only EU citizens are eligible to apply, which does not make the recruitment
system that diﬀerent from national parliaments. The Staﬀ Regulations and the Conditions
of Employment for Other Servants (CEOS) are rather vague on national proportionality
(Article 27). On the one hand, no post shall be reserved for a particular citizenship. On
the other hand, an institution can adopt measures where there are significant imbalances
between nationalities.
The services that are of interest in this dissertation are presented in Table 5.1 and are
considered in detail in the following section. These services are: DG for Internal Policies
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(DG IPOL), DG for External Policies (DG EXPO), DG European Parliamentary Research
Service (DG EPRS) and the Legal Service. While DG IPOL and DG EXPO are mainly
organised according to policy, DG EPRS and the Legal Service carry out duties that are
transversal to policy subjects. In the following section, these four departments are reviewed
on the basis of their services.
5.3.1.1 Committees Assistance
The legislative assistance for committees is provided by the so-called ‘committee secret-
ariats’, which are the administrative organs of committees located within the EP’s central
administration. This is a similar organisation to the one encountered in European na-
tional parliaments. However, it diﬀers from the US Congress, where staﬀ is partisan and
the central administration consists of mainly technical and specialist services. In the EP,
committee secretariats oﬀer four types of assistance (Provan, 2001, see also Corbett et al.,
2007, pp. 133; Reck, 2003, p. 47):
• Technical-administrative assistance, such as the organisation of meetings;
• Technical-substantive assistance, such as the provision of procedural and legal advice;
• Research, such as the collection of relevant information for reports;
• Political assistance, such as provision of advice on how to achieve political comprom-
ises.
The extent to which committee secretariats fulfil these duties depends on the personal
characteristics of committee members, their interests, working style and the type of re-
ports they deal with (legislative or non legislative) (see Section 2.2.2). Organisationally,
committee secretariats are split between DG IPOL and DG EXPO. The majority of com-
mittees are staﬀed by DG IPOL (seventeen in the seventh legislature). Foreign aﬀairs
committees (AFET, DEVE, INTA), subcommittees (DROI, SEDE) and delegations are
staﬀed by DG EXPO. The assistance for delegations is divided in seven region-specific
units.5 In 2013, each of these units had at least four administrators.6
Apart from committee secretariats, DG IPOL includes two horizontal services. The Le-
gislative Coordination unit assists the Conference of Committee Chairmen and the Pres-
idency in the preparation of the plenary agenda. It deals with procedural questions in
committees, manages requests for own-initiative reports, coordinates the work of the EP
vis-à-vis other EU and foreign institutions, etc. The Conciliation and Codecision unit
manages conciliation files in the third reading stage and follows issues related to codecision
and comitology (Neuhold and Radulova, 2006).
5These areas are: Enlargement and EEA, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Euromed and the Middle
East, Latin America, Eastern Partnership and Russia, Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, Transatlantic Rela-
tions and G8 (see Table 5.1).
6In 2013, the units for Asia, New Zealand and Australia and Euromed/Middle East included six ad-
ministrators respectively.
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Table 5.1: Organisation of Legislative Assistance in the EP
DG IPOL
Directorates Economic and Scientific
Policies
Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Aﬀairs
Budgetary Aﬀairs
Units Committee Secretariats:
EMPL
ECON
IMCO
ITRE
ENVI
Policy Department
Committee Secretariats:
LIBE
JURI
AFCO
FEMM
PETI
Policy Department
Committee Secretariats:
BUDG
CONT
Policy Department
DG EXPO
Directorates Committees Regions Democracy Support
Units Committee Secretariats:
AFET
DROI
SEDE
DEVE
INTA
Delegation support:
Enlargement and EEA
Asia, Australia and NZ
Euromed and Middle
East
Latin America
Eastern Partnership &
Russia
ACP countries
Transatlantic Relations
& G8
Policy department
DG EPRS
Directorates Members’ Research
Service
Library Impact Assessment and
Added value
Units Economic and Scientific
Policies
Structural and Cohesion
Policies
Institutional, Legal and
Budgetary Aﬀairs
External Policies
Ex-Ante Impact
Assessment
European Added Value
STOA
Ex-Post Impact
Assessment
Legal Service
Directorates Institutional and
Parliamentary Aﬀairs
Legislative Aﬀairs
Units Institutional and
Budgetary Law
External Relations
Rules and
Parliamentary Law
Economic and Scientific
Policies
Structural and Cohesion
Policies
Justice and Civil
Liberties
Source: EP website, May 2013
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Table 5.2: Number of Staﬀ per Committee in 2013
Committee Secretariat EPP S&D ALDE Greens/EFA ECR GUE/NGL EFD
EMPL 8.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.3
ECON 14.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 3.0
IMCO 14.0 3.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.3 3.0 0.8
ITRE 16.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 1.5 3.3
ENVI 13.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.3 2.5 2.3
AGRI 10.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.2
PECH 7.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 0.5 2.2
REGI 9.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.0
TRAN 13.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.8
CULT 6.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.7
LIBE 11.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 0.8
JURI 6.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.5 2.0 3.3
AFCO 7.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 na 0.5 1.5 2.0
FEMM 5.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.8
PETI 6.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 2.3
BUDG 9.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.5
CONT 6.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.5
INTA 14.0 3.0 4.0 0.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.0
DEVE 9.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.3 1.0 2.1
DROI 7.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 na 2.5 0.5 1.2
SEDE 6.0 na 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5
AFET 13.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.7
Total 209.0 55.0 57.0 35.0 45.0 43.5 36.0 39.0
Note: The decimal figures mean that one person had worked in more than one committee.
Staﬀ in Committee Secretariats Among all the AD employees in the central admin-
istration of the EP, only one tenth of them works in committee secretariats (Corbett et
al., 2007, p. 193, Reck, 2003, p. 47). This is similar to other parliaments, where most of
the staﬀ does not work on legislation. Nevertheless, committee secretariats consist of the
highest concentration of AD graders (40 per cent) compared to any other central adminis-
trative unit (Neunreither 2002 in Reck, 2003). For this reason, the committee secretariats
are the most important source of legislative assistance for members. The size of individual
committee secretariats varies given the importance of legislative areas and the number of
MEPs. In general, committee secretariats are composed of a minimum of five to a max-
imum of sixteen AD oﬃcials (Table 5.2, see also Neunreither, 2003, p. 48). The committee
administrator works the most with the rapporteur and the committee chairman. Once a
committee is assigned a proposal for legislation, the administrative head of the committee
secretariat assigns a legislative file to an oﬃcial, which then becomes the principal admin-
istrator on that specific dossier (Interview B, 2012). Generally, MEPs do not have a say
on who is selected as the principal administrator.
5.3.1.2 Legal Assistance
The Legal Service (established in 1985) is in charge of verifying the legal basis of a Commis-
sion proposal and checking legislative acts before signature (European Parliament 2012b,
pp. 45-46; Neunreither, 2003, p. 47). It employs around 100 administrators and lawyer
linguists. The lawyer linguist is a specific profession in the EP/EU, which is related to the
multilingual character of the EU.
A vast amount of time is dedicated to the representation of the EP in lawsuits, drawing
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up all the contracts for the needs of the EP such as the acquisition/renting of buildings,
legal questions on MEPs’ rights etc. In the past, this has left very little time for the
Legal Service to assist committees in legislation. However, as the scope of codecision
expanded, the Legal Service increased its activities in legislative assistance. Within the
legal department, three units have a responsibility in legislation. The Directorate for
Legal Aﬀairs is divided in units dealing with economic and scientific policies, structural
and cohesion polices and justice and civil liberties. The Directorate for Institutional and
Parliamentary Aﬀairs deals with institutional law, budgetary law, external relations and
rules, and parliamentary law. The division of work is thus similar to the structure of
committees and their respective secretariats.
The Legal Service plays a role in the legislative assistance of MEPs. For this reason, its
administrators attend committee meetings, where the chairman can consult them directly.
The committee secretariats tend to consult the Legal Service when they face major legal
challenges, rather than on every day issues. The Legal Service has an important role to
play especially when a legal dispute arises from adopted legislation (Article 5, Bureau of
the EP, 2004). Therefore, one of the main objectives of the Legal Service is to contribute
to the EP’s ability in dealing with the Council.
The right to consult the Legal Service is divided between individual MEPs and lead-
ership bodies (Article 1, Bureau of the EP, 2004). Only the rapporteurs and MEPs that
occupy a leadership position, such as committee and delegation chairs as well as the Pres-
ident of the EP, can consult the Legal Service.7 The right to consult the Legal Service is
conferred to collective entities such as the Conference of Presidents, Bureau, Quaestors,
Conference of Committee Chairmen and Conference of Delegation Chairmen. In excep-
tional cases political groups and individual MEPs can request assistance form the Legal
Service as well (Article 2, Bureau of the EP, 2004).
The main deterrents for asking the Legal Service to issue an opinion are the formal-
ity of procedures and lengthy deliberations. All the legal opinions have to be drawn in
written form. Therefore, committees (rapporteur or committee chairs) turn to the Legal
Service informally, because they require quick consultations. As described by a respondent
interviewed for this study (Interview Y, 2013):
The Legal Service tends deliberate on an issue for several weeks and looks at
all the terms. They do a very valuable job, but very often I didn’t have several
weeks. I needed to know today. So what happened is that I rang up somebody
who I knew in the Legal Service and asked for his opinion: ‘You are not com-
mitted to anything. On first appearance do you think this is reasonable? Do
you think we can do it?’ And I would say: ‘I might put this in the chairmen
notes and he might ask you something in the committee meeting.’
Given the collected data, there is no evidence that that the Legal Service systematically
assist MEPs or political groups.
7The Secretary General of the EP is also allowed to consult the Legal Service.
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5.3.1.3 Research Services
Research in the EP is taken care of by DG EPRS and policy departments, which are
located in DG IPOL and DG EXPO. The policy departments and research services have
the same thematic organisation as committees and the Legal Service. In addition, research
activities are organised based on who is the recipient, which can either be a specific body
(e.g. committees) or individual MEPs (European Parliament, 2013a). Compared to state-
parliaments, the EP has recently developed a network of research departments, which are
looked at below.
Policy departments The policy departments carry out research for committees, deleg-
ations and specific oﬃce-holders therein (i.e. committee chairs, rapporteurs, etc.). Four
policy departments (Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies; Structural and Cohe-
sion Policy; Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Aﬀairs; and Budgetary Aﬀairs) are located
in DG IPOL, while the policy department on external aﬀairs is part of DG EXPO. The role
of policy departments is to help committees carry out their responsibilities by providing
advice on hearings, organising workshops and preparing notes, fact-sheets, studies, which
also involves the outsourcing of research. In 2013, the number of staﬀ varied across depart-
ments. The policy department on the budget was the smallest with seven administrators,
followed by the citizens’ rights and constitutional aﬀairs with twelve employees, cohesion
with sixteen (four of which were seconded national oﬃcials) and the external policies unit
with twenty staﬀ (four of which were seconded national oﬃcials).
DG EPRS On the contrary to policy departments, DG European Parliamentary Re-
search Service (DG EPRS) assists all MEPs independently from their function. It covers
a broader spectrum of tasks than policy departments. It includes the library, the research
service for individual MEPs and some units with specific research tasks (STOA, IMPA
and EAVA). The departments within DG EPRS work closely together with committees
and policy departments. The specific research tasks provided by DG EPRS are presented
in the following paragraphs.
Research Service The unit for research was developed in 2013 out of the research
capacities in the library, which were previously located in DG Presidency. In the same
manner as committees, the Legal Service and policy departments, the Research Service
(RS) is structured in five diﬀerent thematic units covering policies in economics and sci-
ence, structural and cohesion, institutional, legal, budgetary and external aﬀairs. The
fundamental diﬀerence compared to policy department is that the RS was established to
provide research support for all MEPs independently from their function in a committee.
Science and Technology Options Assessment The Science and Technology Op-
tions Assessment unit (STOA) was established in 1987. Its role is to assess the scientific
and technological aspects of legislation (Neunreither, 2003, p. 51). Policy assessments (e.g.
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nano safety, e-democracy, etc.) are requested by committees. Its reports are published
on the EP’s website similarly to the publication of the Research Service of the House
of Commons. In addition to reports, STOA organises round tables, expert discussions
and conferences, which are open to MEPs, oﬃcials, political group advisors, accredited
assistants and other EU organisations. The STOA is supervised by a group of MEPs thor-
ough the STOA Panel, which draws the annual work-plan following the proposals from
all the committees. As of 2013, STOA consisted of three oﬃcials and one seconded na-
tional expert. Several other national parliaments have a similar service. Together these
services form the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment Network, which gathers
the technological assessment units of European parliaments.
Impact Assessment Units There are two impact assessment units (IMPA) with
a staﬀ of five administrators, which are responsible for carrying out ex-ante and ex-post
impact assessments of EU policies. The units were set up in order to provide the EP with
suﬃcient scrutiny capacity, independent from the information provided by the European
Commission (European Parliament, 2013b; European Parliament, 2009c, p. 8). The im-
pact assessments of the EP consider the eﬀects of the Commission proposals given their
economic, social and environmental dimensions (European Union, 2003; European Parlia-
ment, 2013c). In order to further increase EP’s scrutiny capacity, it has been suggested to
establish control sub-committees for legislative policies, which would function in a similar
way as the Budgetary Control committee (CONT) for the supervision of the EU budget
(European Parliament, 2013b, pp. 9, 16).
European Added Value Unit The European added value unit (EAVA) was set
up in 2012 with the objective to support rapporteurs drafting legislative initiative reports
(own-initiative reports) for the consideration of the Commission as stipulated in Article
225 of the TFEU. The Unit has a staﬀ of five administrators, which are responsible for
drawing reports on policy areas where acting at the EU-level can produce greater eﬃciency
than acting on national level only. It produces issue papers on the European added values
in specific policies and monitors the added values of passed legislation.
5.3.2 Staﬀ in Political Groups: Political Advisors
Political groups in the EP are financed directly from the EP’s budget (Budget Item 400).
With these funds they can set up a secretariat. None of the political groups is given
additional funds, such as the ‘short money’ in the British House of Commons, as in the
EP there in no stable majority or coalition. Consequently, political financing in the EP
is more similar to the one in the German Bundestag and the French National Assembly
than the British House of Commons or the US Congress. The following section describes
the general administrative organisation of EP’s political groups EP and signals out the
diversity among them. A summary of the basic features is provided in Table 5.3.
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5.3.2.1 General Organisation
The grants to political groups are distributed by the EP’s Bureau based on a scale pro-
posed by the chairs of political groups (Bureau of the EP, 2003). The Bureau allocates the
grants at the beginning of every new financial year (1 January), taking into account mem-
bership changes. The sum of the grants is based on the number of members and languages
represented within a group. This means that the groups with larger memberships and
greater linguistic diversity are allocated more funds than others. No other criterion for the
distribution of funds is taken in consideration. Political groups can spend the allowances
for their administrative and operational expenditures and for political and information
activities related to EU activity. However, they are prohibited to dispense their funds for
electoral campaigning and activities sponsoring political parties, since European political
parties and foundations are financed separately.
Compared to party groups in national parliaments, political groups in the EP have
more human resources to follow the work of members in committees (Costa, 2003, p. 155).
Nevertheless, their human resources are limited compared to the committee secretariats
staﬀed by the central administration of the EP (see Table 5.2). How many oﬃcials a group
can employ is decided by a formula, which takes into account the number of MEPs and
speaking languages within a group (Corbett et al., 2007, p. 99). The number of oﬃcials is
not supposed to exceed the number of MEPs per group, but this has been violated due to
enlargements (Interview U, 2013).
As of 2013, the total of political groups employed more than one thousand employees;
60 per cent of them belonged to the AST category and performed clerical and secret-
arial jobs, while the rest, around 400 employees, were engaged in AD positions. Political
advisors are therefore categorised in the same function groups as the administrators in
the central secretariat. However, Staﬀ Regulations have never recognised a permanent
status to employees in political groups. This is reflected in the establishment plans of
the EU budget, where political groups are allocated posts for temporary employees. De
facto individuals have made a career and reached retirement by working in political groups
(Camenen, 1995, p. 150). The job contracts of political advisors are in fact indefinite, but
dependent on the election results and the continuity of political groups between legislative
terms. The precariousness of their position is also oﬀset by other employment conditions,
such as health and social insurance, which are similar to the ones of permanent oﬃcials.
Political advisors have to meet the same basic recruitment requirements as the oﬃcials of
the central secretariat. This means that they have to speak two European languages, be
an EU citizen, have a Bachelor degree and show an appropriate character.
Political groups divide their work between administrative and political tasks. Political
tasks are notably carried out by advisors (also ‘political advisors’ or ‘group advisors’). Their
assignments include following the work of one or more parliamentary committees, preparing
summaries, position papers, minutes of meetings, drafting amendments, preparing possible
voting lists, ensuring that MEPs pursue the objectives of the political group, working with
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other political groups, etc. Political group secretariats do not assist individual MEPs.
National and background diﬀerences make it complex for political groups’ oﬃcials to meet
the needs of individual MEPs in respect to their constituencies (Reck, 2003, p. 55). This
task falls mainly on personal assistants of MEPs, who act as political advisors and are
discussed in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2.2 EP Political Group Diversity
Recruitment Apart from the minimal conditions of employment, the political groups
are free to organise their secretariats in terms of internal rules, procedures and additional
recruitment criteria (Hix and Lord, 1997; Corbett et al., 2007, chapter 5). Recruitment
procedures vary among political groups. They can be based on patronage, political or
personal contacts and professional or linguistic requirements. Party membership is not a
requirement, even if it is diﬃcult to imagine an individual applying for a job in a political
group without being ideologically close to that group (Interview U, 2013; Interview ZB,
2013). Compared to the past, it is common that political groups organise a competition
for recruiting new staﬀ. Competitions include oral and written tests for examining the
candidates’ knowledge on the EU/EP, knowledge of languages and the ability to write.
In addition to the general conditions, which are specified in the Staﬀ Regulations, special
conditions might apply, such as commitment to political groups’ objectives, experience,
negotiations skills, understanding of the importance of discretion in a political environment,
etc. (e.g. ECR, 2012; EPP, 2012).
Internal organisation Apart from recruitment, every group is responsible for its own
internal organisation. Two general patterns in the organisation can be observed: organisa-
tion depends on the number of MEPs and it is influenced by the specialisation in the EP’s
secretariat.
Number of MEPs First, the organisation of political groups diﬀers given the number
of MEPs and their specific interest in particular policies. This means that the number of
departments and the level of specialisation vary given the size of each group and/or political
priorities. With the exception of the Greens/EFA (see pg. 93), the level of specialisation
increases with the number of MEPs. For example, the EPP, as the group with the largest
membership, employs a communication oﬃcer for each national delegation. This is not
the case for smaller political groups. Political groups with smaller memberships are less
specialised in committee work as well. Political advisors in smaller groups follow more
than one parliamentary committee at a time (Table 5.2).
Influence of the EP’s Secretariat Second, there is a tendency in political groups
to organise their secretariats in a way that, more or less, mirrors the structure of the EP
general secretariat (see Tables 5.1 and 5.3). For example, in the EPP legislative assistance
is organised by policy areas resembling the division of work in DG IPOL and DG EXPO.
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Work is organised in four working groups (Foreign Aﬀairs, Economic Aﬀairs, Budget &
Agriculture and Social Aﬀairs) and into regional departments for managing the work of
parliamentary delegations. S&D and ALDE have divided committee work in three policy
sectors (Economic & Social Cohesion, Citizens Rights & Institutional Aﬀairs and Foreign
Relations). These working groups are further divided into units, which follow individual
committees.
Specialisation The administrative organisation of the EPP, S&D and ALDE reflects
four levels of political discussions: the committee level, the working group level, which gath-
ers together thematically coherent committees, the presidency level, which consists of the
party leadership, and finally the group as a whole. The purpose of specialisation is to
put in place ‘filters’ that detect disagreements between MEPs and national delegations as
earlier as possible in the decision-making process (Interview ZB, 2013). This has become
especially important with the rise in the number of the so-called ‘early agreements’ (i.e.
when an inter-institutional agreement is reached in the first reading of codecision, thus
shortening the possibilities for deliberation compared to procedures involving two read-
ings). Finding out where alternative opinions exist, solving them or at least pointing them
out contributes to a political group’s unity, which in turn improves its capacity to influ-
ence the outcome of a policy. Specialisation is therefore especially important for political
groups, where membership is diversified and where there is less agreement on a common
political agenda. This also means that it is easier to organise a political group, which is
politically cohesive (Interview ZD, 2013). A disadvantage of specialisation is the establish-
ment of a hierarchy, where information does not flow fast enough between the diﬀerent
levels of organisation. In case of internal disagreements and when information does not
reach those who have the power to intervene, specialisation can be counterproductive. This
is critical especially in first reading agreements, where political groups might not always
have enough time to identify points of disagreements and risk to arrive at the plenary stage
without a common position.
Greens/EFA A particular case of specialisation is the Greens/EFA group. This
political group stands out compared to others due to their specialisation on specific issues,
such as genetically modified organisms, climate change, internet policies and intellectual
property (Greens and EFA, 2012). The Greens/EFA invest most of their resources into
policy work, while keeping the administrative branch of the secretariat small. They are
also known for a fluid type of organisation characterised by few levels of hierarchy between
politicians and staﬀ (Interview ZD, 2013). Together, these two characteristics favour an
environment of ideas, where qualified staﬀ (political advisors and APAs) are free to talk and
intervene in group discussions. The organisation of the Greens/EFA is a strategic choice,
which builds on the notion that one needs to be innovative to counterbalance political
underweight.
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Nationality The importance of nationality varies between political groups and national
delegations. While oﬃcially recruitment is not done according to nationality, linguistic
requirements tend to produce similar staﬀ and MEPs national distributions. For example,
in order to provide support for Latvian MEPs, Latvian-speaking oﬃcial are recruited.8
In certain political groups, the principle of nationality is stronger than in others. For
example, in the ECR some national delegations are entitled to their own staﬀ, which are
accountable to the specific national delegation rather than to the political group as a whole
(Interview V, 2013). In practice this means that each delegation of MEPs within the ECR
is in charge of its own recruitment. A similar tendency exists in the EFD group, where
MEPs are distrustful of staﬀ and demand from them high levels of loyalty. This means
that MEPs are less keen to delegate tasks to their staﬀ.
Recruitment policies and staﬀ compositions are organised along the line of the central
secretariat. EPP and S&D MEPs tend to see political advisors as staﬀ that work for
the whole group and nationality is less emphasised. Anna Colombo, the S&D Secretary
General, has promoted the idea of a supranational secretariat, whose composition does
not necessarily reflect national delegations. This is also why in the S&D the support to
national delegations is voluntary (Interview ZB, 2013).
In the EPP and S&D, the influence of national delegation is curtailed also through
the recruitment process. Namely, a representative of the EP’s general secretariat is always
involved in the selection of candidates in addition to the staﬀ of the group and staﬀ
unions (Interview ZB, 2013; Interview U, 2013). Recruitment is done through competitions,
where selected candidates are ranked in a preferential order. MEPs can then select one
of the ranked candidates. Hiring candidates other than the first ranked on the list can
be controversial and requires argumentation. Otherwise, there is a risk that the selection
procedure is put under question and brought before the Civil Service Tribunal of the
EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg. For this reason, there is an incentive to conduct
fair selection procedures, which do not automatically lead to the recruitment of MEPs’
preferred candidates (Interview U, 2013).
Approach to Politics While nationality is not the most important criteria for either
the EPP or the S&D, there are diﬀerences in the approach to politics, which has to do
with spirit and tradition of political families rather than organisation. For example, S&D
staﬀ have the reputation of being politically loyal to the Socialists party. In the past,
membership in a Socialists party was the precondition for recruitment, while this is not
the case anymore (Interview ZB, 2013). Nevertheless, working for the S&D is regarded as a
statement of personal political convictions (Interview U, 2013; Interview P, 2013; Interview
ZB, 2013; Interview W, 2013). The Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups share a similar
attitude. On the contrary, political convictions are of less importance for the EPP, where
competences are valued above all. This, however, does not imply that EPP staﬀ do not
sympathise with the Christian-Democratic political tradition (Interview U, 2013). These
traditions are also reflected in the type of personal assistants that work for MEPs and are
discussed next.
8However, they do not have to necessarily hold Latvian citizenship as long as they speak Latvian.
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5.3.3 MEPs Personal Staﬀ
The role of assistants in the EP is vis-à-vis national parliaments important due to the
national context of EU politics and the diﬀerences among MEPs, which require specific
knowledge that cannot be otherwise met by oﬃcials or political groups (Reck, 2003, p. 55).
In comparison to national parliaments, the monthly allowance received by MEPs is rel-
atively high. From 2011, the staﬀ allowance has been set to a maximum of 21 209 euros
(European Parliament, 2011b).9 In comparison, French MPs receive 9 412 euros and Italian
MPs 3 690 euros (Assemblée nationale, 2013, pp. 516; European Parliament 2013b, p. 19).
The most generous legislature is the US Congress, whose members receive three times the
amount of MEPs (European Parliament, 2012a, p. 86). Assistants of MEPs are paid from
the appropriations dedicated to the special functions carried out by the EP, while secret-
ariat administrators and political group advisors are paid from the appropriation dedicated
to staﬀ of the EP institution.10
According to the law, two types of assistants work for MEP: local and accredited
(Article 34 of the Implementing Measures for the Statute for MEPs; European Parliament,
2009b). The same distinction exists also in state-legislatures, although it is not enshrined
in law. While accredited parliamentary assistants are responsible for helping MEPs in their
role as legislator and scrutiniser, local assistants take care of the representative and linkage
function. The increase of financial resources in the EP gives MEPs the possibility to set
up their own personal oﬃce with on average two accredited and four local assistants (see
Figure 5.2). The system of MEPs oﬃces resembles the system in the US Congress, with
the exception of the level of formalisation, which is more detailed in congressional oﬃces
than in the EP. In this dissertation, the focus is on the accredited parliamentary assistants
(APAs) that aid MEPs in their committee and plenary work in Brussels or Strasbourg.
The diﬀerence between EP-based staﬀ and local staﬀ is considered next.
5.3.3.1 Constituency and Parliament Staﬀ
The situation surrounding the employment of personal staﬀ in the EP is particular. While
in national systems there are no formal rules on the division between constituency and par-
liamentary work, the EP has set up such rules in 2009 with Regulation 160/2009 amending
the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities (CEOS,
Regulation 160/2009; see also Andreone, 2010). This amendment was adopted among a
series of measures (i.e. Statute for Members of the European Parliament (2009), its Imple-
menting measure (2009) the MEPs’ Code of Conduct (2012)) to increase transparency in
parliament after in 2008 the media published the results of an EP’s internal audit, which
discovered corruptive use of parliamentary allowances.11
9This amount covers the expenses of accredited and local assistants (Article 33 of the Implementing
Measures for the Statute for MEPs; European Parliament, 2009b).
10This is also the main reason why the number of available positions for APAs is not available in the
Establishment Plans in the Annual Budgets of the EU.
11The misuse of allowances was oﬃcially discovered in 2006 after an internal audit on the executed
payments to assistants between 2004-2005. The public became aware of the audit report, known also as
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Figure 5.2: Number of Full or Part-Time APAs per MEP Oﬃce (2013)
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Note: The number of full-time accredited assistants per member is limited to three with contracts
running simultaneously. Given the information on the EP website it is not possible to distinguish
between full-time and part-time employees, which results in a member employing more than three
accredited assistants.
As a result of Regulation 160, there is now a general distinction between assistants
working in the EP (or accredited parliamentary assistants, APAs) and those assistants
that work in constituencies (or local assistants) (Article 34 of the Implementing Meas-
ures adopted by the Bureau of the EP to the Statute for MEPs, European Parliament,
2009b).12 Parliamentary assistants in the EP are employed under European law (Regula-
tion 160/2009), while local assistants are employed under private contracts pertaining to
the national law of the country where they work.13 This means that the legal situation
among MEPs’ local assistants diﬀers per country, and that MEPs’ local assistants have
similar working contracts to assistants employed by MPs in national parliaments. In other
words, the conditions of employment of MEPs’ local assistants diﬀer from the ones of ac-
credited assistants in the Brussels oﬃces of MEPs. This is a particularity of the EP, which
is unseen in other state-legislatures.
Both MEPs’ local and accredited staﬀ are employed personally by an MEP. However,
while it is the MEP who administers the contract of local staﬀ (or a paying agent following
an authorisation from the MEP), this is done by the EP’s central administration in the case
the Galvin Report, in 2008. The EP released the report only in 2011, after the European Ombudsman
stated that the public should have access to details of the payments received by MEPs including the
secretarial allowance, general expenditures allowances, travel and subsistence allowance.
12Prior to the 2009 reform all assistants were employed under private contracts subject to national law.
MEPs were responsible for the management of both parliamentary and local staﬀ.
13A number of common rules for the employment of local assistants are stipulated in the Implementing
Measures to the Statute for MEPs (European Parliament, 2009b; Bureau of the EP, 2009; European
Parliament, 2011b).
98 CHAPTER 5. FORM OF LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE
of APAs. This is diﬀerent compared to national parliaments, where both parliamentary and
local assistants work on private law contracts. In the EP, around 35 per cent of assistants
are employed as APAs, the remaining 65 per cent are local assistants (data for 2013).
This proportion situates the EP somewhere in-between the French and British parliament
(where one third of assistants works in the capital) and the German Bundestag (where half
of the assistants work in Berlin).
Prior to the adoption of Regulation 160, the conditions of employment for parliamentary
assistants were diﬀerent from the ones of oﬃcials and political advisors. Parliamentary
assistants did not benefit from the same social security, pension scheme and the special
tax system as the oﬃcials and other servants of the EU. These conditions put parliamentary
assistants in a underprivileged position, which aﬀected the prestige of their profession vis-
à-vis secretariat oﬃcials and political group advisors. While the position of APAs has
ameliorated with Regulation 160, they neither have a staﬀ union nor are they represented
in any other union. Their representation as employees of the EP are defended through the
APA Committee, i.e. an association, which was for the first time elected in 2010 to defend,
promote and coordinate the interests and views of assistants.
5.3.3.2 Accredited Assistants
Even if all APAs are employed under the same legal conditions, the recruitment procedures
still vary per MEP. Article 33 of the Implementing measures to the Statute for MEPs
states that members can freely choose their personal staﬀ. Article 128 (2) of the Staﬀ
Regulations sets some conditions on the engagements in terms of citizenship, military
service, good health, knowledge of languages and the level of education. As secretariat
administrators and group staﬀ, parliamentary assistants have to have knowledge of at
least two EU languages. In terms of the education level they are not required to have
a Bachelor degree, but at least professional experience and training equivalent to post-
secondary education. Article 128 (1) of the Staﬀ Regulations also says that the relationship
of mutual trust between the MEP and his/her assistant implies the possibility for members
to select their personal staﬀ on political aﬃnity. This provision is unique to assistants and
does not apply to secretariat administrators or political group advisors.
The same trend observed for political groups, holds also for APAs (see page 94): the
tradition of a party influences the type of assistants MEPs employ. APAs working under
EPP members are less grounded in the political tradition of their employer than APAs
working for S&D members (Interview P, 2013; Interview Z, 2013). The importance of
education and political aﬃnity in the selection of assistants has been observed also by
Michon (2005). He has identified two ways to become an MEP assistant. The first option
is through education by completing studies in a foreign country. The second option, which
is usually taken by those who fail through the first, is a militant career in a political party.
The diﬀerences in the recruitment underlie also the diﬀerent types of assistants one can find
in the EP. It is in the discretion of MEPs how to put to work an assistant. For example,
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an MEP focusing on the abduction of children requires a diﬀerent kind of assistance than
an MEP focusing on the direct payment directive.
Diﬀerences in MEPs’ priorities are therefore reflected also in the qualities and qualific-
ations of their personal assistants. Given the many diﬀerent ways MEPs choose to work,
there is no common description for the work of assistants. Compared to Congressional
oﬃces there is also not a clear distinction between assistants that do administrative and
secretarial tasks. However, tasks diﬀer given the level of education and the position in the
hierarchy (grading system, see Section 8.2.1).
5.3.3.3 MEPs’ Personal Oﬃces
The financial conditions that are currently in place allow each MEP to employ a maximum
of three full-time APAs with contracts running simultaneously.14 The increase of financial
resources for staﬀ allowances has enabled MEPs to organise themselves into oﬃces or
cabinets, which is a phenomena pertaining to the US legislative system (Salisbury and
Shepsle, 1981). In fact, in the EP, the oﬃces of MEPs are commonly described as small
enterprises with MEP as their directors (Interview Z, 2013; Interview Y, 2013). However,
the number of staﬀ and the division of responsibilities in the EP cannot be compared to
the US Congress, as it, in terms of tasks, resembles more the European system.
In the seventh term of the EP (2009-2014), most of the MEPs (more than 70 per
cent) employed two or three APAs (Figure 5.2). The most common scenario among polit-
ical groups is an MEPs with two APAs. The Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL and non-attached
members deviated from this number, as they most commonly employed three assistants.
Individual EFD members on the contrary employed most frequently one assistant. Despite
the increase of financial resources for the recruitment of accredited assistants, the relative
size of political groups continues to be respected. This can be seen in Figure 5.3, where
the majority of APAs worked for MEPs that were aﬃliated to the largest groups in the
seventh term. Given the relative size of political groups the proportion between MEPs and
APAs was also equal (Figure 5.4).
The way the work is organised in the personal oﬃce of MEPs varies in the number
of APAs, but also in the type of responsibilities APAs are delegated to do. MEPs that
work on legislation are expected to employ assistants to follow the work of committees. In
terms of legislative work, accredited parliamentary assistants distinguish themselves from
secretariat administrators and political advisors, as they provide direct and personalised
assistance to MEPs. They are also the persons MEPs spends the most time with at work
and can thus become confidants.
5.3.4 Job Comparison
This section compares the roles of secretariat oﬃcials, political advisors and APAs given
the formal and informal character of their jobs. Table 5.4 provides a summary.
14On the contrary, the number of local assistants is not limited.
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Figure 5.3: Number of APAs per Political Group (2013)
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of MEPs and APAs Proportions Based on the Size of Political
Groups (2013)
EPP 39%
S&D 26%
ALDE 10%
Greens/EFA 9%
ECR 8%
GUE/NGL 4%
EFD 3% NA 3%
N = 1500 (Data: EP website, September 2013)
APAs per political groups (%)
EPP 36%
S&D 25%
ALDE 11%
Greens/EFA 8%
ECR 7%
GUE/NGL 5%
EFD 4%
NA 4%
N = 766 (Data: EP website, September 2013)
MEPs per political groups (%)
Source: EP website, September 2013
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5.3.4.1 Formal Aspects
All EP employees are covered by EU law, but according to diﬀerent regulations. Admin-
istrators, which are employed on an indefinite contract, have the status of oﬃcials or civil
servants. All the others do not qualify as civil servants. The employment of oﬃcials is
governed by the Staﬀ Regulations for Oﬃcials, while the employment of political advisors
and accredited assistant is regulated by the CEOS. EP staﬀ are regulated to a larger extent
than staﬀ in national legislatures. This holds particularly for the profession of APAs and
political groups. In national parliaments, staﬀ are employed according to private and not
public law.
The status of civil servants guarantees them greater job security and social benefits
compared to temporary staﬀ and APAs. In addition to permanent employees, the general
secretariat can also employ temporary staﬀ. Political advisors and APAs are per definition
engaged only on a fixed term basis. The duration of APAs’ employment is clearly linked
to the mandate of the MEP that employs them. This is not so clear for political advisors,
where the continuity of employment is assured given the aggregate elections results ob-
tained by individual political groups rather than individual MEPs. As a result, political
advisors have a greater job security than APAs. The contract periods also mean that
the administrations in the secretariat are the only ones whose contracts are not aﬀected
by European elections results. This makes the secretariat of the EP the only permanent
source of assistance for MEPs. In respect to these characteristics, the EP is similar to
state-legislatures.
Except for the job security, political advisors benefit from very similar working condi-
tions as the permanent administrator of the secretariat. Accredited assistants have fewer
privileges. Salary conditions for oﬃcials and political advisors are the same (see Article 66
of the Staﬀ Regulations). At the lowest levels (AD 5 to AD 9) the salaries range from 2
654 to 7 127 euros. Head of units and advisers (AD 9 to AD 14) receive between 7 127 and
14 953 euros.15 The pay on the highest grades ranges between 13 216 and 18 370 euros.16
The remuneration for APAs is lower and varies between 1 680 and 7 740 euros (Article 133
of the CEOS).
The professional requirements for legislative staﬀ are very similar. Before being selec-
ted they have to fulfil basic conditions in terms of military service, appropriate character,
physical fitness and language knowledge. Oﬃcials and temporary staﬀ working either in
the central secretariat or political groups have to have at least a Bachelor degree. The
engagement of APAs is conditioned upon a secondary level of education or suﬃcient pro-
fessional experience. EU nationality is a necessary condition for staﬀ in the secretariat
and political groups, but not for APAs. While recruitment for secretariat’s oﬃcials is done
strictly through centralised competitions organised by the EPSO, this is not a requirement
for political groups and MEP staﬀ.
15All the amounts are based on Staﬀ Regulations as amended in October 2013.
16The salaries of employees in the AST category range between 2 654 and 10 324 euros. Salaries for
employees in the AST/SC rank are 2 345 and 4 921 euros.
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Table 5.4: Legislative Staﬀ in the EP
Administrators Political Advisors Accredited Assistants
Legal Status:
Permanent and Temporary Staﬀ Temporary Staﬀ Accredited Assistants
Recruitment:
Contract are regulated with EU
law since 1956: Staﬀ Regulation
of Oﬃcials and CEOS (Title II)
Regulation of Oﬃcials and CEOS
(Title II)
Contract are regulated with EU
law since 2009: CEOS (Title VII)
Centralised Competitions (EPSO) Decentralised Competition (EPSO
can assist the selection) or other
methods
Decentralised and in the hands of
MEPs
Recruitment criteria:
No posts shall be reserved for
nationals of any specific Member
State. But: Monitoring of
imbalance between nationalities.
No posts shall be reserved for
nationals of any specific Member
State. But: Monitoring of
imbalance between nationalities.
Not regulated
Bachelor Degree (minimum) Bachelor Degree (minimum) Secondary degree (minimum)
Knowledge of 2 EU languages Knowledge of 2 EU languages Knowledge of 2 EU languages
Conditions of Employment:
Indefinite and Fixed contracts Fixed period contracts Fixed period contracts
Paid for the EU Budget Ch. 12 Paid for the EU Budget Ch. 12 Paid for the EU Budget Ch. 42
Temporary staﬀ is eligible to
stand internal concurres to
become oﬃcials.
Temporary staﬀ is eligible to
stand internal concurres to
become oﬃcials.
Ineligible to stand internal
concurres to become oﬃcials.
Salary: 4 349 (Grade AD 5) to 18
370 euros (Grade AD 16)
Salary: 4 349 (Grade AD 5) to 18
370 euros (Grade AD 16)
Salary: 1 689 (Grade 1) to 7 740
euros (Grade 19)
Obligations:
Objectivity, impartiality, loyalty
to the EU and work in the
interest of the EU
Objectivity, impartiality, loyalty
to the EU and work in the
interest of the EU
Objectivity, impartiality, loyalty
to the EU and work in the
interest of the EU. But: In regard
to the special relation between the
MEP and assistant
Duties:
EP Internal assistance EP Internal assistance EP Internal assistance
Legislative assistance: Drafting
for rapporteurs, finding balance
between technical and political
opinion, preparing the order of
voting lists, research, provide legal
opinions
Legislative assistance: Drafting
amendment for group, no direct
role in the assistance of
rapporteurs
Legislative assistance: Drafting
Support functions Group organisation and
coordination
Support functions
Political help to MEPs for their
work in committees (preparation
of positions)
Filtering external sources
Political help
Assistance in the relations with
national parties
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5.3.4.2 Informal Aspects
While the formal criteria are clearly specified in the Staﬀ Regulations and CEOS, the
nature of the work is less determined. Tasks staﬀ have to perform are said to vary given
the characteristics of a political proposal and the main actors involved (Winzen, 2011;
Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013). The information presented in this chapter shows that one of
the factors aﬀecting the duties carried out by staﬀ is specialisation. The central secretariat
of the EP has an extensive organisation chart and some of the duties are clearly divided.
Specialisation is less diﬀerentiated in the secretariats of political groups and MEP oﬃces.
As a result, work is more heterogeneous than in the central secretariat. In political groups,
specialisation is dependent on the financial resources, which are in turn determined by the
number of MEPs. Bigger political groups are allocated higher amounts and have as a result
more detailed organisation charts than smaller groups. In addition, specialisation helps
to overcome problems of political fragmentation in political groups, when several levels of
staﬀ help to identify disagreements between MEPs. Deviations from this situation arise,
when specialisation turns out to be hierarchically too rigid or when MEPs and national
delegations take hold of a staﬀ segment. To prevent this, political advisors are required to
work for the political objective of a political family. This involves standing up to individual
MEPs, when their positions diverge from the positions that benefit the overall interest of
the political family (Interview K, 2012; Interview ZD, 2013; Interview ZA, 2013; Interview
U, 2013).
Oﬃcials working for the central secretariat carry a similar responsibility to disagree
with individual MEPs and political groups. However, the source of their disagreement
deals with their procedural rules guiding the work of the EP and their institutional memory
rather than political arguments. Defending specific political positions is considered a dan-
gerous territory for the oﬃcials of the central secretariat (Interview Y, 2013). Some of
the respondents interviewed for this project did express a negative view regarding specific
committee secretariats and suggested that some committee secretariats have their own
political agenda (Interview V, 2013; Interview W, 2013). One of the reasons that lead
to these opinions has to do with the particular situation that oﬃcials of the secretariat
find themselves in. When the secretariat administrators work on a legislative proposal,
they support the rapporteur MEP. As a result, administrators can be seen protecting the
rapporteur in confront of the shadow rapporteurs and other MEPs that disagree with the
committee report. To avoid such situations, the oﬃcials of the secretariat have to ground
their work on professional rather than political arguments.
Quite distinct is the relationship between APAs and MEPs. Compared to secretariat
administrators and political group advisors, APAs are the most likely to conform to the
authority or will of the MEPs. This behaviour is incentivised by the fact that APAs’
employment is dependent of the MEP. The parliamentary assistant is the person that
seeks out ways to realise the political wishes of the MEP. It is the role of an APA to
provide the MEP with arguments to counter the political and professional reasoning of
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political group advisors and secretariat oﬃcials. This means that there is likelihood for
conflicts between legislative staﬀ.
However, the role of APAs varies the most among legislative staﬀ due to the miscel-
laneous working arrangements in MEPs personal oﬃces. Overall, legislative staﬀ in the
EP are a diverse group, where everyone performs specific tasks given their organisational
aﬃliation.
5.4 Discussion: The EP as a State-Legislature?
This chapter has been structured around Hypothesis 1, based on which the organisation
of legislative assistance in the EP is similar to the one in state-legislatures. The first part
of the chapter has sketched the legislative assistance in state-legislatures. The second part
has presented the system of the EP in detail.
State-Legislatures
Each of the four legislatures that were reviewed has a composite administration consisting
of a central administration, political group staﬀ and personal staﬀ. All the central admin-
istrations provide administrative and legislative advice, which always include procedural
and legal services. The recruitment and organisation of personal staﬀ is in the discretion of
individual MPs within the limits of labour laws. The position of MPs’ personal assistants
is historically grounded.
However, diﬀerences exist given national administrative traditions and the role played
by parliament, its members and political groups within the political system of a given
country. The organisation of political groups and personal staﬀ is an example of the
latter. Where parliamentary groups are weak, they lack the power to formally employ
staﬀ (e.g. the US and France). The weak position of parties in parliament is evident, in
particular in the US Congress. While parliamentary groups in Europe are directly financed
from parliament’s budget via an allowance, the political parties in the US Congress do not
receive a direct grant for staﬃng. In the Congress, the grants that facilitate the work of the
majority/minority are allocated to committees and oﬃce holders such as majority/minority
leaders and whips. This is a reflection of the relative strength of individual MPs vis-à-vis
political parties.
The importance of individual MPs is also evident in the allowance system for personal
staﬀ assistance. Parliaments in political systems that privilege the role of individual MPs
give extensive administrative resource to them (e.g. the US). European legislatures, on the
opposite, tend to strengthen political groups over the individual role of MPs, also through
weak personal legislative and constituency assistance.
The electoral system also plays a role. Parliaments elected in proportional systems
distribute administrative resource fairly among all the represented political parties and
members of parliament. In systems of majority rule, special attention has to be paid
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to parties that are in the opposition. In the UK, a special grant guarantees additional
administrative support for the opposition party. In the US Congress, an informal rule
commands that one third of administrative resources dedicated to a committee is allocated
to the minority party.
In terms of administrative tradition, the main diﬀerences lie between the American
and European legislatures. Parliaments in Europe share the idea of an apolitical central
service, which stems from the Weberian model of bureaucracy. In Britain, Germany and
France, staﬀ’s professionalism in central administration is associated with political neut-
rality. It is not surprising that central administrations of European parliaments represent
the fundamental structure on which members can turn to for legislative assistance. On the
contrary, in the US Congress, which has developed out of a spoils system, professionalism
is not connected with the capacity of staﬀ to stay neutral. Staﬀ of Congressional commit-
tees are organised on a partisanship basis and divided between the minority and majority.
No such division exists in European legislatures. This makes the American example less
similar to Weber’s model for bureaucracy.
The EP as a State-Legislature
Following the theoretical logic of sociological institutionalism, the chapter has built on
the assumption that the EP would resemble an administrative organisation according to
the existing and applied models of parliamentary administration. The basic character-
istics presented in this chapter and summarised in Table 5.5 provide a framework for a
model of parliamentary administrative organisation as a population or field of organisa-
tions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It has been shown that as a form of organisation,
parliaments exist in a homogenous environment, where they share a model of organisation.
Where diﬀerences exist, they relate to the political system and administrative culture.
The EP features characteristics similar to national parliaments as outlined in the first
part of the chapter. The administrative capacity of the EP is distributed among its cent-
ral administration, political groups and MEPs. The organisation of departments divides
the work to committees, research, procedural and legal advice. Work is further divided
according to policy areas.
Some of the dissimilarities that were identified for state-legislatures are detected also
for the EP. On the one hand, the fact that the EP gives substantial resources to both
political groups and individual members brings it closer to national parliaments in Europe
than the US Congress. On the other hand, individual members of the EP receive far more
financial and personnel resources than members of any other parliament in Europe, which
indicates a similarity with the Congressional organisation of legislative assistance. In terms
of committee capacity, the EP resembles the American and German system. Legislative
assistance is built around committees as the most important venues for legislation.
The main diﬀerence with the Congressional model has to do with the treatment of staﬀ
working for the central administration and political staﬀ. In the USA, there is practically
no distinction between the two. Staﬀ working is Congressional committees are considered
partisan staﬀ, which means that they are expected to express political judgments in their
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work. For the oﬃcials working in the EP’s central secretariat, and also in other European
national parliaments, neutrality is the most important value and the source of staﬀ’s
competence. A civil servant of the EP’s secretariat, who participated in the staﬀ exchange
programme between the EP and Congress, has illustrated the diﬀerence between the EP
and Congress in the following way (Interview A, 2012):
In the Congress there is no distinction between an oﬃcial and a political advisor
or assistant. These are staﬀ and if you work for a specific Senator then you
are the party, even if you don’t need to be a member of the party. Here [in the
EP] is like: “Oh, no, no, no.” MEPs will have the assistants and they have the
group people and then they have us [secretariat administrators]. And the group
people for example are allowed to have an opinion. We can have an opinion on
technical things, but how can you diﬀerentiate what is technical and what it is
not? [...] MEPs in general they want staﬀ to be staﬀ. Shut up and don’t say
much. Basically this is how it is.
As already stated, diﬀerences can be attributed to diﬀerent administrative traditions in the
US and Europe. The US has developed out of a spoils system, where senior positions are
reserved for appointees. In Germany, France and the UK there is an emphasis that civil
servants need to be neutral and adhere to the classical model of bureaucracy according
to Weber. This neutrality means that civil servants have the capability to understand
political sensibilities. The same understanding is in place in the EP.
Hybrid Elements The EP has adopted a hybrid organisation for its research services.
The organisation of research combines elements of vertical and horizontal departments. On
the one hand, the EP has a separated research service within the organisation of its central
administration as seen in the Bundestag. On the other hand, the EP also has horizontal
research units (i.e. policy departments), which are nested in the committee organisation as
seen in France. The EP has also developed considerable research capacities for identifying
possibilities to initiate legislation and assess policy impact, which is in line with EP’s right
to initiate legislation.
Own Characteristics However, the EP has also developed attributes of its own, which
are not common among state-legislatures. It has developed an extensive legal framework
regulating the work of staﬀ (Staﬀ Regulations, but mainly the CEOS). These laws specify
separately the conditions of employment for the central administration, political group
staﬀ and the MEPs parliamentary assistants working in Brussels. No such statuses ex-
ist for group and personal staﬀ in any other parliament. This finding is at odds with
the isomorphism hypothesis if the latter is understood as the literal adoption of existing
models without any manoeuvre for deviation. It is known from previous research that
heterogeneity lessens the likelihood of one particular model to determine others within the
same organisational field (Clemens and Cook, 1999, p. 448). However, the EP functions
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in a homogenous environment of parliament, where there are no real competing models
of organisation. Despite this, the organisation of legislative assistance that we find in the
EP results from a sort of deviation from the dominant model of state-parliaments. The
model exhibited by the EP is not a hybrid either, because it does not combine properties
of competing models (see Haveman and Hayagreeva, 1997).
The existence of the separate staﬀ regulations for staﬀ in the secretariat, political
groups and MEPs oﬃces could be explained as a functional necessity and an innovation,
which the EP adopted as a result of a learning process or functional adaptation. Given
the distribution of resources, we also see that both political groups and MEPs can recruit
staﬀ. In other words, resources are distributed among all political actors. The question that
remains unanswered is whether there is are discrepancies in the distribution of resources
that puts one political actor at a disadvantage over the other. However, this is a question
on the consequences of the form of legislative assistance was not the purpose of this chapter
and will be addressed in Part II of the dissertation.
5.5 Conclusion
The information presented in this chapter provides evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1.
Hence, the overall conclusion is that the form of legislative assistance in the EP resembles
the form that is found in state-parliaments to a great extent. Namely, the EP has its
own civil service, it has the right to financially determine its administrative budgets, its
political groups and MEPs can employ their own staﬀ, etc. However, the EP’s legislative
form cannot exclusively be explained by the logic of isomorphism as put forward in Hypo-
thesis 1. Other mechanisms, such as functional adaptation, are also at play. Under what
circumstances the form of legislative assistance came to be is the topic that is explored
in the next chapter. One of the question that Chapter 6 considers is whether the EP’s
system of legislative assistance has always resembled a state-parliament and if not, how
has it developed.
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Table 5.5: Administrative Organisation in State-Legislatures and the EP
Assemblée
nationale
House of
Common
Bundestag US Congress EP
Central administrations:
Civil Service
Code
Separate from
the executive
(possible
mobility)
Separate from
the executive
Same as the
executive
(possible
mobility)
Public
employees
Same as the
executive
Head of
Service
Appointed Appointed Appointed Elected Appointed
Tasks Administrative
and
Legislative
Assistance
- Procedure
- Legal unit
- Committee
- Research
(horizontal)
Administrative
and
Legislative
Assistance
- Procedure
- Legal unit
- Committee
- Research
(vertical):
within the
Library
Administrative
and
Legislative
Assistance
- Procedure
- Legal unit
- Committee
- Research
(vertical):
separate RS
Administrative
and
Legislative
Assistance
- Procedure
- Legal unit
Administrative
and
Legislative
Assistance
- Procedure
- Legal unit
- Committee
- Research
(horizontal
and vertical)
Personal Staﬀ:
Recruitment Hired by MP,
private
contracts
Hired by MP,
private
contracts
Hired by MP,
private
contracts
Hired by MP,
private
contracts
Hired by MP,
public
contract
Allowance 9 000 EUR 7 000 Pounds 15 000 EUR 17 000 EUR
Political
Groups
Financed from
parliament
budget
Financed from
parliament
budget
Financed from
parliament
budget
Parliament
budget only
for oﬃce
holders
Financed from
parliament
budget
Chapter 6
The Origin of Legislative Assistance
in the EP
In this chapter the origin (or creation) of administrative organisation and legislative as-
sistance in the EP is considered. For this purpose the first decade of European integration,
when the EP was known as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) is reviewed. The first part spells out the main arguments for theorising the
first form of legislative assistance in the EP. Hypotheses on functionality and isomorphic
adaptation are considered. The basis for the investigation are Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Hypothesis 2a stipulates that the first form of legislative assistance of the EP follows a
functional pattern. Hypothesis 2b is about the cultural expectation on the organisation
of legislative assistance. Moreover, a bargaining argument is presented. The second part
provides evidence for the hypotheses on the basis of oﬃcial documents and secondary liter-
ature. The findings show some support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The Common Assembly
was neither organised according to state-legislatures nor was its form purely functional.
Theoretically, the creation of EP’s legislative assistance in the 1950s is best explained with
diﬀerent new institutionalists logics.
Throughout this chapter and specifically in the formulation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b,
legislative assistance is referred to as administrative assistance. This is done in the aware-
ness that the EP, as the Common Assembly, did not have the right to propose or adopt
legislative acts. Therefore, in the strictest sense one cannot talk about legislative assist-
ance in the Common Assembly, until the EP was granted legislative powers in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the assistance structures that were adopted in the 1950s are the foundation
on which legislative (and budgetary) assistance was built on later on. Moreover, legislat-
ive assistance refers to assistance in legislatures rather that to the legislative function of
parliament (see Chapter 1).
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6.1 Theory Application
Chapter 5 provided evidence supporting the assumption that the form of legislative assist-
ance in the seventh term of the EP is similar to the typical organisation in state legislatures.
Two obvious questions follow. Has legislative assistance in the EP always resembled state
legislatures? And if not, when did legislative assistance in the EP acquire such form?
As a political body the EP has not always exhibited state-parliament characteristics.
Quite the opposite, the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 did not even envisage a par-
liamentary body for the ECSC. In 1952, when the Common Assembly was set up as the
forerunner of the EP, it did not have any law-making, financial or amending functions; it
was not directly elected and it had budgetary authority neither on its own budget nor on
the ECSC’s budget. It had the responsibility to control the High Authority, the ECSC’s
executive type of organ, and the function of deliberation (Articles 20 and 24 of the Paris
Treaty 1951). Given these powers and the absence of legislative prerogatives, the Common
Assembly resembled an international parliamentary assembly (i.e. inter-parliamentary or-
ganisation), such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) (Kiss-
ling, 2011, pp. 39-40). Most importantly, the Common Assembly did not carry out the
crucial activity of any legislature, which is to decide its own budget.
Given the initial mission and prerogatives of the Common Assembly, it is plausible to
assume that the EP did not take up state parliament characteristics at the time of the
Common Assembly. Following sociological institutionalism and the idea that legitimate
models of organisation spread in the field of similar organisations, it is likely that the
founding members of the ECSC (i.e. the Six)1 opted for an inter-parliamentary admin-
istrative organisation for the Common Assembly. This meant that the secretariat of the
Common Assembly was dependent for its finance and/or personnel either on the govern-
ments or national parliaments that constituted it. The problem of this interpretation is
that international parliamentary assemblies are relatively recent phenomena. While there
are today more than seventy inter-parliamentary assemblies, in the 1950s there were less
than ten (Puig, 2008; Šabič, 2008, p. 261). Moreover, only three of them, namely the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 1889), Nordic Inter-Parliamentary Union (1907) and the
Empire Parliamentary Association of the Commonwealth (1911), were functioning before
1945. While the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was established in
1949, other parliamentary assemblies with European membership, such as the Western
European Union Parliamentary Assembly (1954), North Atlantic Assembly (1956, NATO
Parliamentary Assembly) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1992), were set up after
the Common Assembly of the ECSC had been established in 1952. Therefore, what was
lacking in the 1950s was a group of inter-parliamentary assemblies constituting a field of
organisations from which ideas could be diﬀused from (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; see Sec-
tion 3.2, p. 45). In this sense, it is more logical to assume that the Common Assembly was
1The Six constituting members of the EU are Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France
and Germany. These countries are also among the founding members of the Council of Europe.
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rather one of the forerunners in the field of international parliaments, which determined
the legitimate models of organisation for all subsequent similar organisations.
Despite the likely absence of an organisational field consisting of inter-parliamentary
assemblies, the Common Assembly could have nevertheless adopted forms of legislative as-
sistance that are today common among inter-parliamentary organisations. However, rather
than as a result of isomorphic adoption, these characteristics are likely to have arisen from
concerns on how to make the Common Assembly a functional organisation. This means
that the organisation of the Common Assembly’s administration was led by consideration
of solving a collective problem to make an organisation function. In line with this, the first
administrative organisation of the Common Assembly can be explained by its tasks and
available resources (Peters, 2005, p. 103). It is therefore assumed that the emergence of the
EP’s form of legislative assistance is connected with the given incentives and constraints of
the environment rather than with internalised ideas and values pertaining to an organisa-
tional field. Given that the mission of the Common Assembly was of a consultative nature,
it is likely that the first form of administrative assistance exhibited inter-parliamentary
characteristics. The hypothesis is (‘Functional Hypothesis’):
Hypothesis 2a: The administrative organisation of the ECSC’s Common As-
sembly corresponds to the rational-functional model of organisation.
An alternative to functional organisation is to look at the historical context in which
the Common Assembly was set up. This has already been done in the first paragraphs
for explaining the diﬀusion of inter-parliamentary organisations in the 1950s. A similar
discussion to the organisational circumstances can be developed on the political conditions
in which the ECSC was set up.
A lot has been written on the reasons for setting up the ECSC. The prevalent explan-
ation is that the governments of the Six set up a communitarian institution in order to
ensure future peace and stability on the European continent (Messenger, 2006; Gillingham,
2006). The body of literature stressing the mission for peace also emphasises the role of
the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of the European Union and their idea to develop a federal
Europe or a united Europe (Monnet, 1978; Duchêne, 1994). Following this federal account,
one could assume that there was an interest among those who were responsible to set up
the structures of the ECSC to develop them according to a state federal system. Setting
up structures, which have supranational characteristics such as, an independent secretariat
for the Common Assembly or an autonomous European civil service, would represent a
symbolic gain for those that promoted the idea of federal Europe. This means that the his-
torical conditions were in a way demanding to decouple the formal structures of legislative
assistance from the practical needs of the Common Assembly in the 1950s, which related
to the control of the High Authority and deliberations. Such decoupling would have en-
hanced the organisational legitimacy of the Common Assembly (Scott, 2014, p. 187; Meyer
and Rowan, 1977; see Section 3.2, p. 45). In line with this reasoning, the following can be
hypothesised (‘Decoupling Hypothesis’):
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Hypothesis 2b: The federal idea of Europe, as conceived by the founding fathers
of the EU, promoted the adoption of state parliament characteristics for the
organisation of legislative assistance in the Common Assembly.
Following these two hypotheses, the remaining part of this chapter strives to show to what
extent each of the above described institutional logics - sociological and functional - can
explain the set up of legislative assistance in the Common Assembly.
So far, the distributive explanation of rational choice institutionalism has not been em-
ployed. There are two interrelated reasons for it. First, the decision on the administrative
form for the ECSC was not a question on the political agenda in the negotiations over the
Paris Treaty. This was mainly due to the fact that administrative issues qualified neither
as choices over polity (‘higher’ level choices such as decision between supranational and
intergovernmental designs) nor as questions over practical operations (‘low’ level of choice
such as the selection of policy to be regulated or the scope of decisions) (see Rittberger,
2001, p. 667). Since administrative organisation did not qualify as a salient political issue,
it is unlikely that the creation was driven by a bargaining process among the Six founding
member states of the EU. Second, even if bargaining over the distribution of legislative as-
sistance resources occurred, the low political saliency of the issue and the historical distance
of events do not provide optimal conditions to identify the key actors and their preferences
(as the distributive approach would require). There is not enough documentation and
information to carry out a game theory model.
6.2 The Common Assembly of the ECSC (1952-1958)
As for the case of EP’s political structures, the origins of the EP and its administration go
back to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (Article 78 [1,
2] of the Paris Treaty, April 1951). The set up of the necessary political (e.g. appointment
of delegates) and administrative structures (e.g. organisation, date and location of the
first gathering) for the Common Assembly went hand in hand. In order to organise the
constituting session of the Common Assembly, a sort of administrative service had to be
first set up. From the organisational point of view, the main responsibility to establish the
Common Assembly (as well as all the other Community institutions) laid with the High
Authority as the institution, which first took oﬃce in August 1952. As a result, the ideas of
Jean Monnet, the first President of the High Authority and the most prominent ‘founding
father’ of the EU, influenced the organisation of the administrative services of the Common
Assembly and the Community as a whole. In addition to Monnet, the Council of Europe
(CoE) and the British government also played ad important role. Below the positions of
these three actors are reviewed.
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6.2.1 Organising the First Session
6.2.1.1 Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was set up in 1949, three years before the European Coal and Steel
Community. Its mission was diﬀerent compared to the initial mission of the ECSC. As an
organisation, which still functions today, the CoE advocates for the protection of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law. Among its proponents was the British government
under the premiership of Winston Churchill. As a result, the UK was one of the founders
of the CoE together with Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the countries, which in 1952
founded the ECSC. Since its beginning, the institutional structure of the CoE consisted
also of a parliamentary assembly, which is today known as the Parliamentary Assembly of
the CoE (PACE) (in 1949 it was known as the Consultative Assembly).
As the first post-war international organisation with broad European membership, the
CoE was the venue where nation states’ ideas on post-war Europe played out. While many
individuals in continental Europe were advocating for an integration based on supranation-
alism, the UK favoured integration where states could keep full sovereignty. This debate
is visible also in the relations between the CoE and ECSC, when the CoE attempted to
become the umbrella organisation for the ECSC.
In 1952, when the ECSC Common Assembly was set up, the Parliamentary Assembly
of the CoE had been functioning already for three years. The CoE’s Maison de l’Europe
building in Strasbourg was adapted to accommodate a large number of delegates who spoke
diﬀerent languages. For this reason, the initial idea of the founding members of the ECSC
was to organise the first meeting of the Common Assembly in the premises of Council
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. Holding the first session in Strasbourg, even if the
headquarters of the High Authority were in Luxembourg, was a practical decision, since
several national representatives to the Common Assembly were also accredited to represent
their respective parliaments in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Duch-
êne, 1994, p. 238). However, Jacques Paris, the Secretary General of the CoE, refused to
house the constituting session of the Common Assembly unless the CoE’s secretariat ran
all the secretarial and assistance tasks for the Common Assembly (Monnet, 1978, p. 380;
Duchêne 1994, p. 238; Guerrieri, 2010). This is how Monnet described Paris (Monnet,
1978, p. 380):
He thought he was in a position to do battle and - with or without Government
backing, I cannot tell - he pushed ahead very boldly, claiming that he and his
staﬀ should act as the Secretariat for the meetings of the new Community
Assembly.
6.2.1.2 The United Kingdom
Monnet’s hesitation is understandable given the British proposal known as the ‘Eden Plan’,
which the British Conservative Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden presented in March 1952
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to the Consultative Assembly of the CoE (Council of Europe, 1952d; Haller, 2007, p. 53).
In fact, the ‘Eden Plan’ mirrored the ideas of the CoE’s Secretary General. The Plan
proposed that all future ‘European “restricted communities”, such as the Coal and Steel
Community, which require Ministerial or Parliamentary institutions, should draw upon the
facilities existing here in the Council of Europe’ (Council of Europe, 1952c).
The oﬃcial position of the British Government was that setting up the Common As-
sembly of the ECSC and its secretariat within the CoE would preserve the unity of Europe.
In a memorandum, Eden specified that linking the CoE with the ECSC was necessary in
order to make sure that the new European communities developed as part of the Atlantic
community (Gowland and Turner, 2012, pp. 30-31). Moreover, Eden hinted that the pro-
posal to reform the CoE’s Statute, which was put forward in 1952, would transform the
CoE into a ‘quasi-federal institution,’ which would ‘make it diﬃcult for us [UK] to remain
in the Council of Europe’ (Gowland and Turner, 2012, p. 30).
When the ‘Eden Plan’ was discussed in the CoE, the responses from the national del-
egation in the CoE’s Consultative Assembly were half-hearted (Council of Europe, 1952a;
Council of Europe, 1952b). Italian deputies were the ones who most clearly articulated
their opinion in saying the proposal was acceptable if it included also the other institutions
of the CoE and ECSC (Council of Europe, 1952a):
A single seat (be it at Strasbourg, Saarbrucken or Luxembourg as you wish)
would help to identify, in the eyes of public opinion, a European capital and
aﬀord a common territory to all the organs of the various institutions. [...] A
common roof limited only to the Assemblies would end up by putting a brake
on the federalist trend of the Assembly of the Defence Community.
Reservation was expressed also by German and Dutch deputies, who thought that it was
diﬃcult to envisage merging the European communities into the CoE, as these were very
diﬀerent organs. In a resolution, the CoE’s Consultative Assembly did neither accept nor
reject the ‘Eden Plan’ (Council of Europe, 1952b). However, the resolution importantly
noted the supranational aspect of ECSC’s administration (Council of Europe, 1952b):
It would appear advisable to take suitable steps to standardise the regulations
aﬀecting the staﬀ of these Communities and of other European Organisations,
in order to prevent the danger of the administration of the said Communities
and Organisations being carried on in separate compartments. Steps should be
taken to draw up the constitution and rules of a real “European Civil Service”.
The ‘Eden Plan’ was unlikely to stop the integrationist trend in continental Europe.
6.2.1.3 Jean Monnet
Monnet considered the CoE’s proposal for a common secretariat an attempt to implement
the ‘Eden Plan’, which he viewed as ‘a most dangerous suggestion’ (in Duchêne, 1994,
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p. 238). In his memoir Monnet wrote about the conflict with the CoE in the following
terms (Monnet, 1978, p. 380):
[...] the dispute was more than merely formal: what was at stake was the
independence of the Community itself. [...] I had little diﬃculty in convincing
my colleagues of the High Authority that this oﬀer of technical assistance was
merely a pretext for the Council of Europe to take over our parliamentary and
ministerial institutions.
In addition, Monnet had very clear ideas on what kind of administration he did not want
for the ECSC’s institutions. Out of his suspiciousness for bureaucracy, he opposed the idea
expressed by some member states to form a permanent civil service. In Monnet’s words
(Monnet, 1978, p. 384):
I had found that there was usually an irresistible tendency [in international
organisations] to set up an administration with all the features of a national
civil service [...]. This, combined with the desire to achieve a balance between
the nationals of all the member States, often led to a proliferation of staﬀ and
to internal divisions which hindered the flow of ideas.
In his memoir Monnet refers to the organisation of the League of Nations, which he con-
sidered an undesired system to imitate (Monnet, 1978, 384 and 373). He defended the
principle of a small and flexible administration. In Monnet’s view only practice could de-
termine the real organisational needs of the ECSC’s institutions. Monnet envisaged that
the ECSC’s institutions would rely on a small administration, which would be supported
by national administrative services (Page, 1997, pp. 4-5).
Resolution
In response to the dispute with the CoE, Monnet entrusted the organisation of the con-
stituent session of the Common Assembly to the secretaries general from the parliaments
of the Six (Monnet, 1978, pp. 380-381; Guerrieri, 2012, pp. 846-848). Emile Blamont, the
Secretary General of the French National Assembly, played a key role in resolving the con-
flict when he arranged the Chamber of Commerce in Strasbourg as an alternative location
to the CoE. The proposal from the Council of Europe for a shared secretariat was, there-
fore, rejected by the ECSC in awareness that if the Common Assembly wanted to develop
its prerogative to control the High Authority it needed to establish its own administrative
structures (Camenen, 1995, p. 148). Moreover, Monnet, encouraged by Blamont, wrote to
the CoE’s Secretary General over the importance for the Common Assembly to acquire its
own independent administrative structures (Guerrieri, 2012, pp. 846-847; Camenen, 1995,
p. 148; Guerrieri, 2008, p. 191). Following these events, the CoE backed down from its
proposal and unconditionally oﬀered its premises to the ECSC. As a result, in Septem-
ber 1952 the first session of the ECSC Common Assembly was held in Strasbourg at the
premises of the CoE, but without the latter’s secretarial support.
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6.2.2 Form of the Common Assembly Administration
The sessions of the Common Assembly were organised in part by seconded oﬃcials from
national parliaments (i.e. national aspect) and in part by contractual oﬃcials working for
the ECSC in the Secretariat of the Common Assembly (i.e. supranational aspect). The
seconded oﬃcials to the Common Assembly’s administration took care of the technical
services, while the own administrators of the Common Assembly were supporting members
in the discussions. This mixed national and supranational administrative system persisted
until the members of the EP were directly elected and the link between the EP and national
parliaments slowly eroded.2
6.2.2.1 National Aspect
The first central administration of the EP included a temporary service of clerks (i.e.
temporary registry), who were seconded from national parliamentary administrations every
time the Common Assembly was in session. The temporary registry was divided into a
division for meetings and a division for minutes, analysis and shorthand typing. By the end
of 1957 there were 101 seconded oﬃcials coming to the sessions of the Common Assembly
in Strasbourg (European Parliament, 2008, p. 14). The role of these temporary clerks was
to take care of the running of the sessions, the minutes and the stenographic services.
The temporary service allowed the Common Assembly to have skilled and highly qualified
staﬀ on a short notice (Guerrieri, 2012, p. 850). It can be argued that the support from
national parliaments to the Common Assembly is an example of (early) inter-parliamentary
administrative cooperation.
In addition, every national delegation of legislators received support from respective
national parliaments’ secretariats. In the first years of the ECSC, the recruitment of oﬃcials
was controlled by the secretaries general of national parliaments (Camenen, 1995, p. 148).
It is therefore not surprising that Marie Frederic de Nerée tot Babberich, the first Secretary
General of the Common Assembly, was beforehand the Deputy Secretary General for the
Dutch Second Chamber of the States-General (Tweede Kamer).
6.2.2.2 Supranational Aspect
Once the nominated representatives began to meet for the part sessions of the Common
Assembly, they devoted attention to developing its political (e.g. mainly political groups
and standing committees) as well as administrative structures (e.g. departments, units,
administrative rules, etc.).3 An example are the Rules of Procedure of the Common As-
sembly, which were adopted in January 1953. The first Rules of Procedure included Article
40, which stated the basic conditions for the functioning of the central secretariat. This
2In can be argued that on the administrative level this link was re-established in 1990 when a unit in
the secretariat was created for cooperation with national parliaments.
3Political groups were oﬃcially recognised on 15 June 1953, after Paul Struye introduced an amendment
that would insert a new article to the Rules of Procedure of the Common Assembly (Assemblée Commune
de la CECA, 1956).
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article has been maintained almost intact throughout the years and it is today known as
Article 207 (Rules of Procedure, 2013). The article specifies that the Bureau, as a leader-
ship body, is the main organiser of the administrative structures of the EP. It appoints the
secretary general and other senior positions and it decides the establishment plan for the
EP. The Bureau’s first establishment plan envisaged 31 staﬀ and considered the principle of
national proportionality (Guerrieri, 2000, p. 140; Guerrieri, 2008, p. 191; Guerrieri, 2012,
p. 849). This number increased to 58, then to 92 and by the end of the ECSC to 132
permanent staﬀ (Figure 6.1) (Guerrieri, 2008, p. 191; European Parliament, 2008, p. 17).
Figure 6.1: Number of Staﬀ 1958-2011
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In 1955, the Common Assembly adopted the internal rules on the administration, which
organised the administrative and parliamentary services into four divisions: 1) Committee
Services, 2) Studies, 3) Information and Documentation and 4) General Services and Ad-
ministration. The committee division was responsible to support members in their control
function of the High Authority throughout four committees (i.e. Common Market, Invest-
ments, Financial Questions and Production Development, Political Aﬀairs and External
Relations, Legal Questions, Rules of the Common Assembly, Petitions and Immunities)
and one subcommittee (Competences and Power). The work of representatives developed
beyond what the Paris Treaty envisaged in 1952, i.e. the scrutiny of the High Author-
ity’s annual report and administrative expenditures. The parliamentary activities, which
developed around extraordinary sessions and committees enabled the committee staﬀ to
assist in the preparation of reports (Guerrieri, 2012, p. 850). A report, which was pre-
pared by the secretary general and his deputy mentioned that the rapporteurs were not
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only giving guidelines to develop committee reports, but they occasionally put in charge
committee secretariats to completely elaborate them (in Guerrieri, 2012, p. 850).
The Directorate for Parliamentary Studies prepared reports on the work of other in-
stitutions and analysis of community competences. The documentation division published
studies on social-economic and institution weakness of the ECSC. Despite the several tasks
administrators were in charge of, they did not benefit from secure employment until the
adoption of the Staﬀ Regulation.
Staﬀ Regulation The adoption of the Staﬀ Regulation was a contentious issue in the
ECSC (Guerrieri, 2000, p. 148). Several individuals, among others Monnet, resisted the idea
of a permanent European civil service. Opposition lay also within the Common Assembly,
where the number of staﬀ began to swell, while an immutable number of representatives
(78) met between once and five times a year.4 It is exactly this asymmetry between
a permanent administration and a ‘part-time’ political institution, which lead political
scientists to assume that the general secretariat of the EP could have exercised significant
power in the first decades of the EP up until direct elections in 1979 (Camenen, 1995;
Costa, 2003).
The absence of a staﬀ regulation meant that staﬀ were hired on temporary contracts
and in a personalised manner. Monnet wrote (Monnet, 1978, p. 384):
[...] we recruited very sparingly. I personally interviewed all the candidates; I
consulted my colleagues about them and I took decisions, I must confess, only
after much hesitation. Every organism has its own natural rate of growth. To
preserve its character, ours had to absorb new elements slowly.
It was only after Monnet left oﬃce that the High Authority of the ECSC adopted the first
regulation on staﬀ in 1956.5 This paved the way for the organisation of a civil service in the
sense of a Weberian bureaucracy. The ECSC started to develop a separated civil service
from its member states (Page, 1997, p. 7). The first staﬀ regulation specifically stated that
Community staﬀ were ‘supranational oﬃcials’ (Article 1, Staﬀ Regulations, 1957). Even
though, the formulation was dropped after its first revision in 1962.
The 1956 Staﬀ Regulation was applicable to all permanent and temporary oﬃcials work-
ing for the ECSC including the Common Assembly. However, it did not include provisions
for persons working in political groups. Nevertheless, the Regulation had already institu-
tionalised the possibility for the detachment of oﬃcials to other Community institutions,
national or supranational, private or public bodies (Articles 30 and 32). In practice this
meant that the permanent oﬃcials of the Community, hence the Common Assembly, could
4For example, Paul Struye (Belgian Senate) and Nicolas Margue (Luxembourgish Chamber of Depu-
ties), Demo-Christian members of the Commission de la Comptabilité de l’administration, questioned the
existence of a permanent secretariat and the increase of human resources.
5The regulation was adopted independently form the Common Assembly, which did not have any
decision-making right in the matter. This changed when the staﬀ regulation was amended in 1962 and the
EP as the Parliamentary Assembly had to be consulted.
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be seconded to political groups, while retaining their status as oﬃcials and the possibility
to return to the permanent service.
Between 1956 and 2013, rules applicable to the Community personnel were amended
131 times. The majority of the amendments related to the adjustment of remuneration
and pension. Most of the basic provisions remained unchanged. For example, the first staﬀ
regulation included the still valid provisions, which allows recruitment from the ‘broadest
possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States’ (Article 28, Staﬀ Reg-
ulations, 1957; today Article 27, Staﬀ Regulations, 2013). The basic hiring requirements
have also not changed and they include the criteria on citizenship, appropriate character
and knowledge (Article 3 in Annex II and Article 27, Staﬀ Regulations, 1957; Article 28,
Staﬀ Regulations, 2013).
6.2.2.3 Allowance for Political Groups and Members
In June 1953, the Common Assembly set up political groups and decided to grant them a
financial contribution from the budget of the Assembly. The first three political groups,
Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals, organised their administrations into separ-
ates secretariats, with headquarters in Rue Beaumont, Luxembourg. This represented an
important departure from the practice in inter-parliamentary assemblies in which members
had been grouped in national delegations and assisted by national parliamentary adminis-
trations (Guerrieri, 2000, p. 137).
As in the case of the general secretariat, the decision to finance political groups from
the Common Assembly’s budget was contested. The Belgian representative Struye (Bel-
gian Senate), together with two Dutch representatives, Korthals (Tweede Kamer, Non-
Attached) and Rip (Senate, Christian-Democratic Group), claimed that the use of funds
from the Common Assembly’s budget to finance the organisation of political groups was
against the rules (Guerrieri, 2000, p. 141; Guerrieri, 2008, p. 188). The French delegate
Laﬀargue proposed to give both, individual representatives and political groups an allow-
ance, where the individual allowance could be used for financing political groups. The
discussion in the Common Assembly coincided with the debate on the secretarial allow-
ance in the French National Assembly. Laﬀargue’s proposal mirrored the system that was
eventually adopted in the French National Assembly, where members of parliament can
renounce their allowance for the benefit of their respective parliamentary group.
Other politicians, among whom the German member of the Bundestag Werner (So-
cialists Group) and the Dutch member of the Tweede Kamer Sassen (President of the
Christian-Democratic Group), defended the use of budgetary resources for the financing
of political groups. At the end the decision that was taken allocated each group a fixed
allowance and an additional amount to every member. How members were to use this
allowance was not defined. In practice the individual allowance enabled the non-attached
delegates (mainly Communists) to pool resources together and employ assistants. In cases
where a delegate was a member of a political group, then the individual allowance would
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often go to political groups. The personality and character of individual representatives
was therefore subdued for the benefit of political groups.
6.3 Discussion
The first formal structures guiding the organisation of legislative assistance in the EP were
set up already in the 1950s. The administration of that time resembled only partially the
present structures in the EP as described in Chapter 5. This is an indication that the
EP did not develop an organisation similar to state legislatures from its beginning as the
ECSC Common Assembly.
Functionalism Given the evidence in this chapter, the choices made in the early 1950s
were the result of a combination of inter-parliamentary and parliamentary administrative
elements. The organisation of administrative assistance on the level of national delegations
is a characteristic of inter-parliamentary assemblies, such as the Council of Europe. Staﬀ
from national parliament supported the national delegations in the Common Assembly.
Temporary clerks, which were seconded from national parliaments to the Common As-
sembly each time it was in session, complemented the support of national parliaments to
national delegations. The Common Assembly combined diﬀerent elements to carry out its
function (H2a).
Decoupling On the contrary, the organisation of administrative assistance on the level
of political groups is a feature of legislatures, albeit the Common Assembly was not a
legislature. Since the Common Assembly formally acknowledged political groups in its
Rules of Procedure, each of the political groups set up also an administrative secretariat.
In comparison, the first internal rules of the CoE’s PACE (1949), which also operates with
transnational political groups, did not contain any provision on the role of political groups.
PACE’s political groups were formally granted certain rights only in 1964, or more than ten
years after political groups were recognised in the EP. In addition, the Common Assembly
never enshrined in its rules of procedure the principle of national delegations (i.e. the
organisation of representatives according to nationality rather that political party), which
on the contrary, has been recognised in the Council of Europe from its beginning.
Given the data, it seems that diﬀerent institutional mechanisms were at work in devis-
ing the first form of administrative assistance. There is some evidence that the diﬀusion
of parliamentary organisation occurred, and that some organisational structures were de-
coupled from the functional mission of the Common Assembly (H2b). For example, it is
not clear how the set up of political groups and their financing through the ECSC’s budget
was connected with the Common Assembly’s control function over the High Authority in
the steel and coal sector. While the establishment of political groups was not necessary
for the formal mission of the Common Assembly, the members of the Common Assembly
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deliberately developed their role beyond their formal mandate and political staﬀ was seen
as a necessary part of it.
The adoption of a state-parliament model is further sustained by the ECSC’s response
to the UK-backed CoE’s proposal for shared administrative services with the CoE’s Con-
sultative Assembly. The proposal’s refusal can be seen as an (ideational) dismissal of the
inter-parliamentary design, or as an act of defence of federal Europe. Surprisingly, Monnet,
as the main proponent of a federally organised Europe, opposed the idea of a European
civil service. Ideas over federalism were not on Monnet’s mind when he was considering
how to administratively organise the ECSC. In 1953, Monnet’s goal was to avoid the pit-
falls he had personally witnessed in the secretariat of the League of Nations. His priority
was to set up an administrative service, which would guarantee the Common Assembly
independence to perform its tasks. In his view, such service was neither possible through
the creation of an administration with features of a civil service nor through the CoE.
The administrative independence of the Common Assembly was achieved through a
mix of inter-parliamentary and parliamentary elements, which were easy to change to
respond to the future needs of the EP. Monnet’s considerations were therefore functional.
Nevertheless, this did not impede the adoption of state-legislature features. Evidence shows
that the federal ideas of ‘founding fathers’ did not necessarily promote a supranational
state-legislature organisation. On the contrary, the retirement of Monnet facilitated the
adoption of Staﬀ Regulation and the establishment of a European civil service. In respect to
Monnet, it is interesting to observe that the Common Assembly (and the ECSC in general)
survived and evolved beyond its most prominent founder. This leads to the conclusion that
institutions can be autonomous from its founders.
Summing up, the EP started to acquire administrative structures pertaining to state-
legislatures already at the time of the ECSC. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that
federal ideas have likely promoted the adoption of state-parliament characteristics in the ad-
ministrative organisation of the Common Assembly (H2b). Even though, state-parliament
features were not necessarily linked the Jean Monnet. This implies that only part of the
Common Assembly’s administrative organisation corresponded to the rational-functional
model of organisation (H2a). However, in 1952 the administration of the EP did not
resemble completely neither to a parliament nor to a (functional) inter-parliamentary or-
ganisation.
Bargaining While assumed otherwise, there is evidence of bargaining in the early 1950s.
This can be seen in two cases: the conflicting interests among the CoE, the UK and ECSC,
but also in the Common Assembly’s debates on the financing of individual delegates and/or
political groups. In the first case, it is more appropriate to speak about a clash of interests
and ideas rather than of distributive bargaining. Monnet and the secretaries general of
the Six national parliaments joined forces to reject the UK-backed CoE’s proposal for
shared administrative services between the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly and the ECSC’s
Common Assembly. Strategic behaviour is perhaps the most visible in the case of the UK,
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which through the ‘Eden Plan’ sought to preserve a role in European integration albeit
choosing to stay outside the formal membership of the ECSC.
The second case on the secretarial allowance resembles more to a distributive scenario.
The main contestation issue was how funds should be distributed among individual del-
egates and political groups. It is not surprising to observe a distributive conflict, since
the secretarial allowance is a physical resource (e.g. oﬃce space, oﬃce equipment, money,
etc.). The resolution of the allowance question shows how political groups prevailed over
individual delegates already at an early stage in the history of the EP. The prevailing
force of political groups over individual members would later on not only be visible on the
funding level, but also politically in terms of voting patterns (Hix et al., 2009).
Given the data that is available, it can be concluded that multiple institutional logics
were at work in the set up of legislative assistance in the EP (Scott, 2014, p. 188). The
main visible process is that the functionality of the Common Assembly’s administrative
services was permeated with ideas, which went beyond functional purpose: the Common
Assembly adopted elements, which are characteristics for parliament even though it was
only a deliberative and control body without any decision-making rights. It can be said
that the Common Assembly adopted administrative forms based on ideas, which were
deemed functional for the long run rather than for its formal role in the 1950s. It is said
that organisations are more likely to decouple structure from practices when there is a high
symbolic gain (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). This can explain the particular administrative
form of the Common Assembly, as Jean Monnet and other politicians promoted the de-
velopment of supranational cooperation, which would go beyond steel and coal. Moreover,
when there is clarity on the goals to pursue, as in the case of the EU, the imitation of
already existing designs are less likely to occur than when there is uncertainty and ambi-
guity. Ideas on the future development of European integration are likely to have shaped
the form of organisation in the 1950s. As such, the case of the Common Assembly is an ex-
ample of an institutional scenario, where the act of organising is transcendent to functional
properties.
6.4 Conclusion
To sum up, the organisation of legislative assistance in the Common Assembly is a good
example for showing how diﬀerent institutional logics can complement each other and
work at the same time. The case of administrative organisation in the Common Assembly
exhibits functional, sociological and bargaining logics of new institutionalism. For the
latter, the conclusions in this chapter are less firmly grounded in data, because there is not
enough information to identify all the relevant actors and their interests. The Common
Assembly adopted parliamentary-like administrative structures, because they were deemed
functional. At the same time, it also adopted characteristics that do not pertain to the
model of parliament, which provide further evidence for the functional explanation of
organisational form. Based on this it can be concluded that there is mixed evidence for
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Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The Common Assembly developed some structures according to
state parliament characteristic (H2b). However, the form was pursued for its functional
properties only partially (H2a) and in some respect functionality was argued on the basis
of ideas rather than the formal mission of the Common Assembly.

Chapter 7
The Changing Nature of Legislative
Assistance in the EP
The previous two chapters have looked at the form of legislative assistance at the incep-
tion of the EP (Chapter 6) and in the present (i.e. seventh term, Chapter 5). This chapter
considers the changes in the time in-between. The first part of the chapter presents the
assumptions and hypotheses (H3a, H3b and H3c). Change is explained by drawing on
the functional version of rational choice institutionalism (H3a), sociological (H3b) and his-
torical (H3c) institutionalism. After these theoretical approaches are applied, there are
five sections, which consider changes in the form of legislative assistance by decade. Evid-
ence is based on the author’s interview data, oﬃcial documents and secondary literature.
Generated data shows that an isomorphic logic in terms of adopting parliamentary charac-
teristics has become clearer with every decade (H3b). Functional adaptation is present in
the 1960s and 1970s (H3a), but stalls afterwards. From the 1980s onwards, developments
are slow as theorised in historical institutionalism (H3c). Moreover, the slow phaseout of
national elements (i.e. temporary clerk service) and the adoption of new parliamentary
features shows how the EP follows the path initiated in the 1950s. The bargaining element
that was tentatively identified in the formative phase of the EP’s administration becomes
more visible in subsequent decades.
7.1 Theory Application
In rational choice institutionalism, change is commonly understood as the result of an
exogenous event that disrupts the established order (Steinmo and Thelen, 1998, p. 15). A
number of events have shaped the EP such as, enlargements, treaty revisions (increases of
powers) and direct elections (1979). From 1973 onwards, the EU extended its membership
seven times. Each time the number of MEPs and oﬃcial languages increased (Table 7.1).
From a deliberative assembly, the EP acquired a consultative power in 1958, and from then
on it gradually gained the power to decide on legislation together with the Council (Table
7.2).
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Table 7.1: EU Enlargements
Year Enlargement, countries
(Population in million)
N of MEPs
(Change from previous year)
Languages
(Number)
1973 1st: UK, Ireland, Denmark
(64)
198 (+56: 10 Irish, 10 Danish and 36
British MEPs)
6
1981 2nd: Greece (9) 434 (+24 Greek MEPs) 7
1986 3rd: Portugal, Spain (49) 518 (+84: 60 Spanish and 24 Portuguese
MEPs)
9
1995 4th: Austria, Finland
Sweden (22)
626 (+59: 21 Austrian, 16 Finnish and 22
Swedish MEPs)
11
2004 5th: Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia (75)
732 (+106: 6 Cypriots, 24 Czech, 6
Estonian, 24 Hungarian, 9 Latvian, 13
Lithuanian, 5 Maltese, 54 Polish, 14
Slovak and 7 Slovene MEPs)
21
2007 6th: Romania, Bulgaria
(30)
785 (+53: Bulgarian 18 and 35 Romanian
MEPs )
23
2013 7th: Croatia 766 (+12 MEPs)* 24
Note: * The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 set the limit to 751 MEPs. This number was achieved in 2014.
The EP’s former Secretary General Julian Priestley has written that the central ad-
ministration of the EP has evolved in parallel with the evolution of MEPs’ role and powers
(Priestley, 2000, p. 440). Following this logic, it is assumed that legislative assistance has
changed concurrently to the events that have politically shaped the EP. Hence, adminis-
trative changes in the EP should be linked to the changing environment in the EP and EU.
However, which specific conditions in the changing environment have aﬀected legislative
assistance?
With each political reform or enlargement, the diversity of the EP in terms of mem-
bership and languages increased. Enlargement has put a strain on the administrative
structures of the EP in terms of translation capacities. Due to enlargement, the EP had
to acquire new buildings and hire additional staﬀ. However, membership changes mostly
aﬀected the linguistic services of the EP. On the contrary, enlargement and the inherent
increase of the number of national parties did not fragment the parliament or aﬀect the
voting cohesiveness within political groups (Hix and Noury, 2009). In this respect, it is
unlikely that enlargements have altered the practices and structures in the organisation of
legislative assistance.
On the contrary, several treaty changes from 1958 onwards have enhanced the role of
the EP in terms legislative procedures and policy competences. From obtaining budgetary
powers (1970s), to direct elections (1979) and further legislative powers (1980s to 2000s),
the EP has developed into a policy-influencing legislature, with the right to modify, reject
and even propose laws via its right of initiative (Norton, 1994). It is therefore assumed
that legislative assistance had to adapt to each treaty revision.
Moreover, with each treaty reform, the EP has steadily acquired new prerogatives
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Table 7.2: EP’s Competences
Treaty/Decisions Entry into force Competence
Rome Treaty 1 January 1958 Consultative power
Luxembourg Treaty 22 April 1970 Budgetary powers
Joint declaration 4 March 1975 Conciliation procedure (budgetary aﬀairs)
Brussels Treaty 22 July 1975 Budgetary powers
SEA 1 July 1987 Cooperation and assent procedure
Maastricht Treaty 1 November 1993 Codecision (15 legal bases)
Amsterdam Treaty 1 May 1999 Extension of Codecision (32 legal bases)
Nice Treaty 1 February 2003 Extension of Codecision (37 legal bases)
Lisbon Treaty 1 January 2009 Extension of Codecision (85 legal bases)
similar to state-legislatures (i.e. parliamentarization or the institutionalisation of repres-
entative democracy; Rittberger, 2005). In line with these developments, the expectation
is that the EP administration has developed according to a model of organisation, which
is perceived legitimate for a democratic parliament. The following two hypotheses are
suggested (‘Functional Hypothesis’ and ‘Isomorphic Hypothesis’):
Hypothesis 3a: Since 1958, legislative assistance in the EP has changed in
parallel and as a result of treaty revisions.
Hypothesis 3b: The form of legislative assistance has changed in line with the
model of state-legislatures.
It is suggested that the EP adopted parliamentary models of administrative organisation
as a functional and isomorphic necessity according to the functional version of rational
choice and sociological institutionalism.
Even if changes did not follow treaty revisions (i.e. extension of competences) and the
political transformation of the EP, it is still plausible to assume that change towards an
administrative state-parliament model occurred at a certain point. Since the EP did not
evolve into a parliament by night, the same might also not have happened to its administra-
tion. According to historical institutionalism change can be path-dependent and gradual
(Pierson, 2000a). Namely, institutions do not always promptly adapt to the changed en-
vironment. They are autonomous in respect to responding to emerging challenges (as seen
for the Common Assembly, Chapter 6). Moreover, historical institutionalism presumes
that institutions follow an incremental logic of change (‘path dependency’) alongside tra-
jectories or paths that have been determined by earlier institutional choices at ‘critical
junctures’ (Ikenberry, 1994; Pierson, 2000a; Collier and Collier, 2002). Hence, it can be
assumed that legislative assistance in the EP has changed according to a parliament-state
model that was coined in the 1950s the ‘critical juncture’ for EP’s legislative assistance),
but that administrative change did no necessarily parallel treaty revisions. The following
hypothesis is put forward (‘Path-Dependency Hypothesis’):
Hypothesis 3c: The form of legislative assistance in the EP has gradually
changed in line with the model of state-legislatures.
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Hypothesis 3c is in line with the isomorphic assumption in H3b, but contradicts H3a, where
the assumption is that administrative change is synchronous to treaty revisions.
The last issue that needs to be addressed is the balance between diﬀerent staﬀ groups
in the EP. Once more the views of the former Secretary General Priestley oﬀer a point of
departure. Priestly has claimed that compared to thirty years ago, the role and legislative
work in the political group secretariats has increased on the expense of the general secret-
ariat (Interview C, 2012). The change is mainly associated with the first direct elections in
1979 and treaty reforms giving the EP legislative powers (Single European Act in 1986/87
and the Maastricht Treaty 1991/93). This is to say that before MEPs became directly elec-
ted and full-time representatives of the people, the general secretariat had worked under
little supervision or control from MEPs. Staﬀ in the general secretariat were independent
from their political principals. Besides the physical absence of MEPs, the EP did not ex-
ercise any budgetary or legislative powers before the 1970s and 1980s respectively. MEPs
were disinterested in EU aﬀairs since their involvement had little impact. Given these
circumstances, the administration of the EP was an autonomous actor. As the political
saliency of the EP increased, the role of the central administration started to diminish and
new administrative actors appeared.
These events can be theorised with rational choice institutionalism that considers the
power of individual social actors. The distributive (or power) approach of rational choice
institutionalism assumes that an institutional equilibrium is the result of the distribution
of power among diﬀerent actors (general secretariat, political groups and MEPs) at a given
time (Knight, 1992, pp. 32-34; Knight, 1998; see also North, 1990). As power shifts from
one actor to another, so it changes also the institutional arrangement. Change is not
anymore the result of an eﬃciency or adaptation process to a changing situation, but the
manifestation of power resources allocation. From focusing on the aggregate eﬀects of an
organisation, distributive rational choice institutionalism shifts attention to the benefits of
individual social actors.
For the same reasons as in the previous two chapters, evidence for change is not sought
on the basis of a distributional hypothesis. However, since distributive elements appeared
in the cases of the creation of the legislative assistance (Chapter 6), the possibility that
change can be associated to the redistribution of resources is kept in mind.
7.2 European Communities in the 1960s
In 1958 the Rome Treaty came into force and the Common Assembly of the ECSC was
expanded to cover the newly established European Economic Community and European
Atomic Energy Community. The Common Assembly was renamed into the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Communities and in 1962 the Assembly issued a resolution in which it
proclaimed itself as the European Parliament. Under the new name the Parliament held its
first session in March 1958 in Strasbourg. The Treaty granted the EP a consultative role.
The number of committees increased to ten standing and one temporary committee; from
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78 representatives the Assembly now included 142 delegates from national parliaments.
The increase in the policy areas, where the Community made legislation meant that the
Parliament was consulted more often than before. The total number of weeks in session
increased from three to five per year. The number of sessions per year increased form a
maximum of five in the period of the ECSC to a maximum of twelve sessions in the 1960s
(European Parliament, 1982, p. 144).
7.2.1 Central Administration
The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community inherited the admin-
istrative structures of the ECSC Common Assembly (Guerrieri, 2012, p. 852). However,
the general secretariat was reformed almost immediately after the first session in May
1958 in order to increase the eﬃciency of the services. The changes that were adopted
aimed towards a greater specialisation of parliamentary services. The general secretariat
was restructured into five departments with several new internal units (European Parlia-
ment, 2008, pp. 16-17). These departments were: Committees and Parliamentary Stud-
ies, Information and Parliamentary Documentation, Administration, General Services and
Presidency. The department Committees and Parliamentary Studies was further split into
two units, one was responsible for staﬃng committee secretariats1 and a second one, which
carried out parliamentary research. In 1962, under the newly appointed Secretary General
Hans R. Nord, the departments were renamed into the present directorate generals (Par-
lament Européen, 1963). The division for legislative assistance, which was established in
1963, persisted until 2003.
In parallel to political events (i.e. the entry into force of the Rome Treaty), the legislative
services and the people working therein became increasingly important (Guerrieri, 2012,
p. 854). Enrico Vinci, who was to become the fourth Secretary General in 1986, remembers
that MEPs were pleased to have competent and active staﬀ, since they had very limited
knowledge on the technical aspects of Community policies (Interview E, 2012):
The European Community and economic integration involved some very dif-
ficult technical aspects. The parliamentarian was having great diﬃculties in
understanding these technicalities. Imagine, that at a certain point, when the
Common Agriculture Policy became operational [1962], common prices had to
be fixed. Who knew how to do it? The deputy had no idea and it was the
oﬃcial, whose advantage was to be a technician that knew what common prices
meant. The European functionaries, who stayed in Luxembourg 365 days a year
1In 1962, seven units within DG Committees and Parliamentary Studies staﬀed thirteen committees :
Questions relevant de la compétence des commissions politique et du commerce extérieur, Questions rele-
vant de la compétence des commissions du marché intérieur et des budgets et de l’administration, Questions
relevant de la compétence des commissions économique et financière et du transport, Questions relevant
de la compétence de la commission pour la coopération avec des pays en voie de développement, Ques-
tions relevant de la compétence de la commission de l’agriculture, Questions relevant de la compétence des
commissions sociale et de l’énergie, Questions relevant de la compétence des commissions de la protection
sanitaire, de la recherche et de la culture et du règlement.
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knew much more than parliamentarians, who came to the EP for five weeks per
year. And because many things were being done on a technical level, there was
less politics and members were less interested in the Communities. There was
more technocracy than politics. In fact, many critics say that the European
Community is a technocratic community and that the functionaries are doing
too much. And under certain aspects they are right. For many decades, the
oﬃcials were in charge. When we were discussing the budget, you would for
example stand up and say “We need to make sure that the own resources...”
and everybody would be looking at you and asking “But what are the own
resources?”
By the end of the 1960s, the important role of secretariat staﬀ was formally recognised
by the Finance and Budget Committee. In one of its reports it stated that the staﬀ
of the Community have been the cornerstone of the EP, which had allowed appointed
representatives to successfully carry out their work in complex conditions (Report of the
Finance and Budget Committee, doc. 85, 26 June 1968 in Guerrieri, 2012, p. 855).
National Aspect The national aspect consisting of a temporary secretariat, which was
composed of seconded oﬃcials from national parliaments’ administrations, continued to
exist throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, national parliaments singled that
they could no longer sustain their tasks in the temporary registry or continue to second
a large number of oﬃcials to the EP (Guerrieri, 2012; European Parliament, 2008, p. 14).
Hence, the EP strengthened its central administration.
7.2.2 Political Groups
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants In 1962, the Staﬀ Regulation was
reformed for the first time. The new rules (‘Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of
the European Communities’ or CEOS) introduced the category of temporary agents. The
reform’s aim was to regulate the employment of those individuals who worked for the EC
institutions, but did not have the status of civil servants. In the 1960s, the EP employed
the majority of temporary agents (Figure 7.1). For example, in the 1960s the EP employed
a maximum of 31, the Council 10 and the Commission 15 temporary staﬀ. Furthermore,
most of EP’s temporary agents have been working in the secretariats of political group.
Therefore, the CEOS regulated in particular the position of political group advisors in
the EP. Given their newly acquired status in the 1960s, the employees of political groups
strengthened their position vis-à-vis the permanent oﬃcials of the EP.
Politicisation In the 1960s, political groups were gaining ground through the status of
their staﬀ, but also through the ranks of the general secretariat. Namely, the first signs of
political involvement appeared in the recruitment of high-ranking oﬃcials in the general
secretariat (Camenen, 1995, p. 149, Guerrieri, 2012, p. 853). Hans Furler, the EP’s Pres-
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Figure 7.1: Number of Temporary Agents
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ident from 1960 to 1962, wanted to designate a politically experienced secretary general.
Under Furler’s influence, the Bureau (i.e. EP’s leadership organ on administrative matters)
discharged the Secretary General de Nerée tot Babberich and his German Deputy Walter
Hummelsheim. Available accounts suggest that aggravated relations between the Secret-
ary General and his Deputy aﬀected the working atmosphere in the EP and contributed
to their sacking. However, the removal signalled a clear power play of politicians over
administrators.2 According to Camenen (1995, p. 149), politicians wanted to signal to the
secretariat that it needed to fall under their control.
7.3 The Decade of the Budget and Direct Elections (1970s)
Compared to the 1960s, the 1970s were marked with several political events, such as the
acquisition of budgetary powers, the first enlargement and direct elections. The parlia-
mentary activity of the EP stepped up, even though not in areas of legislation, where the
EP still occupied only a consultative role. On the contrary, the competences of the EP
in the area of control increased substantially. In the 1970s, the Community treaties were
amended for the first time. The Parliament had now a say on its own budget, it could
2Despite the discharge of the secretary general and Furler’s apparent wish to designate a politically
experienced secretary general, the newly appointed Secretary General Dutch lawyer Hans R. Nord - ap-
pointed with a delay in 1961 - did not show such qualities. At least not in the beginning. In 1979, after
eighteen years of service in the highest post of the EP administration, Nord stood for the first European
elections on the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demo-
cratie, VVD). He was elected in 1979 and 1984, after which he retired. Up to today Nord has been the
only secretary general who moved from the administrative to the political side of the EP.
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propose amendments to the Community budget, it had the last word on non-compulsory
expenditures of the Community (Treaty of Luxembourg 1970) and from 1977 onwards it
could also reject the annual budget as a whole (Brussels Treaty 1975). The conciliation
committee between the EP and Council was set up for the Commission’s proposals with
appreciable financial implications (Joint Declaration 1975). After the first direct elections
in 1979, members started to shift their focus from their work in national parliaments to the
European Parliament. Direct elections gave MEPs legitimacy to make decisions, while the
budgetary treaties presented them with the opportunity to take decisions on Community
policies. The 1970s therefore importantly marked the future developments of the EP and
the EU.
7.3.1 Central Administration
Even though the EP remained in an inferior position to the Council, the latter began to
systematically consult the former in the vast majority of legislative proposals. Hence, the
parliamentary activity in the EP’s committees increased. In the 1970s, MEPs spent on
average 13 hours more in Strasbourg and Luxembourg than in the 1960s.3 The consultation
procedure meant that a series of reports had do be drafted, discussed and voted upon in
the committee and plenary. Despite the increased activity and members’ involvement in
EU aﬀairs, it appears that the committee staﬀ employed in the general secretariat wrote
most of the reports. This is confirmed by the former Secretary General Julian Priestley
(Interview C, 2012): ‘I remember a time, before 1979 when the secretariat was writing the
reports and you were lucky if the members read them.’
The adoption of two budgetary treaties (Luxembourg Treaty and Brussels Treaty) dir-
ected a significant amount of human resources towards the staﬃng of the Budgets commit-
tee, which in 1977 included seven administrators, among whom also Priestley (European
Parliament, 1977). The staﬀ of other committees ranged from two to five administrators
(Table 7.3). The EP’s rejection of the Community budget for 1980 is a telling example
of the importance of the Budgets committee staﬀ. The EP, represented by the Socialists
Dutch rapporteur Piet Dankert for the Budgets committee, advocated for a change to the
Community financing of the Common Agriculture Policy (Priestley, 2008, pp. 7-19). Since
the Council and the Commission did not engage in meaningful negotiations with the EP,
the latter rejected the proposal for the 1980 budget at its plenary in December 1979. The
staﬀ from the Budgets committee played an important role in assisting Dankert. It was in
fact the staﬀ that drafted the ambitious resolution on the 1980 budget. Priestley (2008,
p. 13) describes that after the committee submitted the draft, the rapporteur Dankert
said: ‘It’ll never get through, but leave it for the moment.’ Moreover, when Dankert was
asked to draft a joint declaration between the EP and Council on the future talks over the
budget, it was to the committee secretariat that Dankert turned to: ‘And so, late at night,
he [Dankert], which his oﬃcials, started drafting and before midnight produced the first
3The calculation is based on data provided in European Parliament 1982, pp. 144-145.
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Table 7.3: Number of Staﬀ per Committees in 1977
Committee Sec SOC CD LIB EPD EC K
Political Aﬀairs 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.3
Legal Aﬀairs 4 0.5 0.5 0 0.3 1 0.5
Rules, Procedure, Petitions 2 0.5 0.5 0 0.3 0 0.3
Development and Cooperation 4 1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3
Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs 5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.3
Agriculture 5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.9
Energy and Research 4 1 0.5 1 0.3 0.5 0
External Economic Relations 5 1 1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
Budgets 7 1 0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.3
Social Aﬀairs, Employment, Education 4 1 1 0.5 0 0.5 0.3
Regional Policy, Planning, Transport 5 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.3 0
Envi., Public Health, Consumer Prot. 4 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3
Total 52 11 8 6 6 7 5
Legend: Sec - Secretariat, SOC - Socialists, CD - Christian-Democrats, LIB - Liberals and Democrat, EPD
-European Progressive Democrats EC - European Conservatives, K - Communists and Allies. The decimal
figures mean that one person work in more than one committee secretariat.
Source: European Parliament, 1977
shot’ (Priestley, 2008, p. 17).
These examples show that the secretariat of the Budgets committee clearly played a
supportive role to the rapporteur. Throughout the years the staﬀ working on budgetary
aﬀairs would retain their importance, which can be explained by the complexity of the
budgetary procedure. A Honorary Director of the EP described the situation in the Budgets
committees in the following way: ‘The people who were there [working on budgetary issues
in the secretariat] had been there forever and they knew exactly what was happening.
When they were talking together, you didn’t understand anything’ (Interview F, 2012).
7.3.2 Political Groups
The internal administrative structures of political groups, which by the end of the 1970s
were already six (i.e. Socialists, Christian-Democrats, Liberals & Democrats, European
Progressive Democrats, European Conservatives and Communists & Allies) started to re-
semble the one in the central secretariat, where policy work was committee based. Almost
all the groups had staﬀ based in Brussels. Political groups took over from national par-
liaments the task to staﬀ national delegations. The assistance provided in political groups
paid more attention to ideology than the national aﬃliation of MEPs. This strengthened
the supranational character of legislative assistance.
However, the political groups’ human resources for following committees remained small
compared to the committee staﬀ aﬃliated to the general secretariat (Table 7.3). While the
general secretariat employed at least two oﬃcials per committee, most advisors in political
groups had to cover more than one committee at the same time. The number of staﬀ
per political group respected the number of MEPs. The Socialists had the largest number
of staﬀ as the group with the most members of parliament. However, their staﬀ were
five times smaller compared to the central secretariat of the EP. The situation started to
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change at the end of the 1970s. It is immediately after 1979 that the greatest growth of
staﬀ expenditures is observed (Figure 7.4). Political groups developed from ‘skeletons to
robust secretariats’ (Interview D, 2012).
The relative weakness of political groups in the early 1970s can also be seen in the role
of their secretary-generals. In addition to their supportive function of the most important
political bodies in the Parliament, secretary-generals followed also the work of committees
(i.e. the Political Aﬀairs committee) or coordinated their work. Today, the secretary-
generals of political groups are less involved in the initial stages of a policy proposal, while
their engagement increases as the proposal comes closer to be discussed in the plenary
(Interview ZD, 2013).
7.3.3 Members’ Personal Staﬀ
The 1970s were also important for the development of personal assistance to MEPs. For
the first two decades of European integration, the appointed members of the EP did not
receive any allowance, which would have enabled them to systematically recruit personal
staﬀ for working in Strasbourg. Members received only a subsistence allowance, which
covered their cost of travelling for attending EP meetings.4 In light of members’ double
mandate as national and European parliamentarians they were paid by national parlia-
ments. Consequently, the resources they had at their disposal were dependent on their
respective national parliaments. Civil servants from the national parliaments provided
assistance in the form of national delegation secretariats.
In 1974, members gained a new resource for individual assistance, when a secretarial
allowance was introduced specifically for covering the cost of personal assistants and the
maintenance of an oﬃce (European Parliament 1982, p. 177; see Figure 7.2). However, the
role of assistants developed towards an administrative rather than a political one. Part
of the reason for this was the value of the allowance, which until 1980s did not go past
the secretarial expenditure of political groups (Figure 7.3). However, after direct elections
in 1979 the staﬀ allowance for MEPs increased far more than the allowance for political
groups and the general secretariat (Figure 7.4).
7.4 Legislative Powers (1980s and 1990s)
Until the 1980s the secretariat was a relatively independent service. According to the
former Secretary General Vinci the sources of autonomy were two (Interview E, 2012).
The first one was the lack of interest from member states to control the service of an or-
ganisation, which had little power to influence the EU. The second reason was the physical
absence of members, who until 1979 had a dual representative mandate in national par-
liaments and the EP. These two factors favoured the role of administrators over the one
of members of parliament. As observed by Guy Vanhaeverbeke, Honorary Director of the
4The subsistence allowance was introduced at the time of the Coal and Steel Community.
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Figure 7.2: Monthly Expenditures for MEPs Individual Assistance
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EP (Interview D, 2012):
Indeed the 1979 elections engendered a sort of full time professional euro-
parliamentarians, who were eager to be proactive themselves. Before 1979 they
used to be national parliamentarians, who were at most interested in European
aﬀairs. So they were quite happy to find competent staﬀ.
For the first time in the history of the EP, MEPs were carrying out their mandate as
full-time professional politicians. However, aside from the budgetary policy, the EP did
not exercise decision-making powers, but had a consultative role. In the 1980s, the EP
was prepared to change this mainly through the activities of MEP Altiero Spinelli (Italian
member of the Communist and Allies Group), which lay the grounds for the adoption of
the Single European Act in 1986 (entry into force in 1987) and the Treaty of Maastricht
in 1990 (entry into force 1993). These two treaties gave the EP legislative powers by
instituting the procedures of cooperation and codecision.5 Therefore, it is from 1986 on
that we can speak of legislative assistance in the strictest sense.
5With the cooperation procedure an amended or rejected bill by the EP could be adopted by the Council
only with unanimity. In the codecision procedure, today known as the ordinary legislative procedure,
the Council cannot overrule the EP if there is disagreement, but the institutions have to go through a
conciliation committee process, through which the outcome of a bill is decided. It is worth mentioning
since SEA the EP is also responsible to give assent for concluding an association agreement.
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Figure 7.3: Administrative Expenditures 1974-2012
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Figure 7.4: Growth Rates of Expenditures 1974-2012
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7.4.1 Central Administration
The conditions for an independent administrative action, as explained by Vinci, ceased
to exist after the EP acquired its first legislative powers. The freedom that the general
secretariat exercised in the last three decades was about to change, because the political
stakes in the EP started to increase. However, this change did not happen at once, but
gradually. Secretariat staﬀ continued to draft reports throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
As a matter of fact, administrators monopolised legislative assistance to the members of
parliament. An EP head of unit, who had worked as a committee administrator in the
1980s and 1990s, has said the following about the work in committees (Interview L, 2012,
Interview):
Normally he [the member] has the ideas and he writes the report. You [the
administrator] know the procedures, you prepare the “feuille de presence” for
the chairman, you have to be able to make a good voting list [...]. You are
supposed to know how to administratively manage the committee, but in fact
often you are much more than that. Many of the ideas come from you. Of
course if you know the member, you won’t say certain things if the rapporteur
is a socialist or EPP, because he will not agree. You have to have that feeling.
So often it is you that write the report and I hate to say that he hardly looks
at the report.
An internal EP’s survey further confirms the role of committee secretariats. According
to the survey results, in the 1990s committee staﬀ drafted reports still far more often
than political group advisors (Provan, 2001). It is diﬃcult to determine when legislative
assistance to MEPs changed. Virgilio Dastoli, assistant to Spinelli from 1977 to 1986 and
subsequently temporary agent in the EP, witnessed this evolution (Interview J, 2012):
From the moment the EP acquired a legislative role, the functionaries of the
parliament had to change the way they were working. This happened because
the Parliament did not go into the substance of legislative texts before the
Single Act. Its role was limited to the adoption of resolutions with a polit-
ical character. Then with the Single Act, the cooperation procedure and then
with the Maastricht Treaty and all subsequent treaty changes, the work of the
members and functionaries became more detailed from the point of view of
legislation. Therefore, we could no longer allow ourselves to have a fantasy
approach. The texts that we were writing were texts that later on were trans-
formed into law. Therefore, the administration had to be careful how it was
writing the amendments, because the amendments became law.
Dastoli’s observations are confirmed by another oﬃcial of the general secretariat, who
started to work for the EP in 1981 and performs this job till date. In this oﬃcial’s opinion,
the SEA has had lasting eﬀects on the nature of legislative assistance (Interview X, 2013):
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Let’s say that [before the SEA] creativity was the prevalent requirement in
the secretariat. Today, there is less creativity and more input is required from
the political staﬀ. This has probably been the greatest evolution in legislative
assistance in the last 30 years. To sum up, there is a larger quantity of work,
the secretariat has less possibility for initiative and there is more initiative from
the members. The last point I think is a positive development, because it is
the members of parliament who normally should have the initiative and then
the secretariat should oﬀer the technical assistance.
7.4.2 Political Groups
Even though the secretariat staﬀ in committees continued to assist members of parliament,
several respondents were of the opinion that political group advisors were increasing their
presence. However, from available data it appears that political groups did not benefit
from additional financial assistance (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). While financial resources for
administrative expenditures increased in 1979, in 1987, when the SEA came into force,
there was almost no growth. In the early 1990s, financial resources for the secretariat and
political groups remained unvaried.
Instead, political groups tried to nest their people into the secretariat of the EP. Mi-
chael Contes, who has been a parliamentary assistant since the early 1990s, commented
(Interview P, 2013):
In 1979, or even earlier, it was the administration that was doing everything.
For example, in a committee it was the administrator who was writing the
draft report either for a Socialist or a PPE [European People’s Party] member.
And this administrator did not have a problem doing so, because he knew the
political diﬀerences. And then in the 1980s political groups were increasingly
saying: “Careful, we need to be aware that there is a political split there and
we cannot leave these tasks to apolitical administrators in the parliament. We
want to have our own people in the administration.” So, in the beginning of
the 1990s political groups became directly osmosing into the administration.
As long as they had certain amount of years and qualifications they could just
move. So a person working for a political group would move to the secretariat.
In the above quote Contes describes the ‘parachuting’ practice, which involves temporary
agents in political groups to stand internal concours and become EU civil servants working
in the general secretariat (Article 29 Staﬀ Regulations 2013; Article 2 of CEOS). In the
opinion of Secretary-General Vinci ‘parachuting’ had become a problem for the EP:
Fifteen years ago when I retired [1997], I was in a full battle with the function-
aries of the Parliament against the political groups. After I retired, but not
because I retired, political groups prevailed. For example for the promotions
we had always privileged the functionaries. The parachuters, as we were calling
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them, were those coming to the secretariat from political groups. And of course
the parachuter doesn’t fall low, he falls up-high.
Vinci suggested that parachuting is problematic when a period in political groups becomes
a requirement for an individual to take up a high-ranking position in the central admin-
istration of the EP. This pattern of political recruitment has become quite apparent on
the level of the EP’s secretary-generals. In the last thirty years, four out of five secretary-
generals had at a certain point in their careers been secretary-generals of a political group.
Hans Joachim Opitz (EP Secretary General from 1979 to 1986) served as the Secretary
General for the Christian-Democratic Group, Julian Priestley (EP Secretary General from
1997 to 2009) was the Secretary-General for the Socialists, Harald Rømer (EP Secretary
General from 2007 to 2009) was the European Democratic Group’s Secretary General and
Klaus Welle (EP Secretary General since 2009) was the Secretary General for the Christian
Democrats. It has to be noted that, Priestley and Rømer started their careers as low-level
functionaries in the 1973, after their respective countries joined the EU. Priestley was
member of the Budgets committee staﬀ, while Rømer worked in the Energy committee
and later in the division for publications and central documentation. On the contrary,
Opitz and Welle started their careers in the EP’s without occupying any junior rank posi-
tion in the EP’s central administration. Both Opitz and Welle joined the EP’s secretariat
as Directors. Only Enrico Vinci, EP Secretary General from 1986 to 1997, had never been
an employee in a political group. He began his career in the EP in the early 1960s in the
Sanitary Protection committee. He was never part of a political group’s administration,
but was prior to his entry into the EU civil service the assistant of the Italian Foreign
Minister Gaetano Martino from the Liberal party. The last three secretary-generals have
also served in the cabinet of an EP President: Priestly in Hänsch’s cabinet, Rømer in
Fontaine’s cabinet and Welle in Pöttering’s cabinet.
It is unknown how frequent mobility from political groups to the general secretariat
occurs at lower ranks. However, it has been suggested that movements from groups to the
secretariat are becoming more common (Corbett et al., 2007, p. 194; see also Brand, 2010).
In 2001, British MEP Provan denounced this practice. In his view it is diﬃcult to foresee
how service in political groups might aﬀect the requirement for secretariat’s oﬃcials to act
politically neutral in carrying out their duties (Provan, 2001). However, no measures have
been taken.
7.5 Reforms in 2000s
By 2000s the predicted consequences stemming from direct elections and the appearance
of a parliament with legislative powers, became true. At the end of the 1980s and begin-
ning of the 1990s, the organisation of legislative assistance was not meeting the needs of
parliamentarians anymore. A head of unit in the secretariat, who in the early 2000s had
been involved in the reforming process, recounted the situation reigning in the EP in the
1990s in the following way (Interview X, 2013):
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After the Parliament had acquired new functions, there was a moment of dis-
orientation. The members themselves needed some time to adapt to the new
functions. Then, the parliamentarians started to take the political initiative
as it was their right. And maybe when they did, there was a disconnection
in respect to the secretariat. The secretariat was destabilised and as a result
it did not provide the immediate technical support, which was needed. But
this lasted for a very short time, because then it became clear that the secret-
ariat was to follow the members’ political initiative and oﬀer them a duly and
immediate assistance.
Another problem was the increasingly blurred distinction between the roles of committee
staﬀ and political advisors, which were attached to political groups. As described by
Provan (2001, p. 4):
[...] the Parliament has evolved rapidly over recent years, particularly in terms
of its legislative role and activities. [...] the nature of the support provided
to members by the institution in this central legislative role has not fully kept
pace with their changing needs.
Moreover, Provan argued that the EP needed to clearly distinguish between administrative
and political roles. In his report on the EP’s internal reform he stated (Provan, 2001, p. 10):
It should be recognised that a career in the political groups and a career in
Parliament’s permanent administration are two separate things. This is not to
say that movement between the two should not be possible, but that movement
from one service to the other should involve a change in career (a “one way
ticket”).
7.5.1 Attempts to Reform the Central Administration
Provan Report In 2001, the first step to reform the EP materialised with a report au-
thored by James Provan, MEP and Vice-President of the Bureau. The main change that
Provan proposed was to clarify responsibilities between the technical-substantive assistance
(i.e. advice on procedures, legal issues, institutional aspects; document drafting, support
in negotiation, drawing attention to policy issues) and the political assistance to MEPs
(i.e. policy definition, political coordination within political group and with other political
groups, coordination with national delegation, party, constituency). Provan’s solution in-
volved the strengthening of the general secretariat as a non-partisan service, while giving
MEPs more responsibilities over resources deployed to serve their political activities (i.e.
secretarial allowances). The latter included the reconceptualization of the role of parlia-
mentary assistants towards the role of personal political advisors to MEPs. This would
allow political group advisors to focus on the political coordination within the group and
negotiations with other groups. Finally, Provan proposed to reform the research service.
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‘Raising the Game’ In 2003, based on Provan’s report, Secretary-General Priestley
proposed a set of reforms under the name ‘Raising the Game’. Despite its name, the
package of reforms was not as ambitious as Provan’s plan as it only included the reor-
ganisation of the central services of the EP. The focus of the reform was to shift from
a vertically based functional organisation to a horizontally based policy organisation fol-
lowing five policy streams: economic and scientific aﬀairs, cohesion and regional aﬀairs,
budgetary aﬀairs, foreign aﬀairs and citizens’ aﬀairs. Prior to the reform in 2003, legislat-
ive assistance was organised based on research and assistance functions in DG Research
(DG IV) and DG Committees and Delegations (DG II) (Neunreither, 2003; Kungla, 2007).
DG Committees and Delegations, based in Brussels, staﬀed all delegations and committee
secretariats and thus, it had the pivotal role in legislative assistance (Neunreither, 2003,
p. 48). DG Research, based in Luxembourg, was responsible for answering questions from
individual MEPs, while a small amount of inquires came also from committees (Interview
R, 2013). While DG Research did provide assistance to MEPs and committees in indi-
vidual instances, the service as a whole was not visible due to the fact that research was
done in Luxembourg, while committee meetings and plenaries were held either in Brussels
or Strasbourg (Interview R, 2013). An Honorary Director stated the following about DG
Research (Interview F, 2012):
For a very very long time we had a DG on research and studies. They were
working like they were in another world. They were writing about things that
nobody had asked for and sometimes we wondered where were they going.
As a result of ‘Raising the Game’, DG Research and DG Committees/Delegations were
reorganised into DG Internal Policies (DG IPOL) and DG External Policies (DG EXPO).6
DG Studies was completely dismantled. Its research services were reorganised into five
policy departments (i.e. Science Policy, Economic & Social Policy, Structural & Cohesion
Policy, Citizen’s Rights & Constitutional Aﬀairs and External Relations) within DGs IPOL
and EXPO and transferred from Luxembourg to Brussels. What was left from the DG IV
was transferred to DG Presidency in a newly established Directorate for the Library and
Documentary Services with headquarters in Luxembourg. With the 2003 reform committee
and research assistance were brought under the same roof.
7.5.2 Political Group Advisors and Staﬀ Regulation Reform
Despite Provan’s warning, the provision on the detachment from political group staﬀ to
general secretariat staﬀ did not change. In 2004, Staﬀ Regulations were amended to clearly
state that the detachment is applicable to political groups as well (Article 37 and 38 (g) of
the Staﬀ Regulations, 2013). That such change was adopted on a regulation level applicable
6 This division of work is in place still today. DG IPOL covers the majority of committees (seventeen
in the seventh legislature), while DG EXPO staﬀs external and foreign aﬀairs committees and subcom-
mittees (AFET, DEVE, INTA, DROI and SEDE in the seventh term) and all the remaining international
delegations to third countries.
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to all institutions is in a way surprising, because the change implicitly targeted the EP as
the institution that employs most of political group advisors.7 On the one hand, the current
provision on the detachment goes against Provan’s recommendations. On the other hand,
it has been claimed that the possibility of secondment between and within institutions can
improve staﬀ’s understanding on each other’s roles. In the view of a former low ranking
political advisor, who is now a permanent oﬃcial of the general secretariat, many oﬃcials
in the EP do not understand what is the role of political advisors (Interview G, 2012).
Mobility between the administration in political groups and the general secretariat can
thus improve mutual understanding.
As far as it regards the highest positions in the hierarchy, it seems that perceptions
vary given the political ideology. For example, when asked to give an opinion on the
current Secretary General Klaus Welle, who used to be the Secretary General of the EPP,
the responses were critical, but varied per political groups. While respondents from the
ALDE and the S&D criticised Welle for being partial to the EPP, respondents form the
EPP claimed the Secretary General was working against political groups in general by
privileging the general secretariat (Interview N, 2012; Interview V, 2013; Interview ZA,
2013). Former Secretary General Priestly also recalled that political groups were expecting
from him to make decisions favouring his former employer, the S&D group (Interview C,
2012):
At my very first meeting of the group leaders, I was asked to make a ruling
on a request from Pauline Green, the leader of the Socialists group, who was
also my nationality. And I said no, because actually what she was proposing
was wrong. And I think everybody was surprised, because they’d assumed
because she was the leader of then the largest group, my nationality and my
political persuasion, I would say yes to that. But it would not have been proper
according to the rules. You have to build a basis of trust with all the political
groups.
7.6 Recent Developments (2010s)
The most recent developments in the administrative services of the EP can be seen in the
light of the changing nature of parliamentary democracy and the European debts crisis
that started in 2009. The growth in the size of government and the public demand for a
greater engagement with citizens have increased parliament’s responsibilities to scrutinise
legislation and changed the nature of parliamentary representation all over the world (IPU,
2012). In order to respond to these challenges, parliaments have implemented several re-
forms (e.g. public consultations, implementation of the code of conducts for increasing the
accountability of members, etc.).
Part of these changes targeted also the assistance to members. In the EP the trend has
7The Committee of the Regions does also employ temporary staﬀ as political group advisors.
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been to professionalise and personalise the assistance to its members of parliament. This
resulted in the improvement of the conditions of employment for personal staﬀ, but also
in the professionalisation of internal administrative services. At the same time, the EP, as
several other national parliaments, had to reduce its workforce due to the European debts
crisis that started in 2009. The following section reviews how the changing environment
in which the EP operates has aﬀected its legislative services in the 2010s.
7.6.1 Central Administration
Research Support
In 2010s an analysis of the secretariat services showed that ‘Raising the Game’ did not
completely eradicate organisation problems. A report published in 2013, stated that the
organisation of the EP did not match the needs of MEPs in terms of an ‘independent
scientific or research advice’ (European Parliament, 2013b, p. 5). In a presentation, which
announced further reforms of the general secretariat, Secretary General Welle assessed the
research support functions of the EP to be on an average level compared to other state
legislatures (i.e. on a similar level to the UK parliament, below the capacity of the Italian
and German parliaments, but above the capacity of the French parliament) (European
Parliament, 2014, p. 7). In order to strengthen the research support function of the EP,
the establishment of an independent in-house parliamentary research service at the disposal
of all MEPs, was proposed in 2013 (European Parliament, 2013b, p. 7). The same idea was
suggested in the period when ‘Raising the Game’ was discussed. An oﬃcial who was
involved in the implementation of ‘Raising the Game’ recalled that (Interview X, 2013):
The idea of the time was to really set up a general directorate for research,
which would enable the interaction between parliamentarians and researchers.
We believed that this interaction would give birth to new political ideas, which
would be transformed in own-initiative legislative reports. Legislation is pro-
posed by the Commission, but today it can be proposed also by the EP, a group
of citizens etc. And, who can facilitate the internal discussion in the EP? These
are the technical services, which by interacting with member can facilitate the
formulation of policy ideas.
While ‘Raising the Game’ created policy departments (i.e. units providing research exclus-
ively for committees), the 2013 reform set up the Parliamentary Research Service (DG
EPRS), which is responsible to assist individual members (European Parliament, 2013d,
pp. 13-4). In several aspects, DG EPRS has been organised according to the Congressional
model in the US (see European Parliament, 2013b; European Parliament, 2013d). As of
today, the majority of research units are organised under DG EPRS except for the policy
departments. Therefore, the idea of a comprehensive research service has not been achieved
yet, and it is likely to be a future reform issue. In a way, the Bureau of the EP resurrected
the old DG Studies (DG IV). However, in the 2013 reorganisation the Bureau of the EP
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paid more attention to the individual needs of MEPs.
Budgetary Constraints
Problem To respond to the financial and debt crisis in the EU, several member states ad-
opted public spending reforms. These reforms prescribed general public spending cutbacks
including civil service staﬀ reductions. In 2011, under the pressure from member states
that demanded staﬃng cuts up to 12 per cent (Brand, 2012), the European Commission
put forward a proposal to reform the EU’s Staﬀ Regulations, which included the provision
to cut staﬀ by five per cent before 2018 in each institution and agency of the EU (European
Commission, 2011b). The Legal Aﬀairs committee rejected such an ‘automatic’ reduction
across all institutions (European Parliament, 2012c, p. 67). According to the responsible
rapporteur Dagmar Roth-Behrendt (S&D), enlargement and the newly acquired compet-
ences under the Lisbon Treaty required ‘tailor-made’ solutions per institution (European
Parliament, 2012c, p. 69). A compromise was adopted in 2013 to gradually reduce staﬀ by
five per cent by 2018 (Regulation 1023/2014, European Union, 2013).
Staﬀ Cuts In 2014, the EP planned to decrease its staﬀ by 0.55 per cent compared
to 2013.8 The reductions were planned on the expenses of the general secretariat, while
neither a decrease nor increase of staﬀ is registered for political groups. However, the staﬀ
of the EP are in practice still growing. In 2013, the EP negotiated with the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions a staﬀ transfer. As a
result, in 2014 the staﬀ of the EP have actually augmented for 0.63 per cent compared to
2013 (based on Annual Budget, 2013; Annual Budget, 2014). Finally, the secretariat of
the EP has seen a reduction in the yearly increase of its budget (from a budget increase
of 1.9 per cent in 2013 to 0.4 per cent increase in 2014). This has further reduced the
capacity of the EP to grow as an institution.
Political Groups Before a compromise on the Staﬀ Regulations reform was reached, a
controversy arose between the political groups and the EP Secretary General. Political
groups claimed that the reduction of their staﬀ would worsen their administrative capacity
compared to the general secretariat, where AD staﬀ had been growing faster (Figure 7.4).
In fact, while political groups registered an unchanged staﬀ growth in 2013, the number of
post in the committee secretariats increased (European Parliament, 2014).9 The Secretary
General of the EP further irked political groups when he considered applying the five per
cent reduction at once. The S&D group, under the leadership of its Secretary General
8In 2013, the implementation staﬀ cuts touched in particularly translation services, where reductions
were easier to implement due to technological advancements (e.g. automatic translations). Nowadays in
order to decrease expenditures, all documents which are not priority or legislative are outsourced for trans-
lation (Interview R, 2013). Besides translation, other central administrative services (i.e. ushers service)
have lost staﬀ mostly due to technological advancements as well.
9This increase was possible due to the reallocation of a hundred translation posts to political sup-
port managements units in the EP (i.e. committee support, plenary support, legal-linguistic services etc.)
(European Parliament, 2014).
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Anna Colombo, overtly opposed the reduction of staﬀ in political groups (Interview ZB,
2013). Respondents from both the S&D and EPP expressed the view that the plan of the
EP’s Secretary General was an attempt to progressively reduce the role of political groups
in favour of the general secretariat (Interview ZB 2013; Interview ZA, 2013).
The 2013 staﬀ increase in committee secretariats further indicates the priority of the
EP’s Bureau to develop a sound legislative assistance service for MEPs. This priority has
become clear already under Secretary General Priestley. Together, Priestley and Welle’s
reforms can be seen as an eﬀort to professionalise and personalise the legislative assistance
oﬀered to members (Interview Q, 2013; Interview R, 2013). Before that, the general sec-
retariat’s of the EP was known as an ‘old-timer’ which was against any reform to change
its structure (Neunreither, 2003, p. 47).
7.6.2 Members’ Personal Staﬀ
The assistants working for MEPs were for a long time excluded from the Staﬀ Regulations.
In 1998 and 2001 the Commission proposed to amend the Conditions of Employment of
Other Servants of the European Communities (CEOS) in order to integrate the occupa-
tion of personal assistants in the European framework.10 However, it was not until 2009
that Council adopted Regulation 160, which serves as the statute for the employment of
accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) in Brussels and Strasbourg (Bureau of the EP,
2009). The rules were implemented to provide MEPs’ assistants job stability and security.
Regulation 160 changed the management of APAs’ employment contracts. While mem-
bers are still allocated a fixed amount of money for parliamentary assistants in Brussels
(Article 125 of the CEOS in the Staﬀ Regulations 2013; Article 2 Bureau of the EP, 2009),
the contracts and payments are since 2009 managed by the EP administration and not
anymore by MEPs (Article 34 of the Implementing Measures to the Statute for MEPs).
The expenditure was delinked from MEPs allowances and included in the EP’s budget
as a cost resulting from the special functions carried out by the EP. The change in the
payment system was mainly organised as a response to an internal audit in the EP (i.e.
Galvin Report) that discovered unjustified claims of secretarial expenses. Even though the
management of the expenditure changed in 2009, its purpose has always been to guarantee
members with personal assistance in secretarial, research and political activities.
The amount MEPs receive for the recruitment of APAs has been increasing over time.
Figure 7.2 shows this trend on a cumulative basis for individual MEPs in a given year.
The Bureau decides the maximum yearly amount defrayable for personal staﬀ, which is
since 2011 set to 21 209 EUR per member (European Parliament, 2011b). The actual
10COM (1998) 312, 15. 5. 1998, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC,
Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 laying down the Staﬀ Regulations of Oﬃcials of the European Communities
and the Conditions of Employment of the Other Servants of the Communities. COM (2001) 344, 24. 6.
2001, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation amending, for the benefit of European
parliamentary assistants, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security
schemes to employed persons, self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within
the Community, and Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71.
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expenditures have remained below 17 000 EUR per month. In the opinion of Secretary
General Welle, the organisation of personal assistance in the EP is above average compared
to other legislatures (i.e. similar to the quality of the German parliament, but above the
level of the British, Italian and French parliaments) (European Parliament, 2014, p. 7).
7.7 Discussion
Functionalism in the 1960s and 1970s As in the case of Chapter 6, diﬀerent institu-
tional logics (i.e. functional, sociological and path dependency) explain the developments
in the administrative organisation of the EP between the 1960s and 2010s. Throughout
this period the transformation towards a state-parliament model of administrative organ-
isation is always visible (Hypothesis 3a). The EP has strengthened its general secretariat,
the secretariats of political groups and the assistance to individual members of parliament.
Assistance based on common political aﬃliation was given precedence over support based
on nationality. The model of parliamentary administration was finally on track when the
temporary secretariat drawn from national parliaments was phased-out and when MEPs
started to rely on their own assistants rather than the staﬀ from national parliaments.
Until the 1980s, the administrative transformation according to state-legislatures was
connected to the changes in the EP’s environment (Hypothesis 3a). Moreover, the func-
tional adaptation was linked to the new competences the EP acquired with treaty revisions
rather than to enlargement. The most prominent example of functional adaptation is the
change that followed the organisation of the first direct elections in 1979. Following the elec-
tion, the EP increased the number of staﬀ and expenditures dedicated to the functioning of
the general secretariat, political groups and in particular individual MEPs. Several other
examples give evidence for a functional adaptation. Immediately after the creation of the
EEC in 1958 the general secretariat specialised its departments for the first time. Political
groups strengthened their administrative capacity as well. Political advisors were recog-
nised as temporary oﬃcials and were allowed to participate in internal concours (1962). In
terms of policy work most of the legislative assistance was done by the general secretariat
due to the technocratic nature of policies and the lack of real decision-making powers in
the 1960s.
Functionalism in the 1970s In the 1970s, when the EP obtained budgetary powers,
there is an increase of staﬀ and their activity in the Budgets committee. The conferral of
the powers in the budgetary policy provides an early indication of how the assistance to
MEPs would develop once the EP acquired meaningful powers on legislative files. The ex-
ample of the 1980 annual budget shows that the general secretariat was actively involved
in drafting EP’s report compared to political advisors. However, it was the rapporteur
who ultimately controlled the involvement of secretariat’s staﬀ. This is very similar to the
principal-agent theorisation for which Winzen (2011), Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and
Neuhold and Dobbels (2014) found support in specific cases of parliamentary committees
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and EU policies. The analysis of events in this chapter shows that MEPs’ control on staﬀ
(agent-principal relationship) emerged gradually. Hence, the principal-agent relationship
cannot be assumed as a given condition for the case of the EP (at least not in a historical
perspective). In the 1950s and 1960s, when the Common Assembly did not have decision-
making rights and when its members were part-time representatives, staﬀ were in control
of its activities. By the end of the 1970s, MEPs achieved the status of full-time repres-
entatives. Thus, they should have had the time for controlling the staﬀ of the general
secretariat. Nevertheless, no evidence is found for specific cases apart from the Budgets
committee, where the EP gained substantial control and decision-making powers.
Functionalism from the 1980s onwards In the 1980s and 1990s, the conditions that
were found in the area of the budget in the 1970s existed also in some areas of legislation.
Yet, evidence does not show MEPs to routinely control staﬀ. There are indications that
MEPs started to routinely exercise control over the staﬀ of the general secretariat in the
2000s. This coincides with the gradual loss of prestige of the general secretariat staﬀ.
However, the data of this chapter does not allow generalising by policy cases and only a
general pattern can be presented. Whether the general pattern of principal-agent relation-
ships between MEPs and staﬀ holds could be further tested on specific cases as it has been
done by Winzen (2011), Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) and Neuhold and Dobbels (2014).
However, the relative time distance of events represents a major diﬃculty to analyse policy
cases in history.
Path-Dependency and Isomorphism The functional pattern, where administrative
changes are connected to a changing environment, disappeared when the EP gained legis-
lative powers. After the first direct elections, the adoption of the SEA and the Maastricht
Treaty, one would expect the role of political group advisors to grow due to the increase in
the saliency of issues. However, the general secretariat continued to play an important role
in drafting reports, albeit oﬃcials now self-restrained themselves in creativity. In addition,
no significant change in the expenditure or staﬀ number is seen from mid-1980s onwards.
Between the 1980s and 2000s, the unvaried working practices were accompanied by
an absence of significant reforms (see European Parliament, 2012b, p. 46). The political
situation was not any longer a precondition for administrative reforms. Change occurred,
but only gradually. After a time of reform inactivity, the Bureau of the EP launched
the process ‘Raising the Game’ in 2003, which only partially solved problems relating to
legislative assistance. Further changes were made in 2009 (reforms of the Staﬀ Regulations)
and 2013 (reforms on research).
Since change was not anymore responding to EP’s political environment, the insti-
tutional transformation of legislative assistance was no longer functional. The political
institutionalisation of the EP, which happened with the acquisition of legislative powers,
did not match the administrative institutionalisation: political changes were inconsequen-
tial for the development of legislative assistance. At the turn from the 1970s to the 1980s,
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the pace of administrative reforms slowed down and resembled to a path dependent logic.
While reforms were gradual, they continued to draw the EP closer to a parliamentary type
of administration, which the EP initiated already in the period of the ECSC. An isomorphic
process cohabited with functional adaptation until the late 1970s (H3b and H3a). While
from the 1980s onwards, it coexisted with path-dependent changes (H3b and H3c).
Distributive Rational Choice Institutionalism As the EP acquired new prerog-
atives, the administrative organisation was not anymore just a question of functionality
and adaptation to the parliamentary model, but also a question of control. This is at best
illustrated by the impeachment of Secretary General tot Babberich, whom the Bureau sud-
denly replaced in 1960. Except for one, all the subsequent secretary-generals had worked
for a political group. When political dossiers became salient and the EP gained the right
to reject a decision of the Council, further accounts on the discord between the general
secretariat and political groups become available (i.e. ‘parachuting’, politicisation of the
highest ranks of the general secretariat, staﬀs’ perceptions over their number, etc.).
The administrative resources allocated to the central administration, political groups
and individual MEPs developed unequally. In particular the role of parliamentary assist-
ants developed slower compared to the administrative capacities in the general secretariat
and political groups. The slower pace can be attributed to the evolving role of MEPs
through the years. At first MEPs were delegates to the EP and a full-time member of a
national parliament. As a result, MEPs’ resources for working in the EP (i.e. salary, but
also allowances) were limited and linked to their functions in national parliaments. When
MEPs became full-time professional European politicians, they started to benefit from a
staﬀ allowance, which enabled them to employ personal staﬀ.
The developments since 2000s indicate a shift of power from political groups to indi-
vidual members. For example in 2005, the EP adopted the Statute for MEPs, which aﬃrms
that members are free and independent and that they vote on an individual and personal
basis, without being bounded by any instructions (Articles 2(1) and 3(1)). Moreover, the
preamble to the Statute for MEPs states that the members’ salary and other entitlements,
specified in Article 9 of the Statute, are not meant for financing parties, but for safe-
guarding MEPs’ independence. The preamble also says that such a statement ‘is necessary
because parties often expect the benefits referred to in Article 9(1) and (2) to be used
in part for their purpose’ European Parliament (2005, point 12). The EP administration
has responded quickly to these developments by improving the conditions of employment
for MEPs’ personal staﬀ (Regulation 160/2009) and increasing members’ staﬀ allowance
(Implementing measures to the Statute for MEPs).
Personalisation can be seen also in the latest reform of the secretariat, where a research
service has been set up to deal with the request of individual MEPs rather than political
groups or committees. Similar organisational challenges are faced by other parliaments in
the world (IPU, 2012).
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7.8 Conclusion
In order to examine the change of legislative assistance in the EP as an institutional design,
this chapter has reviewed developments from 1958 to 2013. The chapter has built on the
functional, isomorphic and path-dependency explanations of change. Three initial hypo-
theses were made. The first hypothesis was that change in legislative assistance has been
driven by concerns over functionality (H3a). The second hypothesis was that legislative
services would acquire a form similar to state-parliament administrations due to the parlia-
mentarization of the EP (H3b). The third hypothesis summarised the second hypothesis,
but added a temporal dimension (H3c).
The findings show mixed evidence for the first (H3a) and third (H3c) hypotheses,
while evidence is found in support of the second hypothesis (H3b). Based on the evidence
presented in this chapter, changes to improve the quality of assistance in the EP were more
functional and dynamic in the 1960s and 1970s compared to the 1980s and 1990s. This
means that until the 1980s, the administrative structures of the EP were responding to
political events (e.g. direct election, budgetary powers, etc.). These parallel developments
provide support for the functional hypothesis according to which adaptation is linked to
observable challenges. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s a stalemate in administrative
changes is observed, even though, the EP gained important powers with the SEA and
Maastricht Treaty. Time lags between political and administrative change began to appear.
In fact, the EP began to respond to problems from the late 1980s and early 1990s, only in
2000s. Reforms were not problem-driven, since they occurred ten years after Maastricht
and two other treaties had been adopted. For this reason there is no evidence supporting
the functional hypothesis after the 1980s. The last thirty years of administrative change
in the EP are rather explained by historical institutionalism, where change is slow and
path-dependent. Reform occurred gradually and in small steps following the trajectory
of administrative organisation in state-legislatures. The EP had acquired some aspects
of state-parliament administrative organisation already in the 1950s (e.g. political group
secretariats and the civil service law). A fairly similar organisation to national parliaments
was acquired throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when national parliaments discontinued their
administrative support to the EP and with the implementation of a staﬀ allowance. The
most recent developments (i.e. professionalisation and personalisation) show that the EP
has to adapt to the same challenges as national parliaments. Therefore, there is substantial
evidence supporting the third hypothesis (H3c). Possibly, the EP is even one of the most
successful European parliaments in adapting to contemporary challenges.

Part II
The Eﬀects of Organisation in the
EP’s Administrative System of
Legislative Assistance
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Chapter 8
Organisation Theory and the EP
In line with the first empirical part, the second part continues to observe legislative as-
sistance. However, instead as a design or organisation, legislative assistance is treated
as behaviour. To study behaviour, the second empirical part of the thesis consists of
three chapters. In Chapter 8 organisation theory is applied and the independent variables
are operationalised. Chapter 9 develops a quantitative measure for legislative assistance.
Chapter 10 presents the results. The information and findings provided in Part II are
based on original survey data (Chapter 4).
8.1 Theory Application
The present chapter addresses how the formal organisation of legislative assistance aﬀects
the behaviour of legislative staﬀ in the EP from the point of view of organisation theory.
The literature review (Chapter 2) has shown that scholars have to a certain extent already
investigated how administrative players behave in the EP. This has mainly been done us-
ing role theory and modelling assumptions on the principle agent (politician/bureaucrat)
relationship (Winzen, 2011; Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014).
Analysis of influence and delegation exclude the eﬀect of a structure. In principal agent
studies, the structure is at best the product of the principal and, as such does not contain
any autonomous properties. Political sociologists claim the opposite. For them agents
are autonomous and give meaning to structures (Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010; Busby
and Belkacem, 2013; Michon, 2014). This dissertation proposes to study behaviour from
the analytical view of organisation theory (Section 3.3). Organisation theory, as employed
in this study, is a theory of administrative behaviour (Simon, 1997). Organisation theory
concurs with studies in political sociology that human behaviour is embedded in an institu-
tional context. Analyses in political sociology have focused on informal practices, symbols
and power relations among actors. On the contrary, the strength of organisation theory
is the most evident when articulating formal structures, i.e. rules and roles, which specify
who is expected to do what in an organisation (Blau and Scott, 2003).
Since the purpose of this dissertation is to study the organisation of legislative assist-
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ance in the EP, it builds on organisation theory rather on a principal agent approach. In
other words, the aim is to see how the organisation of legislative assistance, rather than the
relationship between MEPs and their aids, aﬀects the behaviour of legislative staﬀ. Both,
studying the relationship between the principal and the agent or organisation, are import-
ant from the point of view of accountability. Studying the relationship between politicians
and their administrative aids unfolds around delegation and degrees of autonomy. Studying
organisation emphasises the extent to which accountability (but also eﬃciency, organisa-
tional goals, etc.) can be achieved through formal structures. Organisational structures
are therefore interesting to study, because they operate as means to control administrative
behaviour.
Based on the state of the literature one can further conclude that the rational model of
behaviour on the relation between the principal (politician) and agent (bureaucrat) is not
exhaustive in explaining the behaviour of the latter in the EP. As Dobbels and Neuhold
(2013) have shown there are some characteristics, which are not strictly related to the
agent and the principal, that are also important for the understanding of the role of staﬀ.
Organisation theory suggests focusing on organisation as an externality to the relationship
between the principal and the agent (Mitnick, 1992; Waterman and Meier, 1998).
Compared to previous research on the EP’s administration, which has also leaned on
organisation theory (Egeberg et al., 2013; Egeberg et al., 2014a; Egeberg et al., 2014b),
the focus of this study lies exclusively on the activities performed by staﬀ in the EP. Be-
haviour is therefore conceptualised narrowly, since the study does not inquire about staﬀ’s
considerations, concerns, contacts, attitudes, etc. This choice has been made, because in
addition to exploring how organisational structures aﬀect behaviour, the aim is to dissect
the type of activities that staﬀ in parliament does most commonly. Organisation theory is
therefore also used as a tool to explore the question what it means to carry out legislative
assistance. As an exploration tool, organisation theory is practical, because it allows to
systematically analyse the diﬀerent tasks staﬀ carry out independently of their importance
or frequency.
Main Hypothesis
Following organisation theory, the underlying assumptions is that the way legislative assist-
ance is organised in the EP shapes the behaviour (in terms of assisting MEPs) of individuals
and the collective(s) who are responsible to assist MEPs in legislation (i.e. legislative staﬀ).
It is argued that the degree to which individuals are involved in the assistance of MEPs
varies given the organisational structure. By employing an organisational perspective the
objective is to find out to what extent can we explain the variation in the behaviour of
diﬀerent administrative players in the EP. The following hypothesis is put forward:
Hypothesis 4: The behaviour of legislative staﬀ in the EP varies given the
organisational structure of legislative assistance.
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Five organisational structures (or components of the organisational structure in the EP)
are examined: job rank, administrative aﬃliation, functional specialisation, policy special-
isation and political specialisation. Based on the EP’s Staﬀ Regulations and organisational
charts, this chapter reviews the above-mentioned organisational structures and develops
sub-hypotheses to H4. The hypotheses are analysed based on the theoretical model in
Chapter 3. For the purpose of simplification the model can be illustrated with the follow-
ing formula:
legislative assistance =  0 +  1 ⇤ org. structures+  2 ⇤ control variables+ u, (8.1)
E(u|org. structures, control variables) = E(u) = 0.
Equation 8.1 says that given the control variables (i.e. demography and institutionalisa-
tion), organisational structures aﬀect legislative assistance. The second line of the equation
states the assumption upon which the model is based. It says that factors, other than the
theorised independent variables, which might have an eﬀect on legislative assistance (i.e.
the relationship between the MEPs and staﬀ, decision-making procedures, saliency of the
policy proposal, etc.) are not correlated with independent variables. Under this assump-
tion, a causal interpretation of organisational structures on legislative assistance is made.
In order to test the relationships presented in the model above, this chapter explains the
independent variables. Chapter 9 operationalises the dependent variable.
8.2 Organisational Structures in the EP
Chapter 3 presented the organisational structures as products of vertical and horizontal
specialisation in an organisation. The following section reviews these two types of special-
isation as they have developed in the EP. Five organisational structures are reviewed: job
rank, administrative aﬃliation, functional specialisation, policy specialisation and political
specialisation.
8.2.1 Vertical Specialisation
Job Rank & Sub-Hypothesis 4a
The vertical specialisation of the EP is specified in Article 5 of the Staﬀ Regulations (2013).
Two diﬀerent grading systems apply, one for oﬃcials working in the general secretariat and
political groups and one for accredited assistants.1 Permanent and temporary administrat-
ors in the general secretariat and political groups are classified in twelve grades (from AD5
to AD16). With experience up to three years administrators are recruited into the lowest
1Moreover, separate rules are in place for contract staﬀ (Article 80, Title IV of CEOS). Contract staﬀ
are vertically specialised in four diﬀerent function groups and eighteen grades. The sample on which the
model is tested includes seven contract staﬀers. Due to the low number, they are omitted from the final
dataset.
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grade AD5. Subsequent promotions are based on the principle of seniority. Grade AD6
requires from three to six years of experience, grade AD7 from six to nine years, grade
AD8 from nine to twelve years, grade AD9 from twelve to fifteen years, grades AD12/13
from fifteen to eighteen years and grades AD14/16 from eighteen to twenty-one years of
experience. Oﬃcials in the ranks from AD5 to AD12 occupy the post of administrators, the
ranks AD9 to AD14 open the doors to become heads of unit or advisers2, while AD14 to
AD16 are occupied by directors and director-generals. The salaries range from 3 810 EUR
to 16 000 EUR (Annex XIII of the Staﬀ Regulations). Accredited parliamentary assistants
(APAs) are classified in nineteen grades, where the salary ranges from 1 680 EUR to 7
740 EUR per month (Article 133 of CEOS). It is up for the MEP to decide the rank of
an accredited assistant. The seniority principle, which applies at least for administrators
in the general secretariat and political groups, means that hierarchy levels are strongly
correlated with age and the years of working experience in the EU institutions.3
Previous research has shown that the rank of oﬃcials aﬀects their behaviour in terms
of considerations. For example, individuals in top rank positions are more likely to evoke
a logic of hierarchy than oﬃcials in lower positions (Trondal, 2011, p. 799). It also holds
that individuals in high-rank positions have more responsibility than low rank oﬃcials.
Therefore, hierarchy implies that staﬀ carry out diﬀerent tasks. Since hierarchy tends to
empower high-ranking oﬃcials, it is assumed that high-ranking oﬃcials are more involved
in legislative assistance than lower ranking oﬃcials. Here, I test the preposition whether
the grade an administrative player in the EP occupies is likely to aﬀect an individual’s role
in legislative assistance also for the case of the EP:
H4a: Involvement in legislative assistance increases with the job rank.
Figure 8.1 shows the frequency of ranks in the survey sample given the administrative
aﬃliation. Since the grading system for administrators and political advisors is diﬀerent
from the one of assistants, the variables measuring rank were transformed into ordinal
variables following the distributional approach of coding (see Vaus 2002, p. 165). Grade
was standardised into three categories: high, middle and low ranks (Table 8.1).4
8.2.2 Horizontal Specialisation
The horizontal specialisation in the EP is specified in the Staﬀ Regulations and the EP’s
organisational chart. The EP administration is specialised horizontally in diﬀerent ways
2Adviser is a special category of oﬃcials, which can either be employed in the secretariat or political
groups. This category is not related to the political advisors that work in political groups and which
denotes all the AD employees in political groups disregarding the grade/rank.
3Based on the survey results, the correlation between age and rank for secretariat administrators is 0.77
and 0.57 for political group advisors; while the correlation between rank and experience for secretariat
administrators is 0.76 and 0.74 for political advisors. Age and years of experience in the EU institutions
are strongly correlated in all the cases for EP staﬀ. However, the survey data shows there is no correlations
between the rank and age of an APA, while experience is strongly correlated. The correlation coeﬃcient
equals 0.76.
4Administrators and political advisors: Grades AD5/7 were recoded into low rank, AD8/9 into middle
rank, AD10/16 into high rank. Accredited parliamentary assistants: 1/6 low, 7/10 middle, 11/19 high.
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Table 8.1: Grade: Standardisation and Recoded Values
Grade Standardisation (AD and APA) Values (N of observations)
High AD10/16 and 11/19 N = 79
Middle AD8/9 and 7/10 N = 73
Low AD6/7 and 1/6 N = 88
Figure 8.1: Survey Sample: Rank
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given the:
• Administrative aﬃliation within the EP (i.e. whether an individual is aﬃliated to
the central secretariat, political group or an MEP oﬃce);
• Specialisation in terms of function (i.e. research staﬀ, committee staﬀ or legal staﬀ);
• Policy area (i.e. internal versus external policies of the EU or more elaborated distinc-
tions between economic and scientific policy, structural and cohesion policy, citizens
rights and legal aﬀairs, budgetary aﬀairs and foreign aﬀairs or distinction between
committees, such as AGRI, AFET, etc.);
• Political specialisation as the aﬃliation to political parties for political groups and
MEP oﬃces (Christian-Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, etc.).
The following paragraphs explain these horizontal structures. Table 8.7 provides as a
summary.
Administrative Aﬃliation & Sub-Hypothesis 4b
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that structures of horizontal aﬃliation
aﬀect the behaviour of individuals. Egeberg et al. have shown this also in the case of
the EP administration for preferences and contacts (2013; 2014; 2014). However, they only
tested the administrative aﬃliation (what they call as ‘organisational aﬃliation’) and their
data did not include accredited parliamentary assistants. Previous research has determined
that secretariat staﬀ used to be the most influential source of assistance in the EP (see
Chapter 2). In line with this past research the following hypothesis is tested:
H4b: Administrators employed in the general secretariat are involved in legis-
lative assistance more frequently than the political advisors working for political
groups and accredited parliamentary assistants.
Functional Specialisation & Sub-Hypothesis 4c
Compared to MEPs oﬃces, where APAs work, and the secretariats of political groups,
where political advisors work, the general secretariat of the EP has a more detailed hori-
zontal specialisation. Secretariat administrators can for example work in the secretariat
of a committee, the legal service, a policy department, etc. This study controls for this
diﬀerentiation with a dummy variable, which measures if a secretariat administrators is
formally assigned to a committee or not.
Even if in strict terms there is no formal division of work into committee or non commit-
tee staﬀ for APAs and for a part of political advisors (i.e. for those political groups where
the number of MEPs is low and thus do not possess as many staﬀ resources as the larger
political groups), work is de facto organised around committees and other obligations. For
this reasons, staﬀ were asked whether they followed the work of at least one committee.
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Independently on whether one works for the general secretariat, a political group or an
MEP’s oﬃce, assisting a member of parliament in the committee is supposed to increase
staﬀ’s involvement in legislative assistance. The following hypothesis is put forward
H4c: Staﬀ who follow the work of at least one committee are involved in le-
gislative assistance more frequently than staﬀ who do not follow the work of
committees.
Policy Specialisation & Sub-Hypothesis 4d
Not all committees have the same importance. Given the decision-making procedure,
which is most commonly applied in a committee, it is possible to infer how important
are individual policies. Figure 8.2 shows that committees, which deal with economic and
scientific policies (ENVI, ECON, EMPL, IMCO and ITRE) are more likely to deal with co-
decision (ordinary) legislative files than those in structural (TRAN, CULT, AGRI, REGI
and FISH), citizens (JURI, LIBE, FEMM, AFCO and PETI), foreign (DEVE, INTA,
AFET and DROI) or budgetary (CONT and BUDG) aﬀairs. Consultation dossiers are
most commonly dealt in committees dealing with citizens aﬀairs, following economic, struc-
tural, budget and foreign aﬀairs committees. Based on the distribution of co-decision files
the prediction is:
H4d: Individuals working on economic and scientific policy are involved more
frequently in legislative assistance than others.
Political Specialisation & Sub-Hypothesis 4e
Given the lack of research on political advisors and APAs, nobody has so far tested whether
political groups and MEPs employ human resources diﬀerently given their political spe-
cialisation or ideology. The findings on the US Congress show that there is no significant
diﬀerence in how Republicans and Democrats consult their staﬀ (Malbin, 1980). Whether
diﬀerence exist among the political groups and MEPs in the EP is the final tested hypo-
thesis:
H4e: The involvement of staﬀ in legislative assistance depends on the political
group staﬀ work for.
H4e can only be tested for accredited parliamentary assistants and political advisors whose
work is organised according to structures, which determine a political ideology. Admin-
istrators working in the secretariat are not organised according to political family. This
means that while APAs and political advisors assist exclusively members of one political
group, administrators assist MEPs independently from the political specialisation.
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Figure 8.2: Percentage of Codecision and Consultation Reports by Policy Area
Co-decision (OLP) Consultation
Budget 2.1 %
Foreign 10.7 %
Citizens 23.1 %
Structural 23.9 %
Economic 40.3 %
Budget 9.4 %
Foreign 5.7 %
Citizens 34.9 %
Structural 22.6 %
Economic 27.4 %
N = 629 co-decision reports (Seventh term) N = 106 consultation reports (Seventh term)
Data: Own calculations based on the data in the Legislative Observatory of the EP (OEIL)
Legend: Budgetary Aﬀairs (BUDG & CONT), Foreign Aﬀairs (AFET, INTA & DEVE), Citizens Rights
(FEMM, AFCO, PETI, LIBE & JURI), Structural and Cohesion Aﬀairs (TRAN, CULT, AGRI, REGI &
FISH), Economic and Scientific Aﬀairs (EMPL, ENVI, ECON, ITRE & IMCO)
8.3 Control Variables
In order to estimate the eﬀect of organisational structures a set of other organisational
variables are put in place. These are demography and institutionalisation. One of the
organisational variables reviewed the Chapter 3 was locus, i.e. the physical location of an
organisation. In the present time and case, locus is irrelevant for the administration of the
EP. While initially all the administrative support for the EP was based in Luxembourg,
today MEPs have staﬀ support wherever they are (Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg and
the constituency). The part of the EP administration, which takes care of legislation, is
located in the same location and in one building block in Brussels. Therefore, there is no
space variation between the oﬃces of political groups, MEPs and the central secretariat.
Location would be an important variable to consider in the case of translation staﬀ in Lux-
embourg vis-à-vis legislative staﬀ in Brussels; and MEPs’ local assistants in constituencies
vis-à-vis accredited assistants in Brussels. However, neither linguists nor local assistants
are taken in consideration in this study, since they do not qualify as legislative staﬀ.
8.3.1 Demography
Survey data shows that the average professional doing legislative wok in the EP is a 38 year
old male with citizenship from one of the member states that joined the EU before 2004. He
has a master’s degree in social sciences and did part of his studies in a foreign country. Prior
to joining the EP, he had acquired minimal working experiences. English is the language
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he uses for daily communication with his colleagues in the EP. This characterisation of the
average staﬀ member gives little indication of the varied background one can find in the
EP. The following paragraphs present more details on the demographic attributes of staﬀ
in the EP.
Gender Based on oﬃcial data, the EP employs more women (58 per cent) than men (42
per cent) if the total of all the employees, including translators and secretaries (i.e. AST
and AST/AC categories of employees) is taken in consideration (European Parliament,
2013f). On the contrary, the majority of the professionals in the sample doing legislative
work are men (52 per cent). It can be said that the gender representation of legislative
staﬀ is balanced, even if slightly in favour to men. While gender balance is achieved in
legislative work, other areas seem to be over-represented by women. Among the diﬀerent
administrative groups, the representative gap between female and men is the highest among
administrators (39 per cent female), followed by political advisors (42 per cent women).
Women make up the majority (55 per cent) of MEPs’ APAs. Women and men are fairly
equally represented in the hierarchy of the EP. The gender situation and the distribution
of rank responsibilities make the EP a fairly equal opportunity employer.
Age In terms of age most of the professionals working in the EP, 64 per cent, are less
than forty years of age. This makes the staﬀ of the EP a young administration and
similar to the US Congress (Fox and Hammond, 1977), but diﬀerent compared to European
parliamentary administration (for example in France the average age is 48 years old and
only one fifth of oﬃcials in the central administration are less than forty years of age). In
the EP there are diﬀerences among administrators, political advisors and parliamentary
assistants. The majority of the latter tend to be on average in their late twenties and
early thirties and, thus, younger that administrators and political advisors. The average
age of APAs surveyed for this study is 33.5 years, and more than half of them are actually
younger than that. Administrators and political advisors are on average ten years older
than APAs. Administrators tend to be older than political advisors, but the diﬀerence is
a few months and therefore negligible. More than half of all the administrators and nearly
half of all the political advisors are more than 41 years old, while this is true for only
twelve per cent of the APAs. Despite the youthfulness of legislative staﬀ - parliamentary
assistants in particular - individuals of all ages occupy the diﬀerent positions in the EP
(i.e. the minimum age is between 25 and 26, while the maximum age is between 63 and
65). There is a perception that the job of a parliamentary assistant is a job for young
professionals (Michon, 2014). However, the survey shows that there are cases where MEPs
hire assistants, which are more than 30 years old.
Tenure Age is important because it is an indicator of someone’s professional experiences,
which is in turn related to someone’s tenure in an organisation and exposure to organisa-
tional socialisation. As expected, assistants spend on average the least time in employment
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in the EP (less than four years or one full mandate). On the contrary to parliamentary
assistants, political advisors show a greater tenure (on average ten years), which is similar
to the one of administrators (on average nine years of experience in the EP). While about
fifty per cent of parliamentary assistants have at least three years of working experience in
the EP, the majority of administrators and political advisors have more than seven years
of experience.
Experience Staﬀ were asked to respond to a series of questions asking them about their
employment history (see Table 8.2). More than three quarters of all the surveyed staﬀers
came to work for the EP with some prior job experience. The most common job experience
is work in the private sector, followed by work in the national government and other public
or semi-public institution. A majority of administrators has also the experience of working
for another EU institution than the EP, which is atypical for political advisors and APAs.
A very small minority of legislative staﬀ has been involved in international organisations
other than the EU.
Table 8.2: Job Experiences
Prior working experience in... % (N of total
responses)
Private organisations 81 (135)
Government 58 (137)
Public or semi public institutions 56 (127)
EU institution other that EP 39 (116)
Political party 31 (106)
Other position in the EP 142 (346)
EP Mobility Since there are plenty of mobility opportunities within the EP, respondents
were asked whether they ever occupied any another job position in the EP. The answers
show that two fifths of the professional staﬀ have changed positions in the EP. Mobility
within the EP is more likely for administrators and political advisors than parliamentary
assistants. None of the APAs, which responded to the survey, has ever worked for the
general secretariat.
Partisanship The survey included two questions to asses the political ideology of staﬀ.
The first one asked them whether they had ever worked for a political party. The second
one asked them whether they had ever been a member of one (see Table 8.3). The results
show, that those who have been employed by a political party at any time in the past are
also more likely to be members of a political party and the opposite.5 This relationship
is stronger for administrators and assistants than political advisors.6 However, a greater
number of political group advisors are members of a party compared to administrators
and assistants. Around two fifths of political advisors and APAs had been employed in a
5Correlation coeﬃcient is 0.49 (p < 0.01).
6Based on the Cramér’s V coeﬃcient.
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political party prior to coming to the EP compared to one fifth of administrators. As in
the case of employment, only one fifth of administrator claim to be members of a political
party. On the contrary, 67 per cent of political advisors and 46 per cent of assistants
are members of a political party. It seems that membership in a political party is more
common than employment. However the results on membership and employment indicate
a similar pattern: political advisors and assistants show a greater political involvement
through employment and membership in a political party than administrators.
Table 8.3: Employment and Membership in Political Parties
Employment Membership
No Yes Total No Yes Total % (N)
Secretariat admin. % 78 22 100 (37) 80 20 100 (95)
Political advisors % 39 61 100 (23) 33 67 100 (54)
Accredited assistants % 38 62 100 (39) 54 46 100 (160)
Total % (N) 68 (67) 32 (32) 100 (99) 42 (128) 59 (181) 100 (309)
Education Training refers to the level of education attained and the subject studied.
The EP mostly recruits people with at least a bachelor degree. In the past, most of
the employees were lawyers, while social sciences professions are now becoming every day
more important (Georgakakis and Lassale, 2013). Given the results of the survey, a large
majority of legislative staﬀ, 78 per cent, has a master’s degree (see Table 8.4). Based on
the collected data administrators holds degrees of higher specialisation than APAs and
political advisors. None of the administrators is employed on a high school diploma, as it
is also required by the conditions of employment. A large majority, 73 per cent, has also
studied abroad.
Most of the staﬀ hold either a degree in law (26 per cent) or social sciences (39 per cent)
(Table 8.5). The most common training for administrators is law, while political advisors
and APAs have most commonly a background in social sciences. Georgakakis and Lassale
(2004) have observed that the profession of economist is on the rise in the Commission. Of
those surveyed in the EP, 16 per cent were trained in economics. Another 14 per cent were
trained in arts and humanities. It appears that training in the EP has a social science and
legal orientation, rather than an economic one.
Even less represented are the professions requiring training in engineering, life sciences,
math and physics. This indicates that there is predominant generalist orientation, rather
than a specialistic one. In one of the interviews an administrator described in the following
way the profile of an average EP staﬀ: ‘In the parliament I would say there are, except for
a very few specialised units, mostly generalists, even in the committee secretariats. You
have to be normally a generalist, because you are covering several topics at the same time,’
(Interview A, 2012).
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Table 8.4: Level of Education
Level Administrators
%
Advisors % Assistants % Total %
(N)
High school 0 6 2 2 (8)
Bachelor’s degree 6 23 13 13 (43)
Master’s degree 78 68 81 78 (267)
Doctoral degree 16 3 4 7 (26)
Total % (N) 100 (107) 100 (57) 100 (164) 100 (328)
Table 8.5: Educational Training
Training Administrators % Advisors % Assistants % Total % (N)
Social Sciences 27 45 46 38 (91)
Law 40 22 19 28 (66)
Economics & Business 16 8 18 15 (36)
Arts & Humanities 11 17 15 14 (33)
Other 5 8 2 5 (12)
Total % (N) 100 (92) 100 (60) 100 (90) 100 (242)
Citizenship Recruitment in the EU is open to all the nationals from EU member states.
Hence, the EP is an organisation employing individuals from 28 diﬀerent countries. As a
rule, people working in the EP are there to work for the EP and MEPs rather than their
countries of origin. Even though not formally acknowledged, the hiring policy of the EU
takes into consideration the citizenship of candidates. The composition of staﬀ is supposed
to be proportional to the population of member states. This implies that most of the staﬀ
should have German, French, British or Italian citizenship. The representation of diﬀerent
nationalities in this study follows the above-mentioned population pattern to a large extent
(see Figure 8.3). Most of the legislative staﬀers come from countries that acceded the EU
before 2004. However, this might be due to a low response rate from citizens of countries
that joined the EU in and after 2004.
If the EU is divided into four geographical regions, then we see that legislative staﬀ
are mostly from the west (36 per cent) and south (28 per cent). While the representation
of the north makes up almost for one quarter of legislative staﬀ, the number of staﬀ from
the east lags behind (13 per cent). Twelve per cent of all the respondents has also dual-
citizenship. There are no significant variation in terms of citizenship representation among
and between administrators, political advisors and APAs.
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Figure 8.3: Citizenship
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8.3.2 Institutionalisation
When invoking institutionalisation one refers to all practices that are unwritten, but ob-
served by the members of the organisation. Institutionalisation is a multi-dimensional
concept, where in order to measure it, it is desirable to use multiple indicators. As a res-
ult, institutionalisation is a diﬃcult concept to operationalise (Egeberg, 2004, p. 206). In
previous research institutionalisation has been operationalised as an attitude and most of
the literature on the EU has treated it as a dependent rather than an independent variable
(e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005; Lewis 2005).
In this study institutionalisation is operationalized as an independent attitudinal vari-
able. It has been observed that individuals in the EP widely share the concern for
Europe/EU (Egeberg et al., 2013). This is corroborated by research on other EU insti-
tutions (Shore, 2000; Georgakakis and Lassale, 2007; Cini, 1996). Moreover, the concern
over Europe/EU is supposed to be specific for the EU’s administration compared to na-
tional civil services, where such concern is uncommon (Hooghe, 2012). Staﬀ might be
concerned for Europe/EU, also due to the fact that the same concern is enshrined in the
treaties and staﬀ regulations as a norm of conduct. On the assumption that, the concern
for Europe/EU is shared among the majority of the administrative players in the EP, the
concern for Europe/EU is considered an institutional value.
The study of public administration behaviour is rich with indicators, which measures
similar concepts, such as loyalty, public service motivation (PSM) and commitment. The
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concept of PSM has in recent years been applied to many European national administra-
tions (Hondeghem and Vandenabeele, 2005; Vandenabeele et al., 2006; Vandenabeele and
Walle, 2008; Giauque et al., 2010) and an attempt has been done also for the European
Commission (Vandenabeele and Ban, 2009). This study draws from this literature to se-
lect indicators for expressing the institutionalised value of concern for the EP/EU. What
is claimed is that in the absence of a reliable measurement of institutionalisation, these
statements oﬀer an approximation for the empirical estimation whether institutional values
aﬀect administrative behaviour in the EP. Table 8.6 presents the selected indicators.
Table 8.6: Institutionalisation
Respondents that agreed or strongly agreed with the
following statements:
% (Total N of
responses)
Attitude 1: Serving the European public interest is an important
drive in my daily life (at work or outside work).
79 (265)
Attitude 2: What I do should contribute to the welfare of
European citizens.
87 (334)
Attitude 3: To me, serving the European public interest is more
important than helping individual persons.
34 (330)
8.4 Concluding Remarks
On the basis of organisation theory, this chapter has formulated and operationalized hypo-
theses in order to explore the behaviour of legislative staﬀ in the EP. In order to test the
above-mentioned sub-hypotheses, the chapter has described the organisational structures
that are likely to aﬀect the behaviour of legislative staﬀ in the EP: rank, administrative
aﬃliation, functional specialisation policy specialisation and political aﬃliation. Besides
these five structures, there are other formal ways in which the work of legislative staﬀ is
organised, but are not included in this study. For example, it is not sensible to include or-
ganisational structures such as full/part working time, because the majority of staﬀ in the
EP is employed for full time (European Parliament, 2013e; European Parliament, 2013f).
While it would be interesting to see how secondment in the EP from national adminis-
tration influences behaviour, quantitatively it is not possible due to the small amount of
seconded oﬃcials in the EP compared to the European Commission. Similarly, there not
enough observations for a meaningful statistical analysis on contract staﬀ in the EP. One
could also include the geographical location of one’s place of employment, as it has been
demonstrated that diﬀerent locations influence behaviour (Kuus, 2011). However, given
the fact that the population of legislative staﬀ is based in the Brussels building near Place
du Luxembourg, location is not taken into consideration. Therefore, the study takes into
account the organisational structures, which are statistically observable and theoretically
relevant.
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Table 8.7: Summary of Horizontal Specialisation
Variables Definitions Values (N of observations)
Administrative
aﬃliation
Administrative aﬃliation
inside the EP
Nominal:
Administrators in the Secretariat (N = 127)
Political groups’ advisors (N = 72)
Accredited parliamentary assistants (N = 192)
Dummies:
Administrators in the Secretariat (Yes = 127, No =
124)
Political groups’ advisors (Yes = 72, No = 319)
Accredited parliamentary assistants (Yes = 192, No
= 199)
Functional
Specialisation
Do you follow the work of
at least one committee?
Yes (N = 327)
No (N = 52)
Secretariat administrators
working in one of the
committee secretariats
Yes (N = 71)
No (N = 51)*
Policy
specialisation
Main working area Nominal:
Economic and scientific policy (N = 96)
Structural and cohesion policy (N = 52)
Citizens rights and legal aﬀairs (N = 56)
Budgetary aﬀairs (N = 35)
Foreign aﬀairs (N = 63)
Dummies:
Economic and scientific policy (Yes = 96, No = 205)
Structural and cohesion policy (N = 52, No = 249)
Citizens rights and legal aﬀairs (N = 56, No = 245)
Budgetary aﬀairs (N = 35, No = 266)
Foreign aﬀairs (N = 63, No = 239)
Political
specialisation**
Political ideology of MEP
or political group
Nominal:
EPP (N = 69)
S&D (N = 64)
ALDE (N = 40)
Green/EFA (N = 37)
ECR (N = 15)
GUE/NGL (N = 11)
EFD (N = 10)
NA (N = 8)
Dummies:
EPP (Yes = 69, No = 185)
S&D (Yes = 64, No = 190)
ALDE (Yes = 40, No = 214)
Green/EFA (Yes = 37, No = 217)
Centre (EPP, S&D, ALDE) (N = 173) ***
Left wing (GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA) (N = 48)
Right wing (ECR, EFD) (N = 25)
Notes: * The No value includes secretariat oﬃcials working in policy departments (N = 21), legal service
(N = 11), delegations to third countries (N = 8) and other departments (e.g. STOA, IMPA, EAVA) (N =
11). **Applicable only for respondents who revealed the name of the political family of their employer,
i.e. APAs and political advisors. *** Based on the most common voting coalitions between 14 July 2009
and 14 June 2013 as calculated by votewatch.eu.
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Table 8.8: Summary of Demography
Variables Values (N of observations)
Age x¯ = 39, sd = 9.8, min = 25, max = 65, N = 313
Experience x¯ = 6.9 sd = 6.7, min = 0.33, max = 33.42, N = 351
Prior experience in
the EP
Yes (N = 146)
No (N = 200)
Gender Female ( N = 150)
Male (N = 175)
Citizenship based
on enlargements
Citizens from member states before the 2004 enlargement (N = 241)
Citizens from members who joined in 2004, 2007 and 2013 (N = 60)
Region of origin* South (Italy, Spain, Croatia, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Malta,
Slovenia; N = 83)
North (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Sweden, UK; N = 69)
West (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands; N = 111)
East (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia; N = 38)
Area of education Law (N = 66)
Social sciences (N= 91)
Arts and humanities (N = 33)
Other (N = 12)
Level of education Master and Doctorate (N = 293)
Bachelor and High School (N= 51)
Party membership Member of a political party (N = 135)
Not a member of a political party (N =185)
Note: * Based on the geographical division of Europe of the United Nations, ECOSOC (2013).
Chapter 9
Legislative Assistance as Behaviour
While the previous chapter has presented the independent variables, the following one
focuses on developing the dependent variable, which is legislative assistance. Defining
and subsequently measuring legislative assistance serves two purposes. First, it enables
the comparison of diﬀerent administrative players in the EP following the sub-hypotheses
formulated in the previous chapter. Second, it allows exploring what it means to assist
members of parliament. Section 8.1 stated that one of the reasons to employ organisation
theory is its usefulness to explore assistance to MEPs. This chapter is mainly about
this contribution, i.e. the exploration of staﬀ’s activities. Subsequently, the definition and
operationalisation of legislative assistance allows testing the hypothesis that organisational
structures aﬀect staﬀ’s behaviour (Chapter 10).
9.1 The Argument
Not a lot is known about legislative assistance as a type of behaviour, which makes it an
undefined concept. The main argument in seeking to define legislative assistance is that
we need to take into account the multiplicity of administrative actors and the complex
character of legislative tasks. So far scholars have conducted research based on individual
tasks and administrative players. For the most part, legislative assistance is understood as
drafting reports and amendments together with a member of parliament (e.g. Winzen 2011;
Marshall 2012; Dobbels and Neuhold 2013). Reports and amendments are considered to
be central tasks through which the EP can exercise influence on EU legislation (e.g. Bowler
and Farrell 1995; Kreppel 2002; Ringe 2010). Drafting assistance is especially important
when considering the inclusion rate of EP’s amendments into EU law. The majority of
amendments the EP suggests are, in fact, included in an unchanged or modified form into
EU’s final legal acts (Chalmers et al., 2010, p. 106).
Complex Tasks While drafting reports and amendments are possibly the most prom-
inent legislative tasks, they are by no means the only activities through which legislation
is prepared. For example, participating in negotiations, providing research material and
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selecting witnesses for hearings are tasks, which staﬀ can be asked to do and which can po-
tentially impact legislation. Moreover, it has been pointed out that tasks that are presum-
ably technical (e.g. the preparation of voting lists or preparing the agenda for committee
meetings) can also have a substantive eﬀect on legislation (Winzen, 2011). For example,
voting items are ordered based on their distinctness from the original proposal. MEPs vote
first on amendments or paragraphs, which change the original text the most. Putting into
order voting items is deemed a technicality. However, if one of the first amendments is
adopted, then all subsequent amendments are rejected. Hence, the order of voting items
can potentially also aﬀect the outcome of legislation (Interview Y, 2013).
One can argue also the opposite. Tasks that are deemed substantive can turn out to be
of little consequence for legislation. This can be the case of amendments, which any MEP
can table in the first reading of a Commission’s proposal. While the inclusion rate of EP’s
amendments into EU law is relatively high, not all of MEPs’ amendments are considered in
plenary. Taking as an example the last revision of the General Data Protection Regulation
(2012/0011 COD), we see that more than four thousands amendments were tabled in
committee. However, only 196 amendments were proposed in the committee report tabled
for plenary. The amendments tabled for plenary are basically compromises that a majority
in parliament - and the Council in cases of early agreements - is likely to adopt. Hence,
through negotiations MEPs weed out certain amendments and decrease the relevancy of
drafting assistance.
Multiple Actors Most of the information on the type of tasks that staﬀ perform de-
rives from research that has primarily studied the role of committee oﬃcials and thus
excluded the specific roles of other administrative players in the EP. The assumption is
that committees are at the centre of the legislative process. Consequently, committee staﬀ
are assumed to be the most important actors in assisting MEPs (Marshall, 2012, pp. 3-5;
Neuhold and Dobbels 2014, p. 2; Winzen, 2011, p. 28). However, legislative staﬀ is not
a synonym for committee staﬀ. Or at least oﬃcials of committee secretariats are not the
only administrative actors to actually work in committee. Legislative staﬀ encompasses
all those individuals who are employed in parliament to assist members of parliament in
decision-making, controlling of the executive (i.e. Commission) and formulating legislation.
As described in Part I there is today a market of information within the EP. A multitude
of administrative actors have existed since the establishment of political groups’ secretariats
in 1953 and the introduction of the staﬀ allowance in 1974. However, political advisors and
accredited assistants did not always have the resources to work on legislative proposals.
For example, in the beginning MEPs’ assistants were not allowed to attend committee
meetings. Through the improvement of working conditions the role of these administrative
players rose. The central secretariat has been reformed as well. Aside from the traditional
committee secretariats, the EP administration consists of specialised units for research and
legal advice.
Due to the professionalisation of services, the role of administrative players has diver-
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sified. Some staﬀ might be involved in one activity, while others might be called upon for
other tasks. For example, assistants might be more likely to conduct research and contrib-
ute to policy ideas than others. As a result, the role of respective administrative actors has
to be considered in relation to one another and in respect to a multitude of activities. To
analyse the role of legislative staﬀ it is important to take into account of the multiplicity
of actors in the EP and to define legislative assistance in the broadest way possible.
In order to do so, two quantitative measurements for legislative assistance are developed
on the basis of original data (see Chapter 4). The first measurement consists of individual
task or items, which were discerned from interview data based on a content analysis. The
frequency of each task was assessed with a survey. Overall thirteen tasks were examined to
account for the work complexity in the EP. The second measurement consists of a selected
number of tasks gathered into a scale. The operationalisation of legislative assistance with
a scale is the biggest advantage of the study. Probing into the behaviour of staﬀ with an
alternative measure, such as the scale of legislative assistance can show the robustness of
the most recent findings. In order to obtain the scale a principal component factor analysis
(PCA) was carried out.
Two diﬀerent measures are used, because when drawing conclusions on individual tasks,
the validity of the analysis is at best unknown. In other words, are drafting amendments or
reports the only activities aﬀecting legislation in the EP? Or are there other tasks, which
should be taken into consideration? Analysing data with PCA solves this problem, since
a number of items is selected into a component. The selection of items takes into account
the statistical importance of an individual item in relation to other items. Together these
items underlie a latent dimension of legislative assistance, which can be measured with a
scale variable. PCA allows us to observe a series of tasks that are by frequency central
to legislative assistance. It has the advantage of simplifying the analysis by reducing data
compared to reporting results for individual variables (Kline, 1994, p. 39).
Comparing staﬀ on diﬀerent tasks and dimensions has also future applicability. For
example, we know that in the past, administrators of the EP’s general secretariat have very
often drafted entire reports for rapporteurs and MEPs. While this is not as common as it
used to be, secretariat administrators might carry out other activities in which they are
of the outmost importance for MEPs. Similar changes are likely to happen in the future
given the most recent reforms restructuring the role of accredited assistants and research
staﬀ (see Section 7.6). For the moment and given the existing research, the comparisons
that can be drawn with the past are based on vague definitions and exploratory work.
Re-administering the survey to obtain panel data and replicating PCA could accurately
detect changes.
The remaining of the chapter is structured in the following way: the first part of
the chapter (Section 9.2) is dedicated to the presentation of the individual items serving
as indicators of legislative assistance. The second part (Section 9.3) then presents the
development of the scale.
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9.2 Legislative Tasks
The tasks of legislative staﬀ in the EP were identified based on semi-structured interviews
and the content analysis thereof (see Section 4.2.1). In order to facilitate analysis interview
data were coded. Seven diﬀerent first level thematic codes were used. The codes indicated
the job profile respondents were describing (Table 9.1). Some of these codes were then
further broken down given the tasks’ characteristic. Table 9.2 gives examples of the tasks
that were derived from the analysis of interviews. Following this procedure thirteen tasks
were identified:
• Provide advice on parliamentary procedures
• Provide legal advice
• Provide advice on the line to take on a policy (e.g. Advise MEPs on how to vote,
argument in favour of a position, assess if there is a majority, etc.)
• Contribute to policy ideas (e.g. Develop policy solutions/alternatives, etc.)
• Research (e.g. Draft briefings/background notes/studies, etc.)
• Draft amendments (Including compromise amendments)
• Draft legislative or own-initiative reports
• Negotiate with political groups
• Negotiate with Commission/Council/Presidency
• Coordinate MEPs positions (e.g. Find a compromise, etc.)
• Prepare voting lists (e.g. Position amendments/other voting items, etc.)
• Organise (e.g. Schedule meetings, prepare timetables, info circulation, etc.)
• Attend meetings
Figure 9.1 shows the frequency results obtained with the survey for each administrative
group in the EP and for all staﬀ together. Each column in the graphs is understood as an
activity or indicator of legislative assistance.
9.3 The Activity of Legislative Assistance
9.3.1 Principal Component Factor Analysis
Legislative assistance is defined not only on individual items, but also as a composite
phenomenon of diﬀerent indicators. In order to obtain such a composite measure a principal
component factor analysis (PCA) was carried out on tasks listed in Section 9.2. The
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Table 9.1: Coding
First level code Second level code
Advisor On what topic? Parliament procedure, Legal issues,
Politics, Policy, Vote
Negotiator With whom? Political groups, Institutions
Drafter What? Reports, Amendments, Other
Communicator With whom? Media, Public
Researcher or Informer Of what? Research material, New ideas, Meetings
Organiser Of what? Events, Travel
Coordinator of MEPs positions
Translator
Figure 9.1: Frequent and Very Frequent Tasks
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(1) Legislative staff (Cumulative)
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(4) APAs
Note: The number of observation for each task and category of staﬀ is reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 9.2: Examples of Interview Analysis
Survey items Examples in interview data
Prepare voting lists ‘The secretariat prepares the voting list, but it is me and the political advisors
who indicate the minuses and pluses.’ Interview M, 2012
‘You have to do the positioning of the amendments, how will they go logically,
it is not so automatically as it always looks. On the basis on how you position
the amendments you do the voting list.’ Interview A, 2012
Provide advice on
parliamentary
procedures
‘A very important function of administrators working in committee secretariats
is to prepare voting lists, to decide which amendments to be put to vote first,
when are compromise amendments, how they are being drafted, when are
splits votes allowed, when are oral amendments allowed etc.’ Interview B, 2012
‘Normally he has the ideas, he writes the report and you know the procedures.’
Interview L, 2012
Provide legal
advice
‘You have to know all the legal rules on legislation, what kind of procedure it is,
do we go towards a codecision for example, things like that.’ Interview G, 2012
‘Then our legal service was involved in drafting compromises, so the
Directorate for Legislative acts. They are basically lawyer linguists and they
are always involved.’ Interview B, 2012
‘The MEP was a lawyer by profession as well and she wanted to know the legal
implications of what was being adopted. So we had a lot of discussions on the
legal aspect, not just political implications per se.’ Interview I, 2012
Contribute to
policy ideas
‘I am supposed to contribute with ideas. So I would propose issues that should
be raised, should be changed or should be deleted or change places.’
Interview G, 2012
‘I can identify topics, where he could amend.’ Interview G, 2012
‘I would discuss with her: “I think think the policy is moving this way, I think
maybe the PES will do this and this, we don’t have a majority whatever... Or
there are special lobby groups that think this.” As I got to know here it was
becoming less factual and more my perception of the things.’ Interview I, 2012
‘We organise the agendas, but we go to the substance.’ Interview K, 2012
Provide advice on
the line to take
on a policy
‘With all this information we advise the way to go [...] whether to go this way
or the other way and having the knowledge and the capacity to explain why
not this way, but it is better this way.’ Interview G, 2012
‘So a group adviser you know, he must have a position, he must have an
opinion, he must dare to pronounce it, to fight for it, even if it is sometimes
against certain members’ will.’ Interview K, 2012
‘I can prepare a note, where I explain which is the line that should be the line
that he [the MEP] should take.’ Interview G, 2012
‘The MEP makes the political decision. He does not look at the technicality.
So, you have to explain to him what it means to choose between A or B and
what are the consequences.’ Interview M, 2012
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Table 9.2: Examples of Interview Analysis - continued
Survey items Examples in interview data
Negotiate with
political groups
‘Well in a political group when you are a political adviser your job is twofold.
One part is to advice to do the right policy, to develop the policy. The second
part is to make sure that this policy finds a majority in the house.’
Interview C, 2012
‘Before the vote you do the compromise, amendments within the committee
with other groups, because you have the shadow and other political groups
within the committee.’ Interview A, 2012
Negotiate with
Commission,
Council, Presidency
‘Some negotiations skills are quite essential to advice the rapporteur and the
chairman during the negotiations both with the Council, with the Presidency.
But also let’s say when negotiating compromises with the groups if you are
required to give advice.’ Interview B, 2012
‘Because after the vote has been taken in the committee, you have to do the
trialogues, you do negotiations.’ Interview A, 2012
Draft reports ‘My task was to work for him [MEP] for the preparation of the reports.’
Interview J, 2012
‘Own-initiative reports are more creative. You can write a lot.’ Interview A,
2012
‘Well, I didn’t write one, but almost. Yes, I did one with an assistant and we
clearly wrote both of us the whole report. So I went beyond the tasks of just
giving ideas.’ Interview G, 2012
Draft amendments ‘And then you really sit down with them and you do the compromises, you
really draft them together.’ Interview A, 2012
‘And one of the jobs in the secretariat is to identify the articles on which you
received the most amendments and try to find some possible draft compromise
and for that you have to be quick.’ Interview H, 2012
Coordinate MEPs
positions
‘I do everything [...] to ensure that we can develop a coherent position in the
group. And work with the President to ensure that that happens.’
Interview N, 2012
‘I coordinate, because I am the link between the member, the political advisors
and the technical part of the secretariat.’ Interview M, 2012
‘I tell him [the MEP] that I met with the Liberals, Socialists and Greens and
that the assistant of the liberals has told me this, that of socialists has
diﬀerent concerns...’ Interview M, 2012
‘So what we do, we call all these draftsmen from diﬀerent committees on our
side, put them together in a room and we develop a joint position.’
Interview K, 2012
176 CHAPTER 9. LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE AS BEHAVIOUR
Table 9.2: Examples of Interview Analysis - continued
Survey items Examples in interview data
Research ‘As we know the topics in advance, that allows me to have a first contact and
knowing where problems are, where big problems will lie, how diﬀerent
delegations behave even before the proposal is coming...’ Interview G, 2012
‘The administrator has to go to the sort of factual eﬀects of legislation,
whether it is going to be good legislation, whether it will sort of serve the
purpose and fit well into the whole context, whether it will find a majority,
how it will be taken up or criticised by Council.’ Interview G, 2012
‘You do your own research and whatever you know. . . You actually have to do
a lot of research for a report.’ Interview A, 2012
‘I had to do briefings on various subjects.’ Interview B, 2012
Organise ‘So this part takes up drafting letters, authorisation, checking interpretation
requirements, checking whether the room is available...’ Interview B, 2012
‘You are supposed to know how to administratively manage the committee.’
Interview L, 2012
‘They [MEPs] can ask you to set up meetings.’ Interview A, 2012
‘You have to follow the agenda concerning Brussels, because in the
constituency there is obviously another assistant.’ Interview M, 2012
Attend meetings ‘I would go to a meeting, I would take notes.’ Interview I, 2012
assumption underlying PCA was that the survey items measuring how frequently staﬀ
perform diﬀerent tasks, are all composite measures of legislative assistance. The plausibility
of this argument is based on the fact that the survey questions were derived from the
analysis of interviews with EP staﬀ. In addition, when the survey was carried out, the
sampling criteria specifically targeted staﬀ in the EP whose work is related to committees,
policy departments, legal service and related services.
Procedure In this study, PCA identified tasks, which are relevant for legislative assist-
ance in the EP for the time the survey was carried out (i.e. the seventh term of the EP).
The sample included 337 observations, where any record, which included a missing value,
was excluded (i.e. listwise deletion).1 Initially, the factorability of the thirteen items was
examined. All the thirteen items correlated at 0.30 with at least one other item, sug-
gesting reasonable factorability (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). The examination of the
Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) suggested that the sample was
factorable (KMO = 0.84, which is above the commonly suggested value of 0.60). The
communalities (i.e. Uniqueness   1, see the last row in Table 9.3) were all above 0.30,
further confirming that all the items shared some common variance with other items. After
verifications on the statistical sense, PCA results were retained.
1In the beginning there were 391 observations. Due to missing data 54 observation were lost.
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Outcome On the basis of the thirteen variables PCA identified three factors or dimen-
sions. Figure 9.2 shows this as the scree plot starts to level oﬀ with the fourth factor. This
suggests that three factors are needed to account for legislative assistance, while the rest
can be dropped. Initial eigenvalues indicated that the first three factors explained 58 per
cent, 12 per cent and 9 per cent of the variance respectively. Figure 9.2 also shows that
the first factor is clearly dominant. The remaining eleven factors had eigenvalues below
one, and each explained between eight and three per cent of all the variance.
Figure 9.2: Scree Test
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In order to select the items that best represent the dimension of legislative assistance,
the three solutions, which together accounted for 79 per cent of the variance, were then
examined using orthogonal (varimax) and oblique (promax) rotations. The rotation pro-
cedure allows interpreting the factor loadings, which are otherwise the result of algebraic
calculations. In the orthogonal rotation the factors are uncorrelated with each other, while
the oblique rotation allows factors to be correlated. There was little diﬀerence between
the two rotations, but the oblique rotation showed more clearly a simple structure (Kline,
1994, pp. 65-68). A simple structure means that each factor has a few high loadings (over
0.40) with the rest of the loadings being zero or close to zero (between ±0.10) (Acock,
2012, p. 344; Gorsuch, 1983, p. 180).
Table 9.3 shows the results from the oblique rotation. After the rotation, Factor 1 had
eight items with a loading above 0.40, while Factor 2 and Factor 3 had only three items
with a loading greater than 0.40. Two items (Items 4 and 9) had a cross-loading above
0.40 (i.e. complex variables). Item 4 had a stronger primary loading on Factor 1, while
Item 9 had a stronger primary loading on Factor 3. Given the dominance of Factor 1 in
terms of explained variance and strong loadings, it was decided that it represents legislative
assistance in the most reliable way. This was also confirmed by calculating the Cronbach’s
alpha. The alpha coeﬃcient for the tasks loading on Factor 1 was 0.88 (see Table 9.4),
while the items on Factors 2 and 3 had an alpha of less than 0.80.
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Table 9.3: Factor Loadings and Communalities (Varimax Rotation)
N Item (Task) Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Uniqueness
1 Provide legal advice -0.20 0.04 0.91 0.25
2 Provide advice on parliamentary
procedures
0.25 0.18 0.62 0.37
3 Provide advice on the line to
take on a policy
0.65 0.22 -0.05 0.45
4 Contribute to policy ideas 0.48 0.38 -0.01 0.48
5 Research -0.05 0.74 -0.08 0.47
6 Draft amendments 0.80 0.05 -0.12 0.38
7 Draft legislative or own-initiative
reports
0.76 -0.07 0.01 0.45
8 Negotiate with political groups 0.78 -0.09 0.11 0.37
9 Negotiate with
Commission/Council/Presidency
0.48 -0.18 0.55 0.34
10 Coordinate MEPs positions 0.80 0.01 0.02 0.34
11 Prepare voting lists 0.80 -0.03 -0.09 0.41
12 Organise 0.06 0.66 -0.07 0.54
13 Attend meetings -0.07 0.73 0.22 0.44
Note: N = 337
Table 9.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Legislative Assistance Scale as a Factor Score
N of items N of obs. Mean SD Min Max Cronbach’s a
Factor 1 7 354 0.00 1.00 -2.45 1.51 0.88
9.3.2 Scale
A scale variable measuring the frequency of involvement in legislative assistance was con-
structed based on the correlation matrix of thirteen tasks and the PCA. The scale was
built in such a way to include only tasks that are the most central to legislative assistance
in the EP. In other words, PCA leads to the selection of tasks, which are most commonly
executed by the same person and weighted the most. As demonstrated in the previous
section, these tasks pertain to the simple structure of Factor 1: oﬀering political or vot-
ing advice, contributing to policy ideas, preparing amendments and reports, participating
in the negotiations with political groups, coordinating MEPs’ positions and preparing of
voting lists.
After the seven tasks were identified to load on one dimension, the scale was constructed
based on factor scores. This means that the ordinal responses on the frequency of tasks were
translated into standardised scores on an interval level. Using factor scores, as opposed to
calculating means, weights each of the tasks diﬀerently based on how central they are to
the first factor. This means that drafting amendments, coordinating MEPs positions and
preparing voting lists (Items 6, 10 and 11 in Table 9.3) with a 0.80 loading are the most
important items weighted on the scale.
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Figure 9.3: Independent Variable: Legislative Assistance (lega)
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Figure 9.3 shows the distribution of the variable, which was named legislative assistance
(i.e. lega in the subsequent analysis). The variable takes values from a minimum of - 2.45
to a maximum of 1.51. Because the values of the original data were standardised the mean
is equal to zero and the standard deviation is one (Table 9.4).
Validity One could argue that by omitting certain tasks, the scale is biased towards one
specific staﬀ segment. At first glance it seems that the scale of legislative assistance priv-
ileges the role of political group advisors over the one of secretariat oﬃcials and accredited
assistants. By excluding tasks such as research, organisation of activities and attendance
of meetings (Factor 2 in Figure 9.3) the scale could underestimate the role of accredited
assistants. Even though accredited assistants perform these tasks more frequently than
anybody else, the diﬀerences are not systematic and in some cases they are small.2 Sim-
ilar reasoning can be applied for the tasks relating to legal and procedural advice and the
assistance in inter-institutional negotiations (Factor 2 in Figure 9.3). While in the case of
legal advice, there are no diﬀerences among staﬀ groups, there are only small diﬀerences
for providing procedural advice. Moreover, participation in negotiations with the EU in-
stitutions is in general an infrequent activity. For these reasons excluding or including
these specific tasks does not bias the outcome. Nevertheless, the exclusions of the tasks
mentioned above increases the reliability of the concept.
Reliability Previous research has mainly focused on analysing legislative staﬀers whose
work is strictly related to committees in the so-called committee secretariats. However,
the exploratory research of this article indicated that legal and research staﬀ in the central
secretariat are also involved in legislative assistance. For this reasons and as shown above,
2For example, parliamentary assistants are only more likely to be involved in the organisation of activ-
ities for MEPs compared to political group advisors, but not compared to secretariat oﬃcials. In a similar
way parliamentary assistants attend meetings more frequently only compared to secretariat staﬀ and not
political groups advisors (see Table 10.2).
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legislative assistance was defined using observations pertaining to committee, research and
legal staﬀ. Since the division of work in MEPs oﬃces and political groups is less formalised
than in the central secretariat, constructing a scale, which includes committee, research
and legal staﬀ can create a bias in favour of political group advisors and APAs. In order
to control if this is the case, a PCA using observations pertaining to committee staﬀ only
was performed.
Taking into account only committee staﬀ produced two factors with satisfactory reliab-
ility. The first factor was composed of tasks measuring the preparation of a legislative text
(i.e. drafting amendments and reports, preparing voting lists). The second factor included
tasks measuring the preparation for the vote (i.e. advice on how to vote, coordination of
MEPs positions and negotiations with political groups). However, while the operational-
isation of legislative assistance changed, the results of the analysis of variance were not
remarkably diﬀerent compared to using the definition of legislative assistance, which in-
cludes committee, legal and research staﬀ. No matter the definition, the role of political
group advisors does not change substantially. When legislative assistance was operation-
alised as the preparation of a legislative text, there were no diﬀerences between committee
staﬀ in political groups and the central secretariat, while the role of APAs diminished in
importance. When legislative assistance was operationalised as the preparation of vote,
the results remained the same compared to the scale of legislative assistance, which takes
into account the committee, legal and research staﬀ.
9.4 Results
9.4.1 Legislative Tasks
Several general findings on the nature and frequency of tasks can be highlighted from the
survey results. Some of these findings relate to the content of tasks, while others are about
their importance in terms of frequency.
Firstly, the survey confirmed the findings of the interview analysis on the type of tasks
EP staﬀ do. Respondents reported that they performed nine out of the thirteen tasks
frequently or very frequently (see Figure 9.1). The fact that more than half of all the tasks
are (very) frequent activities was expected, as survey response options were designed based
on the exploratory interview study (see Section 4.1.1.1).
Secondly, both preliminary interviews and survey data show that tasks are diverse (see
also Egeberg et al., 2013, p. 504). Rare are the activities for which respondents say they are
not (very) frequent working assignments. This means that legislative staﬀers do a variety
of legislative tasks for members and that their jobs are anything but monotonous. The
activities range from more traditional legislative tasks of writing amendments to activities,
which relate to the running of the parliament, such as organising meetings. The diversity
and multiplicity of tasks in which staﬀ are involved is confirmed also by staﬀ’s impressions.
For instance, an administrator in the secretariat observed (Interview B, 2012):
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There is no such a thing as a normal working day in the EP. My working day
can be quite diﬀerent depending whether it is plenary week, committee week,
whether it is the week foreseen for constituency work or for outside delega-
tion travel. I think my work involves a lot of content related work, drafting
documents for the committee, but also drafting all kind of oﬃcial letters, au-
thorisations, forward planning for hearings and committee delegations.
Michael Contes, a parliamentary assistant who has worked for four diﬀerent MEPs since
he started to work in the EP in 1991, shared a similar impression (Interview P, 2013):
You never have exactly the same day. We have of course the same things coming
back at a certain point, but it is never the same. There is a certain rhythm
of meetings, which are then causing contacts and clearly other meetings out of
them, preparation meetings. All these things are coming back, but it is never
the same.
Thirdly, data from the survey shows which tasks are the most or least important in terms
of frequency. In general, it seems that the work of legislative staﬀ in the EP consists mostly
of attending meetings and providing advice either on procedures or policy; while providing
legal counsel is the least common task (see Figure 9.1). That a high number of respondents
feel they spend a significant part of their workdays in meetings is expected given the
nature of the work in parliament, which is based on an exchange of ideas, information
and discussions among politicians, business and civil society and other interest groups.
A secretariat oﬃcial noted the following about meetings with the European Commission
(Interview B, 2012):
I think these meeting are very useful, but we are let’s say a bit strain on our
capacities to attend all of these meetings that we are invited to. But we are
at least trying to be there for the meetings that we consider most important.
You know if we attended all of these working group meetings then we would
probably spend several hours each of us in some of the meetings every week,
which is not always possible.
Besides attending meetings, it is very common for staﬀ to provide procedural guidance
in the case of secretariat oﬃcials, and to oﬀer voting and policy advice in the case of
political group advisors (see also Egeberg et al., 2013, p. 504) and accredited parliamentary
assistants.
9.4.2 Scale Definition
The purpose of the principal component analysis is to identify a cluster of items with
a substantive sense. In this study the cluster consists of tasks in Factor 1: oﬀering polit-
ical or voting advice, contributing to policy ideas, preparing amendments and reports,
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participating in negotiations with political groups, coordinating MEPs’ positions and pre-
paring of voting lists. These tasks were then computed into the scale variable of legislative
assistance.
Technique The principal component analysis identifies clusters of tasks, which are most
commonly performed together. Hence, the variable that has been constructed from PCA’s
results rates high those staﬀers who repeatedly execute the range of tasks in Factor 1. On
the contrary, staﬀers who frequently execute a unique combination of tasks are rated low.
Therefore, the scale variable discerns a prototype of staﬀ that perform a combination of
tasks very frequently. Based on the correlation technique underlying PCA, which discover
association between tasks, one could claim that the scale variable points out the profile of
generalist staﬀer. However, the definition of the scale variable can only be discerned if we
look at the meaning of each task separately. Therefore, the next step to define the scale
variable is to ask how the seven tasks that were identified in Factor 1, relate to legislation
or legislative assistance.
Meaning Two of the most weighted tasks in the scale of legislative assistance relate to
assistance for drafting reports and amendments (Items 6 and 7). Reports and amendments
are formal instruments through which legislation is prepared. In order to prepare these
documents MEPs can turn to a series of actors for policy ideas, including staﬀ (Item 4). The
content of reports and amendments has to be coordinated between MEPs and negotiated
among political groups (Items 10 and 8). In this respect, staﬀ assist negotiations on
technical and political matters (Marshall, 2012). On technical issues agreements might
even be sealed already at the administrative level (i.e. secretary generals, deputies, etc.).
Finally, before any vote takes place, a voting list has to be drawn (Item 11). Political
advisors assist the coordinators of individual political groups in deciding the line that
political groups will take. APAs are less involved in drawing up voting lists and they
mainly review the voting lists prepared by the political groups and highlight votes, where
an MEP might be in conflict with the political line of the group. Secretariat administrators
participate in preparation of the voting lists, where they determine the order of the votes
and take decisions on split votes.
What does not transpire from results is equally important for defining legislative assist-
ance as the tasks that cluster on Factor 1. The presented definition of legislative assistance
does not include supporting tasks, such as organising activities or following meetings and
research. Even though parliament cannot exist without these activities, they are not ne-
cessarily carried out by the same staﬀ, which draft reports, amendments, etc. Factor 1
does not include support in inter-institutional negotiations (Item 9). The fact that negoti-
ations with the EU institutions do not cluster of Factor 1 is surprising. One would expect
that MEPs and political groups use their administrative resources to target resource deficit
vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council.
Several reasons could explain why legislative assistance as the scale variable does not
include support in inter-institutions relations. It might be that MEPs are reluctant to rely
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on staﬀ in negotiations for fear of unwanted information disclosure, as the latter could
hamper the success of talks. However, the qualitative data of this study and previous
research show that staﬀ are involved in inter-institutional negotiations (Egeberg et al.,
2014a). The PCA results could also mean that support in inter-institutional negotiations
is a specialist task. For example, it might be that staﬀ in high oﬃces are the ones who assist
in negotiations with the Commission and Council. As it will be shown in the next chapter
this is not case. Based on the survey data there is no significant statistical indication
that high-standing oﬃcials more frequently assist MEPs in inter-institutional talks than
low-standing staﬀ.
The exclusion of Item 9 from the scale could also be due to the fact that in general
inter-institutional negotiations do not rank as high as other activities in the EP. In other
words, how frequent and how long are inter-institutional negotiations? The frequency
and length of inter-institutional negotiations can impact the possibility of staﬀ to support
politicians in negotiations. Scholarly literature shows that inter-institutional negotiations
are becoming increasingly opaque in the EU. Since 2006, the EU has concluded a majority
of legislative files with the so-called early agreement procedure (Héritier and Reh, 2012,
p. 1138). In early agreement procedures a legislative dossier is agreed through informal
negotiations either in the first reading or early in the second reading. When legislation is
fast-tracked negotiations proceed opaquely and naturally too rapidly for multiple actors
to be involved. This is another possible reason why inter-institutional negotiations do not
cluster on Factor 1.
Overall, it seems that defining legislative assistance in terms of the seven tasks in Factor
1, targets the role of staﬀ in terms of preparing a common position in the house. Therefore,
what is actually measured can be interpreted as the extent legislative staﬀ in the EP are
involved in the preparation of a common position before a formal vote takes place. In
other words, Factor 1 defines legislative assistance as the ensemble of tasks through which
legislation is prepared, negotiated among political groups or MEPs and subsequently voted
upon in committees or the plenary prior to the start of inter-institutional negotiations.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a quantitative measure for legislative assistance as a type of
behaviour. The main diﬃculty in defining legislative assistance is the scarce literature.
Selecting indicators is risky without in-depth knowledge and firmly grounded theory. The
quantitative measurement had to be developed almost from nothing. For this reason, a
preliminary study consisting of interviews was carried out. On this basis, several indicators
pertaining to the concept of legislative assistance were identified. Each of these indicators
describes a task that legislative staﬀ perform. However, individual tasks were deemed
insuﬃcient for accurately measuring legislative assistance. Measures, which are based on
individual tasks, can be biased when comparing diﬀerent groups of people. In addition,
legislative assistance is a subjective concept, which is better to measure with more than one
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indicator. For these reasons, the individual tasks were scrutinised for an underlying pattern
and a scale was built. The scale does not only provide a reliable measure, but it also reduces
data and thus facilitates the generalisation of the observed phenomenon. Ultimately, the
scale helps to acquire a more detailed understanding of legislative assistance as a type of
behaviour. The scale defines legislative assistance as the preparation of a common position
before a formal vote takes place in the EP. In the subsequent chapter this definition is
employed in regression analysis. For the sake of simplicity the text refers to the scale as
legislative assistance without further specifying the interpretation.
Chapter 10
Does Organisation Matter?
This chapter provides the analysis and findings of the empirical equation set up and opera-
tionalised in Chapters 8 and 9. On the basis of cross-tabulation and regression techniques,
the chapter provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 4, which stipulates that organisa-
tional structures are the main drivers of legislative staﬀ’s behaviour in the EP:
H4: The organisational structure of legislative assistance aﬀects the behaviour
of legislative staﬀ.
Chapter 8 has identified five components of the organisational structure in the EP: job
rank, administrative aﬃliation, functional specialisation, policy specialisation and polit-
ical specialisation. A hypothesis has been put forward for each of the components or
organisational structures (for a summary see Table 10.1).
To provide evidence for the hypotheses, the chapter is structured as follows: Section
10.1 presents cross-tabulation results and Section 10.2 reviews the five sub-hypotheses
based on regression analysis. At first a series of reduced form regressions are performed to
assess individually the components of the organisational structure in the EP without the
control variables (Section 10.2.1). Second, the full model consisting of the five organisa-
tional structures and the control variables in regressed (Section 10.2.2). Throughout the
texts ‘base cases’ are often referred to for explaining regression results. A base case is an
Table 10.1: Sub-Hypotheses
H4a Involvement in legislative assistance increases with the job rank.
H4b Administrators employed in the general secretariat are involved more frequently
in legislative assistance than the political advisors working for political groups
and accredited parliamentary assistants.
H4c Staﬀ who follow the work of at least one committee are involved more frequently
in legislative assistance than staﬀ who do not follow the work of committees.
H4d Individuals working on economic and scientific policy are involved more
frequently in legislative assistance than others.
H4e The involvement of staﬀ in legislative assistance depends on the political group
staﬀ work for.
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arbitrarily selected value of an independent dummy variable. It serves as a benchmark to
observe the relative diﬀerence between two cases (i.e. the base case and the dummy relative
to the base case) on the dependent variable.
10.1 Task Variation
Cross-tabulation was carried out in order to investigate the co-variation of tasks given
organisational structures (see Section 4.2.1.1). Table 10.2 provides an overview of all those
relationships for which data indicated a statistical significance at least at ten per cent.1
The dividing lines in the table separate organisational structures from variables measuring
demography and institutionalisation. This representation is an attempt to show how or-
ganisational structures influence tasks to a greater extent than the latter two. While 19 out
of 29 relationships between individual tasks and organisational structures are statistically
significant at the one per cent level, this is the case only for 13 out of 41 relationships for
demography and zero for institutionalisation.2 In the upper part of Table 10.2 there are
only five relationships significant at ten per cent, while in the lower part there are 13 such
relationships. The statistical importance of organisational structures over demography and
institutionalisation is confirmed also in relative terms.3 Table 10.2 also shows that tasks
vary mostly with the functional specialisation (i.e. whether staﬀ follow the work of a com-
mittee) and administrative aﬃliation (i.e. secretariat administrators, political advisors or
APAs). Out of thirteen tasks, twelve and ten tasks vary with the functional specialisation
and administrative aﬃliation respectively.
Amendments The most co-variation is recorded for drafting amendments, which is a
(very) frequent activity for 65 per cent of all the staﬀ. APAs, staﬀ following the work of at
least one committee, those with experience in the private sector and females are more likely
to draft amendments than others. The finding on the APAs is confirmed also by Corbett
et al. (2007, p. 134) and more generally by the interviewees in this study. The results have
to be interpreted with caution. While APAs are the ones to draft the greatest number of
amendments, political group advisors and administrators in the general secretariat perform
other functions in drafting amendments, which are not related to the number of amend-
ments or writing frequency. Political advisors are the ones that identify compromise within
and among the political groups and they are responsible to draft compromise amendments
1The method is described on page 66.
2Including a greater number of demography indicators could deflate the importance of organisational
structures. In order to avoid this, I compared the same number of demography and organisational structures
indicators, where only the best performing demography characteristics were included. The results confirm
the importance of organisational variables over demography ones.
3The relative importance of organisational (Organisational), demography (Demography) and institu-
tionalisation (Institutionalisation) variables is calculated with an index, where the number of significant
relationships (Nsig.r.) was divided by the number of independent variables measuring organisational struc-
tures, demography or institutionalisation (Nvar.). The lower the index, the less statistically important
was a variable: Index = Nsig.r./Nvar.. Organisational = 29/5 = 5.08, Demography = 41/10 = 4.10,
Institutionalisation = 3/3 = 1.00.
10.1. TASK VARIATION 187
Ta
bl
e
10
.2
:
C
ro
ss
-t
ab
ul
at
io
n
(C
hi
-S
qu
ar
e
St
at
is
ti
c)
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
V
ot
e
A
d
vi
ce
A
m
en
d
m
en
ts
In
te
r-
n
eg
.
In
tr
a-
n
eg
.
O
rg
an
is
e
P
ol
ic
y
id
ea
s
V
ot
in
g
li
st
R
es
ea
rc
h
L
eg
al
ad
vi
ce
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
A
d
vi
ce
C
oo
r.
M
E
P
s
R
ep
or
ts
A
tt
en
d
m
ee
ti
n
gs
P
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
st
ru
ct
u
re
s
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
s.
0.
01
S
0.
01
S
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
0.
01
M
0.
01
M
0.
01
S
0.
10
W
0.
01
S
0.
01
S
0.
01
S
0.
01
M
12
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a.
s.
0.
01
S
0.
01
M
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
0.
01
W
0.
10
W
0.
01
M
0.
01
M
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
0.
05
W
11
P
ol
ic
y
s.
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
0.
10
W
3
G
ra
d
e
0.
10
W
-
0.
10
W
-
2
P
ol
it
ic
al
s.
0.
01
M
1
D
em
og
ra
p
hy
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
/L
ev
el
0.
10
W
-
0.
01
M
-
0.
10
W
-
0.
10
W
-
0.
05
W
+
0.
01
W
-
0.
05
W
-
7
P
ar
ty
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
0.
01
M
0.
10
W
0.
01
M
0.
05
W
0.
10
W
0.
05
W
0.
10
W
7
G
en
d
er
0.
05
W
0.
05
W
0.
05
M
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
5
A
ge
0.
01
M
-
0.
05
W
-
0.
10
W
-
0.
01
W
-
0.
05
W
-
5
E
xp
er
ie
n
ce
0.
01
W
-
0.
10
W
+
0.
10
W
+
0.
01
W
-
0.
10
W
+
5
E
m
p
l.
p
ol
.
p
ar
ty
0.
05
M
0.
10
M
0.
10
M
0.
05
M
4
P
ri
or
ex
p
.
E
P
0.
05
W
0.
05
W
0.
01
M
3
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
/A
re
a
0.
01
M
0.
01
M
2
G
eo
.
R
eg
io
n
0.
05
W
0.
10
W
2
E
n
la
rg
em
en
t
0.
01
W
1
In
st
it
u
ti
on
al
is
at
io
n
A
tt
it
u
d
e
1
0.
10
W
+
1
A
tt
it
u
d
e
2
0.
05
W
+
1
A
tt
it
u
d
e
3
0.
05
W
-
1
P
7
9
4
6
8
5
5
6
4
8
8
2
3
L
eg
en
d:
0.
01
,
0.
05
or
0.
10
in
di
ca
te
th
e
le
ve
l
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e;
+
/
 
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
po
si
ti
ve
or
ne
ga
ti
ve
fo
rm
of
th
e
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
.
Fo
r
no
m
in
al
va
ri
ab
le
s
C
ra
m
ér
’s
V
st
at
is
ti
c
is
us
ed
:
W
ea
k
(W
),
0
.0
5

V

0
.2
0
;
M
od
er
at
e
(M
),
0
.2
0
<
V
<
0
.4
0
;
St
ro
ng
(S
),
V
 
0
.4
0
.
Fo
r
or
di
na
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
K
en
da
ll’
s
⌧ b
st
at
is
ti
c
is
us
ed
:
W
,0
.0
5

ab
s(
⌧ b
)

0
.2
0
;
M
,
0
.2
0
<
a
bs
(⌧
b
)
<
0
.4
0
;S
,a
bs
(⌧
b
)
 
0
.4
0
(s
ee
al
so
pa
ge
66
).
188 CHAPTER 10. DOES ORGANISATION MATTER?
(Interview A, 2012; Interview K, 2012). Administrators in the secretariat have to check
the legal aspects of amendments in order that when transformed into law, the law will
not be challenged in the Court of Justice (Interview F, 2012; Interview Y, 2013). Finally,
high-ranking staﬀ and staﬀ with a doctoral degree are less likely to draft amendments.
Reports Contrary to drafting amendments, which co-vary on nine diﬀerent independent
variables, drafting reports is the activity that co-varies the least. Only staﬀ following the
work of a committee and those with a past experience working for a political party are
more likely to (very) frequently draft reports than others. Existing literature suggests that
administrative aﬃliation plays a role in how frequent staﬀ draft reports (Corbett et al.,
2007, pp. 68, 134). Secretariat oﬃcials are described to have a leading role in drafting
reports, while APAs are said to draft reports only in exceptional cases (Camenen, 1995;
Perez, 2007). The data collected for this study indicates mixed support for this claim.
When controlling for administrative aﬃliations, secretariat administrators report similar
frequencies in drafting reports to political advisors and APAs. However, diﬀerences are
detected when considering the interaction eﬀect between staﬀ following a committee and
administrative aﬃliation. In such case, the committee staﬀ of the central secretariat (65
per cent) are more likely to draft reports than political group advisors (40 per cent) and
APAs (36 per cent). Even though the secretariat oﬃcials of committees are the ones to
draft reports the most frequently, the data sheds doubt on whether the involvement of
political group advisors and APAs is rare.
Providing Advice Three types of advice were investigated: advice on legal issues, advice
on procedures and advising on the vote. Legal advice, which is the least frequent activity
among staﬀ, co-varies with the level and area of education, where a doctorate or degrees
in law are advantages.4 That education does play a role in determining the behaviour of
staﬀ is corroborated in Egeberg et al. (2014b). Given the traditional role of the general
secretariat in providing legal support, it was expected that data would show a result in
favour to their role. However, this was not the case. Only when accounting separately for
secretariat administrators, which work in the Legal Service, this turned out to be the case.
Unsurprisingly, all oﬃcials working in the Legal Service reported to frequently provide
legal support, while only one third of committee and research staﬀ said so. Except for
legal advice, providing advice on other issues - either on procedures or on the vote - is a
frequent activity for staﬀ in general. Both tasks co-vary with the functional specialisation,
administrative aﬃliation, level of education and party membership.
Advising on procedures is more frequent for political advisors and secretariat admin-
istrators than APAs (i.e. more than half of political advisors and administrators reported
to provide advice on procedures, while only one quarter of APAs). This is not surpris-
ing, since the likelihood for providing advice on procedures increases with the working
4Providing legal advice varies on a 10 per cent level also given the functional specialisation. The
diﬀerences are small.
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tenure and working experience on diﬀerent positions within the EP. On both variables,
political advisors and secretariat administrators have a more favourable score than APAs.5
This relationship becomes even clearer when controlling for committee staﬀ. Data in
fact shows that secretariat administrators in committees (87 per cent) are more likely to
provide procedural advice than political group advisors (78 per cent) and APAs (71 per
cent).6
While administrators in the secretariat are used to advise on procedures, this is not
the case for advising on the vote. Only one third of administrators reported to advise
MEPs on the vote, while more than ninety per cent of political advisors and two thirds of
APAs reported to do so. These results are very similar to the ones presented by Egeberg
et al. (2013) and Winzen (2011, p. 38). In addition, the results presented here show that
the likelihood to provide advice on a vote increases when staﬀ are members of a political
party. Giving advice on the vote is the only activity that co-varies with the citizenship
of staﬀ, i.e. staﬀ with citizenship of one of the countries that joined the EU before 2004
reported to give advice on the position to take more frequently than others.
Besides this, it has to be said that on a general level citizenship does not aﬀect many
activities in the EP, which is in line with the results in Egeberg et al. (2014b). Finally,
advising on procedures and legal issues co-vary with attitudinal variables measuring in-
stitutionalisation. Staﬀ showing positive attitudes towards serving the European public
interest are more frequently involved in advising on procedures and legal issues.
Preparing Voting Lists A closely connected activity to advising on the vote is the
preparation of voting lists. Preparing voting lists includes two basic duties: positioning
amendments in a logical order and providing voting indications. The former can be con-
sidered a procedural task and as such it is likely to be carried out by secretariat oﬃcials.
Many interviewees observed that the order of voting items is not always obvious and that
it sometimes requires a personal judgment (Interview F, 2012; Interview L, 2012). When
this is the case positioning amendments is considered a policy-influencing activity (Mar-
shall, 2012). Providing indications on the vote is the activity where the coordinators and
political group advisors draw pluses or minuses on voting lists. Political groups do this to
show MEPs what is the leadership’s desirable course of action. Preparing voting lists is
not one of APAs’ direct responsibilities (Interview Y, 2013).
The results show that staﬀ following the work of committees and political advisors are
more likely to assist in the preparation of voting lists than others. Among all the political
advisors 84 per cent reported to (very) frequently prepare voting lists, while 61 per cent
of APAs and 51 per cent of secretariat administrators did so. Almost three thirds of staﬀ
that follow committees reported to be (very) frequently involved in preparing voting lists,
5The average working tenure for political advisors and administrators is over nine years compared to
four years for APAs. More than half of political advisors and administrators reported that in the past
they have had another job position within the EP, while only a quarter of APAs has had a prior working
experience in the EP before becoming an assistant.
6This relationship is not summarised in Table 10.2:  2(2, N = 303) = 11.13, p < 0.05 .
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while only one tenth of other staﬀ.
As in the case of procedural advice, an interaction eﬀect between the administrative
aﬃliation and functional specialisation shows that the diﬀerence between political group
advisors and secretariat administrators are small.7 Ninety and 84 per cent of political
advisors and secretariat administrators that follow the work of at least one committee
reported to (very) frequently prepare voting lists.8 Since both, secretariat oﬃcials and
political group advisors, are involved in the preparation of voting lists, it is not surprising
that there is little diﬀerence between the two. While political advisors draw up voting
lists for MEPs on the basis of their political superiors decisions (Clark and Priestley,
2012, p. 37), secretariat administrators have most expertise to decide for example on split
amendments (i.e. separate votes on diﬀerent parts of an amendment) (Rule 161 of the
Rules of Procedure 2013; Clark and Priestley, 2012, p. 213). More unexpected is the high
score of APAs (61 per cent of APAs reported to frequently prepare voting lists). It might
be plausible to assume that APAs compare the preferences of political groups to the own
preference of their MEP. And where there is divergence between the two, they can advise
the MEP how to vote (Interview M, 2012).
Negotiations In the survey respondents were asked how frequently they participated in
the coordination of MEPs’ positions in the negotiations between diﬀerent political groups
(i.e. intra-institutional negotiations), and with other EU institutions (i.e. inter-institutional
negotiations). The results show that those individuals who frequently coordinate the po-
sitions among MEPs are also more likely to participate in intra- and inter-institutional
negotiations (see Table A.2). Egeberg et al. (2013, p. 504) have observed the same pat-
tern. Negotiations with either political groups or EU institutions and coordinating the
position of diﬀerent MEPs vary alongside similar variables. For example, committee staﬀ
and political advisors assist in negotiations and coordinate MEPs’ positions more frequently
than non-committee staﬀ, APAs and secretariat administrators. The diﬀerences are more
pronounced for intra-institutional negotiations than inter-institutional negotiations. This
can be explained by the fact that in general almost half of the respondents reported to
be involved in negotiations between political groups, while less than one third reported to
be involved in negotiations with other EU institutions. A similar pattern is in part con-
firmed by Egeberg et al. (2013; 2014), who investigated day-to-day contacts. They did not
find any diﬀerence in how often political group advisors and secretariat oﬃcials meet with
oﬃcials working for the Commission’s directorate-generals, the general secretariat of the
Commission and the Presidency of the Council. They did however find that, while political
group advisors are more likely to be in contact with Commissioners and their cabinets, EP
secretariat oﬃcials are more likely to be in contact with the Council’s general secretariat.
Moreover, political advisors in the EP will have more contacts with the Commissioners
with whom they share political aﬃliation, while EP secretariat oﬃcials are more likely
7The interaction was tested by recoding two variables into one and then using the  2 statistic.
8This relationship is not summarised in Table 10.2:  2(2, N = 304) = 26.05, p < 0.01 .
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to be in contact with similarly organised units of the Council secretariat (Egeberg et al.,
2014a).
In general, the frequency of involvement in negotiations and coordination of MEPs’
positions increases with the years spent working in the EP. In addition, staﬀ that are
members of a political party are more likely to be involved in negotiations with political
groups; while staﬀ that are not members of a political party are more likely to be involved
in inter-institutional negotiations. Prior employment in a political party is supposed to
enhance staﬀ’s opportunity to assist in negotiations between political groups, while it does
not have an eﬀect on inter-institutional negotiations. Policy specialisation does not aﬀect
negotiations, but it does have an influence on the coordination of MEPs’ positions: staﬀ
working in economic and scientific aﬀairs are more likely to assist in the coordination of
positions between MEPs.
Research Over the years the central administration of the EP has enhanced its research
capacity (Chapter 5). In spite of this, administrators are not the most important research
resource for MEPs. According to the survey responses, almost 90 per cent of all the APAs
perform research very frequently, followed by secretariat oﬃcials (69 per cent) and political
group advisors (59 per cent). This makes APAs the most important human resources for
conducting research. Moreover, accounting for those secretariat administrators that work
in research units (i.e. policy departments) does not change the result in a statistically
significant way: committee staﬀ and policy department staﬀ in the secretariat are equally
involved in research.9 While the EP secretariat managed to streamline its legal support to
MEPs, this has not happened for research yet.
It has to be considered that the survey was carried out in spring 2013, before the reform
of the research services and the establishment of DG EPRS in autumn 2013. There has
been no study yet on whether the new organisation has changed the research capacity of
the secretariat. One of the reforms targeted the research support for individual MEPs,
which might decrease the importance of APAs’ research assistance. This might enable
APAs to do more political work in the future. In addition, research varies given the gender
and prior experience in the EP, i.e. while females are more likely to do research compared
to men, staﬀ with prior experience in the EP (i.e. internal mobility within the EP) are
less likely to perform research than those with only one experience in the EP.
Policy Ideas Contributing to policy ideas co-varies with functional specialisation, policy
specialisation and gender.10 Results show that 73 per cent of the staﬀ following the work
of at least one committee report to very (frequently) contribute to policy ideas compared
to half of the staﬀ that reported to not follow the work of committees. In term of admin-
istrative aﬃliation, political advisors and APAs (72 per cent) report in greater numbers to
9This relationship is not summarised in Table 10.2:  2(1, N = 115) = 3.92 , p > 0.10 .
10Diﬀerences are recorded also for administrative aﬃliation and party membership, but in both cases
the relationships are weak and significant only at the 10 per cent level.
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(very) frequently contribute to policy ideas than secretariat administrators (61 per cent).
Compared to providing advice on procedures and preparing voting lists, this result does
not change when testing for the interaction eﬀect between functional and administrative
aﬃliation: general secretariat administrators, APAs and political advisors, which reported
to follow the work of at least one committee, contribute to policy ideas as much as their
counterparts.11
Organising Activities Organising activities for members of parliament tends to com-
prise the work of secretariat oﬃcials (66 per cent), and especially those who are engaged in
committees (84 per cent), and APAs (74 per cent) compared to political advisors (59 per
cent). Attending meetings, which is the most frequent activity for legislative staﬀ, co-varies
with staﬀ’s functional specialisation, administrative aﬃliation and gender: committee staﬀ
(80 per cent), political advisors and APAs (both more than 80 per cent) and women (88
per cent) are more likely to report that they (very) frequently attend meetings compared
to non-committee staﬀ (65 per cent), administrators (less than 70 per cent) and men (71
per cent).
10.2 Scale Variation
The findings presented until now show that: 1) legislative staﬀ in the EP are involved
in several diﬀerent tasks; 2) some of these tasks are more frequent than others; and 3)
that there are some diﬀerences among staﬀ in how often they perform individual tasks.
This section presents the results of regression analysis, where the eﬀects of organisational
structures are controlled for on the scale of legislative assistance. The test is based on
Equation 8.1, which is explained in Chapter 8 and repeated here:
legislative assistance =  0 +  1 ⇤ org. structures+  2 ⇤ control variables+ u (8.1)
10.2.1 Reduced Form Regression
Hypothesis 4a This hypothesis states that individuals in high-ranking positions are
more likely to be involved in legislative assistance than individuals in low-ranking positions.
The  2 tests presented in Section 10.1 show that the position in the hierarchy rarely matters
when carrying out the tasks of legislative assistance. A similar finding is obtained on the
scale measuring legislative assistance: rank does not have any eﬀect on how frequent staﬀ
are involved in legislative assistance (see Table 10.3, Model 1; the base case are high-ranking
staﬀ). Therefore, based on the results in the reduced form regression, data does not support
H4a. This could mean that staﬀ in diﬀerent ranking positions can do the same tasks.
Examples of the non-hierarchic nature of the work in the EP are negotiations: while high-
ranking oﬃcials negotiate the main political direction of legislation, low-ranking oﬃcials
11This relationship is not summarised in Table 10.3:  2 (2, N = 305) = 0.79, p is not significant.
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negotiate the details (Interview ZA, 2013; Interview ZD, 2013). However, the regression of
the full model shows diﬀerent results.
Hypothesis 4b Given previous research, it is assumed that administrators employed in
the secretariat are more likely to be involved in legislative assistance than political advisors
working for political groups and accredited parliamentary assistants. Section 10.1 showed
that eleven tasks co-vary with administrative aﬃliation. Regression analysis also shows a
highly statistically significant result for administrative aﬃliation as a predictor for assisting
MEPs in legislation (see Table 10.3, Model 2, the base case are secretariat administrators).
Model 2 in Table 10.3 explains 16.5 per cent of the variation. However, results do not
provide support for H4b. In fact, both political advisors and accredited assistants, score
higher on the scale, which means that they are more frequently involved in legislative
assistance than secretariat administrators.
Model 3 in Table 10.3 shows a similar regression to Model 2. The diﬀerence is that the
base case are secretariat administrators that work in committee secretariats rather than
secretariat administrators in general (i.e. including those that work in legal aﬀairs, policy
departments, delegation secretariats, etc.) When taking into account only those secretariat
administrators that work in committee secretariats, and exclude the administrators work-
ing in research, legal and other sectors, results change. Only political advisors score on
average higher on the scale of legislative assistance than the administrators in committee
secretariats. There is no diﬀerence between APAs and the administrators in committee
secretariats. Therefore, the results in Model 3 provide partial support for H4b: while
administrative aﬃliation has an eﬀect on the involvement of staﬀ in legislative assistance,
being a secretariat oﬃcial in a committee secretariat does not have a significant eﬀect com-
pared to APAs, while it has a negative statistically significant eﬀect compared to being a
political advisor. On average, political advisors score 0.42 higher on the scale of legislat-
ive assistance than secretariat oﬃcials in committee secretariats. Overall, these findings
are not in line with the assumption that committee staﬀ, and in particular committee
secretariat staﬀ, are the central administrative actors in legislative assistance.
Hypothesis 4c Model 3 in Table 10.3, which shows that working in a committee secret-
ariat increases the likelihood in assisting MEPs in legislation forecasts the finding on H4c.
In fact, all staﬀ that reported to follow the work of at least one committee (independently
on whether they are administrators in a committee secretariat) score higher on the scale
of legislative assistance than those that are not involved in committees (see Table 10.3,
Model 4). Therefore, there is support in favour of H4c. In addition, Model 3 in Table 10.3
explains 27.6 per cent of the variation in legislative assistance. Administrative aﬃliation
and functional specialisation are the only two variables where a relatively large part of the
variation in legislative assistance is explained.
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Hypothesis 4d This hypothesis assumes that individuals working on economic and sci-
entific policy, where the ordinary legislative procedure is the most frequently applied, are
likely to be involved in legislative assistance more frequently than others. The previous
section showed that policy specialisation aﬀects three tasks: the frequency to organise
activities for MEPs, the contribution to policy ideas and the coordination of MEPs’ posi-
tions. Regression analysis shows that on the scale of legislative assistance, those working
in economic aﬀairs score higher than those working in budgetary aﬀairs, citizens’ rights
and foreign policy (see Table 10.3, Model 5; the base case is staﬀ working in economic and
scientific aﬀairs). The result provides partial support for H4d, because staﬀ working in
structural and cohesion aﬀairs are not more or less involved in legislative assistance than
those working in economic aﬀairs. The finding is at odds with research on policy proposals
(Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014) and committee cases (Winzen,
2011).
Hypothesis 4e This hypothesis assumed that the political group staﬀ work for (i.e.
political specialisation) aﬀects their involvement in legislative assistance. The political
specialisation can be controlled for only in the case of staﬀ that occupy the job of political
advisors and accredited assistants.12 Administrators working in the secretariat are not
organised according to the political specialisation or the political aﬃliation of MEPs. First,
I tested for the left/centre/right dimension (see Table 10.3, Model 6; the case are staﬀ
working for centre political groups and MEPs, i.e. ALDE, S&D and EPP). Second, I
tested for political specialisations according to political groups in the EP (i.e. EPP, S&D,
ALDE and Greens/EFA).13 The left/centre/right dimension does not aﬀect the way staﬀ
assists MEPs. There is an eﬀect of political specialisation when individual aﬃliations are
accounted for (see Table 10.3, Model 7; the base case are staﬀ working for the EPP political
group or MEPs). Given the results, staﬀ working for ALDE and S&D score higher on the
variable of legislative assistance than EPP staﬀ. Hence, EPP staﬀ are less involved in
legislative assistance than ALDE and S&D staﬀ.
Control Variables
Scholars emphasising the instrumental nature of organisation, do not study whether demo-
graphy or institutional values aﬀect behaviour. As described on page 55 there is a branch
in organisation theory that focuses on how informal structures, such as demography and
institutional values aﬀect behaviour in organisation (e.g. Lawrence 1997; Pfeﬀer 1983;
Vandenabeele and Ban 2009). These studies show that informal structures can have an
eﬀect on how people behave in an organisation. In order to clarify the importance of
demography and institutional values in the EP, reduced regressions were conducted on the
control variables that were presented in Section 8.3. The results show that among demo-
graphy variables the area of education, age, membership in a political party and prior
working experience for a political party have an eﬀect on the involvement in legislative
12For this reason this variables is not included in subsequent regressions.
13There were not enough observation to account for other political groups.
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Table 10.3: Reduced Regression: Organisational Structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES lega lega lega lega lega lega lega
Middle grade 0.185
(0.172)
Low grade 0.0562
(0.169)
Advisor 1.017***
(0.150)
Assistant 0.751***
(0.113)
Advisor committee 0.421***
(0.147)
Assistant committee 0.155
(0.108)
Committee 1.461***
(0.140)
Structural a. -0.178
(0.164)
Citizen a. -0.328**
(0.148)
Budgetary a. -0.488**
(0.196)
Foreign a. -0.280*
(0.151)
Right -0.0107
(0.199)
Left 0.0597
(0.142)
S&D 0.287*
(0.150)
ALDE 0.432**
(0.178)
Greens 0.193
(0.175)
Other g. 0.179
(0.167)
Constant -0.0933 -0.524*** 0.0716 -1.187*** 0.375*** 0.307*** 0.108
(0.130) (0.0954) (0.0901) (0.132) (0.0908) (0.0671) (0.104)
Observations 229 354 304 343 278 222 230
R-squared 0.006 0.165 0.030 0.276 0.033 0.001 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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assistance (Table 10.4).14 Except for age (Model 1), all the other variables have a posit-
ive eﬀect. A degree in social sciences favours staﬀ’s involvement in legislative assistance
compared to a law degree (Model 5; the base case are staﬀ with a law degree). Being a
member of a political party (Model 7) or having previously worked for one (Model 8) in-
creases staﬀ’s score on the scale of legislative assistance. The level of education, experience,
citizenship (i.e. either measured on south/north/west/east dimension or on the old/new
members states dimension) and attitudinal variables pertaining to institutionalisation do
not have an eﬀect on legislative assistance (Models 2, 4, 6-7, 9-12). While Egeberg et al.
(2013) showed that experience is a statistically significant variable, no such evidence is
found here. This could indicate that the behaviour of staﬀ in the EP does not depend on
organisational socialisation.
10.2.2 Regression of the Full Model
The reduced form regressions showed that, except for the rank, all the organisational
structures influence the involvement of staﬀ in legislative assistance independently. This
section is about estimating the eﬀect of all organisational structures together and given a
set of control variables. At first, all the variables measuring organisational structures except
political aﬃliation are included in one regression model. The results in Table 10.5, Model
1 indicate that organisational structures determine legislative assistance in a statistically
significant way. Even rank, which in the reduced regression model did not show to have
an eﬀect, is now significant. Levels of significance for individual variables are sometimes
lower compared to Table 10.3. Both variations might be due to the reduced number of
observations resulting from combining multiple variables in a single model.
The remainder of the results presents the eﬀect of organisational structures while con-
trolling for institutionalisation (Table 10.5, Models 2-5) and demography (Tables 10.6 and
10.7). Table 10.6 controls for each category of demography separately, while Table 10.7
presents several models where diﬀerent demography variables are combined. Models 1 and 2
in Table 10.7 control citizenship with two diﬀerent measurements (i.e. south/north/west/east
and new/old member states). Models 3-5 in Table 10.7 exclude the demographic variables,
which did not show a statistically significant eﬀect in previous regressions. Since citizen-
ship and the level of education are not a statistically significant variables in Models 1 or
2 in Table 10.7, Model 3 excludes them, but retains the area of education, which is sig-
nificant. A similar logic of exclusion is then applied in Models 4 and 5 in Table 10.7 to
observe how robust are the results on the level of education and party aﬃliation. None of
these two variables is statistically significant. Based on the coeﬃcient’s level of statistical
significance and their robustness, the most important model of the study is Model 3 in
Table 10.7.
Controlling for Institutionalisation When controlling for institutionalisation (Table
10.5, Models 2-5) neither levels of significance nor coeﬃcients change substantially. There-
14The variables indicating whether someone had previously worked for a political party does not contain
enough observations for it to be included in subsequent regression analysis.
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fore, controlling for institutionalisation does not in any way mitigate the eﬀect of organisa-
tional structures. Since institutionalisation does not have a statistically significant eﬀect
neither when measured separately nor when measured together with organisational struc-
tures, it is not included in subsequent regressions.
Table 10.5: Institutionalisation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lega lega lega lega lega
Middle g. -0.108 -0.100 -0.0990 -0.106 -0.104
(0.140) (0.141) (0.145) (0.143) (0.146)
Low g. -0.311** -0.303** -0.298** -0.320** -0.314**
(0.141) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.147)
Advisor 0.937*** 0.928*** 0.915*** 0.943*** 0.929***
(0.143) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.154)
Assistant 0.0689 0.0724 0.0540 0.0795 0.0638
(0.131) (0.131) (0.135) (0.134) (0.139)
Committee 1.455*** 1.448*** 1.464*** 1.428*** 1.432***
(0.197) (0.201) (0.211) (0.204) (0.217)
Structural a. -0.102 -0.100 -0.111 -0.105 -0.112
(0.161) (0.164) (0.164) (0.163) (0.168)
Citizens a. -0.230* -0.232* -0.229 -0.227 -0.232
(0.136) (0.136) (0.140) (0.137) (0.141)
Budgetary a. -0.470*** -0.470*** -0.479*** -0.477*** -0.489***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.174) (0.181) (0.183)
Foreign a. -0.143 -0.149 -0.161 -0.180 -0.193
(0.151) (0.153) (0.157) (0.155) (0.159)
Attitude 1 0.0186 0.0264
(0.107) (0.114)
Attitude 2 -0.0168 -0.00364
(0.142) (0.163)
Attitude 3 -0.0326 -0.0439
(0.0678) (0.0737)
Constant -1.010*** -1.061*** -0.961** -0.921*** -0.948*
(0.210) (0.349) (0.390) (0.280) (0.484)
Observations 177 176 173 173 170
R-squared 0.490 0.484 0.485 0.480 0.481
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controlling for Demography As in the case of institutionalisation, controlling for
demography variables shows a consistent and statistically significant eﬀect of all the com-
ponents of organisational structures. Therefore, controlling for demography does not in any
way undermine the eﬀect of organisational structures. Nevertheless, specific demography
variables aﬀect the score of individuals on the scale of legislative assistance. In particular
the area of education has power in explaining legislative assistance (Table 10.6, Model 5;
Table 10.7, Models 1-5). This is shown in the significance of the coeﬃcients and in the
percentage of the explained variance. Organisational structures and the area of education
explain together 59.7 per cent of the variance in legislative assistance (Table 10.6, Model
5) or 10.7 per cent more than organisational structures alone (Table 10.3, Model 1).
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Table 10.6: Full Model: Organisational Structures (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES lega lega lega lega lega lega lega lega
Middle g. -0.222 -0.0778 -0.110 -0.118 -0.291** -0.118 -0.0857 -0.116
(0.148) (0.157) (0.146) (0.139) (0.146) (0.145) (0.141) (0.143)
Low g. -0.522*** -0.258 -0.348** -0.327** -0.428*** -0.339** -0.292** -0.381**
(0.159) (0.172) (0.151) (0.141) (0.144) (0.148) (0.138) (0.148)
Advisor 0.971*** 0.908*** 0.895*** 0.964*** 0.815*** 0.855*** 0.912*** 0.892***
(0.147) (0.148) (0.160) (0.139) (0.158) (0.152) (0.149) (0.148)
Assistant -0.120 0.103 0.0169 0.0755 -0.0597 0.00922 0.0509 -0.0355
(0.160) (0.139) (0.137) (0.135) (0.147) (0.134) (0.131) (0.135)
Committee 1.459*** 1.473*** 1.491*** 1.474*** 1.611*** 1.521*** 1.500*** 1.529***
(0.196) (0.197) (0.208) (0.198) (0.192) (0.206) (0.204) (0.204)
Structural 0.0440 -0.116 -0.0364 -0.122 -0.207 -0.0217 -0.134 -0.0525
(0.160) (0.159) (0.168) (0.163) (0.182) (0.164) (0.159) (0.168)
Citizens a. -0.248* -0.240* -0.238* -0.259* -0.109 -0.256* -0.224 -0.270*
(0.139) (0.136) (0.136) (0.135) (0.159) (0.144) (0.136) (0.151)
Budgetary a. -0.381** -0.493*** -0.473*** -0.491*** -0.439** -0.471*** -0.453*** -0.480***
(0.180) (0.179) (0.175) (0.170) (0.173) (0.174) (0.172) (0.182)
Foreign a. -0.152 -0.155 -0.169 -0.148 0.0272 -0.154 -0.146 -0.122
(0.152) (0.155) (0.154) (0.153) (0.173) (0.159) (0.152) (0.156)
Age -0.0156**
(0.00713)
Experience 0.00669
(0.0111)
Male -0.0794
(0.116)
MA&PhD 0.218
(0.165)
Economics -0.285*
(0.150)
Soc. s. 0.0295
(0.134)
Arts -0.410**
(0.197)
Party aﬀ. 0.0990
(0.110)
South 0.0782
(0.171)
North -0.0115
(0.163)
West -0.111
(0.153)
Old MS -0.00378
(0.130)
Constant -0.240 -1.105*** -0.953*** -1.199*** -0.898*** -1.049*** -1.030*** -0.994***
(0.401) (0.258) (0.224) (0.257) (0.223) (0.221) (0.259) (0.242)
Observations 169 177 168 176 135 169 177 159
R-squared 0.526 0.491 0.505 0.497 0.597 0.497 0.496 0.517
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10.7: Full Model: Organisational Structures (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES lega lega lega lega lega
Middle g. -0.344* -0.427** -0.364** -0.366** -0.319**
(0.177) (0.169) (0.155) (0.154) (0.146)
Low g. -0.559*** -0.712*** -0.603*** -0.613*** -0.489***
(0.194) (0.200) (0.160) (0.162) (0.146)
Advisor 0.705*** 0.741*** 0.850*** 0.877*** 0.773***
(0.193) (0.193) (0.152) (0.145) (0.167)
Assistant -0.293 -0.412** -0.193 -0.190 -0.108
(0.181) (0.192) (0.169) (0.173) (0.150)
Committee 1.795*** 1.770*** 1.609*** 1.622*** 1.697***
(0.200) (0.208) (0.183) (0.186) (0.193)
Structural a. -0.118 -0.102 -0.0575 -0.0750 -0.104
(0.184) (0.182) (0.175) (0.176) (0.174)
Citizens a. -0.212 -0.203 -0.124 -0.140 -0.155
(0.164) (0.177) (0.165) (0.162) (0.159)
Budgetary a. -0.459** -0.458** -0.404** -0.414** -0.454***
(0.180) (0.191) (0.183) (0.184) (0.168)
Foreign -0.0317 0.0163 -0.00288 -0.00259 -0.00504
(0.171) (0.182) (0.170) (0.169) (0.175)
Age -0.0154 -0.0139 -0.00966 -0.0104
(0.00933) (0.00953) (0.00764) (0.00768)
Experience 0.0126 1.92e-06
(0.0157) (0.0149)
Male -0.0873 -0.0826
(0.142) (0.138)
MA&PhD 0.372* 0.316 0.184 0.167
(0.191) (0.200) (0.179) (0.194)
Economics -0.156 -0.187 -0.304** -0.269* -0.302*
(0.164) (0.170) (0.144) (0.143) (0.159)
Soc. s. 0.0370 0.00882 -0.000496 0.0141 0.0209
(0.140) (0.146) (0.129) (0.127) (0.134)
Arts -0.422* -0.432* -0.472** -0.429** -0.495**
(0.229) (0.231) (0.194) (0.200) (0.215)
Party aﬀ. 0.243* 0.256* 0.112
(0.138) (0.143) (0.134)
South -0.110
(0.225)
North -0.0492
(0.232)
West -0.331
(0.211)
Old MS -0.116
(0.189)
Constant -0.560 -0.408 -0.372 -0.522 -1.066***
(0.602) (0.546) (0.430) (0.489) (0.329)
Observations 123 116 129 129 128
R-squared 0.655 0.644 0.629 0.633 0.621
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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10.3 Discussion
This chapter has presented the findings on the eﬀects of organisational variables on the
behaviour of staﬀ in the EP. The statistical tests built on organisation theory (Chapter 8).
Based on this theory, it was tested whether and to what extent organisational variables
aﬀect the behaviour of staﬀ. Specifically, the statistical tests were set up to examine the
eﬀect of organisational structures, while controlling for other organisational variables, i.e.
demography and institutionalisation. Structures, demography and institutionalisation all
qualify as characteristics of organisation. However, organisation theory supposes that only
organisational structures aﬀect the behaviour of members of an organisation.
Organisation theory has been applied, because the EP is a formalised organisation. The
EP has put in place horizontal and vertical modes in order to channel the behaviour of its
staﬀ. In organisations, where several organisational structures are in place and formally
well defined, as in the EP, one expects behaviour to be patterned accordingly to these
structures. In such conditions behaviour is less likely to be conditioned by demographic
characteristics or institutionalised beliefs.
The findings presented in Sections 10.1 and 10.2 indicate support for this logic. Con-
sequently, there is evidence to support Hypothesis 4, i.e. organisational structure of legis-
lative assistance aﬀects the behaviour of legislative staﬀ. The implication of this finding
is that the principals of the EP (e.g. MEPs, Bureau, political groups, etc.) control staﬀ,
since the latter behave according to the structures that the former devised to oﬀset any
intervention, which is outside the control of the organisation itself.
Among organisational structures, functional specialisation has by far the biggest eﬀect,
where following the work of a committee increases an individual’s participation in assisting
MEPs (Table 10.7). This is an expected finding since committees are the most important
venues for scrutinising legislation in the EP. The findings support the logic found in studies,
which target the role of oﬃcials in the committees’ secretariats (Winzen, 2011; Dobbels
and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014).
However, the results in this study show that besides work in committees, attention
has to be paid also to the administrative aﬃliation of staﬀ, i.e. whether they work for the
general secretariat, a political group or an MEP. The results suggest that political group
advisors are more involved in legislative assistance than secretariat oﬃcials. Overall, it
seems that APAs are less involved in legislative assistance than political advisors, but
they are equally involved as general secretariat oﬃcials. This finding sheds light on how
the balance between diﬀerent administrative players has changed since their roles were
first observed. The role of secretariat oﬃcials, which have been so far considered as the
most important administrative players in the EP, has diminished. Committee staﬀ of the
secretariat are still very important for organising activities for MEPs and to a lesser extent
drafting reports. They do not show a prevailing role in any of the other activities.15 In
15It has to be noted that none of the tests detected a statistically significant relationship between
providing advice on legal issues and administrative aﬃliation. In terms of frequency it seems that secretariat
administrators are the ones who provide legal advice the most commonly. It is likely that this relationship
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parallel to the decrease of the role of the secretariat, the role of APAs has increased. While
in the past, parliamentary assistants could not attend the meetings of committees, today
they are active players in several activities and in particular in providing MEPs research
capacity. The restructuring of research services in the secretariat of the EP might give a
greater role in research to administrators, while APAs could focus on political activities.
The results are telling also about the role of staﬀ given their policy specialisation. The
assumption was that in areas where the ordinary legislative procedure is most frequently
applied (namely in the economic and scientific aﬀairs) compared to other procedures (i.e.
consultation, assent and the budget’s procedures), MEPs tend to require support from
staﬀ more than in other areas. The results mostly show that this is not the case. There is
no diﬀerence between staﬀ that work in economic/scientific aﬀairs and structural/cohesion
aﬀairs. Even staﬀ working on foreign aﬀairs, where the ordinary procedures is on average
used only in 2.6 per cent of cases (Figure 8.2), do not appear to be less involved in legislative
assistance than the others.
There are two statistically significant cases with negative coeﬃcients: citizens’ aﬀairs
and budgetary aﬀairs. Based on Table 10.5, staﬀ working in the area of citizens’ rights
are less frequently involved in legislative assistance than those that work in economic and
scientific aﬀairs. This result is not robust, since the variable is not statistically significant
in any of the models in Table 10.7.
Regarding the type of decision-making procedure, Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) found
out that in cases of consultation staﬀ tends to be less guided than in codecision procedures,
where the EP has a greater power over legislation. The result in this study shows that staﬀ,
which work in areas where consultation is applied in the most cases, are in general less
likely to assist MEPs. Together with the findings of Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) this could
mean that not only are staﬀ less guided in consultation procedures, but that the EP in
general invests less resources in consultation procedures than in codecision (Rasmussen and
Toshkov, 2010). A respondent described the diﬀerence between codecision and consultation
in the following way (Interview A, 2012):
When you work on a proposal with co-decision [...] you work for something
where the EP has a lot of power, so it is diﬀerent from opinions, consultations
and resolutions. So, you really work on legislation. But, because it is legislation,
it is very technical. [...] Of course, a little bit the negative side of it is that
MEPs are always in the front, they are the one who talk in the meetings, the
ones who negotiate. You are just the one assisting. [...] And the parliament
is taken seriously in these areas [of codecision]. If you have a consultation you
[administrator] will do the same work, it is just that nobody reads it.
In addition to the area of citizens’ rights, the second negative statistically significant case
are staﬀ working in budgetary aﬀairs, where the ordinary procedure is used the least (1.1
is true for the population, and that due to the low number of observations (i.e. the number of secretariat
administrators that works in the legal service equals 11 lawyers), the tests could not detect a significant
relationship.
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per cent of the codecision proposals). This result means that staﬀ working on budgetary
issues tends to participate less frequently in legislative assistance. The result could also
mean that MEPs working on budgetary issues require a diﬀerent kind of assistance than
the one measured here with the scale. Thus, confirming the observation made in Section
7.3 that the budgetary policy is a domain, which requires diﬀerent expertise compared to
other policy areas (namely legislation). Overall, given the levels of significance, there is
no strong evidence for the hypothesis that the decision-making procedure in parliament
aﬀects how frequent staﬀ are involved in assisting MEPs.
Contrary to the results in reduced regression models, rank is a statistically significant
and robust variable in full regressions, where control variables are added (Tables 10.6 and
10.7). In particular low-ranking staﬀ are less frequently involved in legislative assistance
than high-ranking staﬀ. Less robust are the results for middle-ranking staﬀ. Based on the
data available, hierarchy matters for assisting MEPs. This is not surprising, since the EP’s
administration is characterised by a developed ranking system.
Except for the area of education, none of the control variables exhibits a statistically
significant result in a consistent way. The finding is line with several other studies that
also did not detect demography as a variable aﬀecting behaviour (Trondal, 2011; Jacobsen,
2006; Egeberg, 2012). As articulated by Pfeﬀer (1997, p. 98): ‘Demography is not destiny.’
This finding raises also some questions on the observations of studies in political sociology.
For the case of MEPs’ assistants, Michon (2014) has showed that some demographic char-
acteristics, such as the attended school and previous experiences, act as ‘gates’ or ‘filters’
to become staﬀ in the EP. While the entry into the EU administration is paved by specific
demographic characteristics and personal choices, this dissertation shows that their eﬀect
fades once an individual becomes a member of the organisation. In other words, demo-
graphy matters when an individual is outside the organisation, while it does not matter
when an individual is inside the organisation. It might be that the uniformity (i.e. the
lack of variation), which is informally produced through recruitment, prevents the rise of
conflict based on demographic characteristics and assures behaviour, which complies with
organisational structures.
The findings in this study also mean that organisational structures are fit indicators
on how behaviour is shaped in the EP. From one point of view, this is a positive finding,
because demography and institutionalisation are outside the control of the organisation
compared to organisational structures. While the organisation can change, modify and set
up new organisational structures through administrative reforms, this is more diﬃcult to
achieve in the case of demography and institutionalisation. In respect to demography, it
is interesting that party membership mitigates the eﬀect of organisational structures in
individual regression models. Among all the demographic variables it is the variable that
stands out and deserves more attention in the future, also because the EP is a political
organisation.
The demography of the staﬀ population changes gradually with the turn of generations.
A radical change can happen only with lay oﬀs or new recruitments. In the case of the EP,
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the population of staﬀ could have changed in a significant way after the expansion of EU
membership from 15 to 25 states, when staﬀ with diﬀerent citizenships were recruited for
the first time after Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995. A qualitative study
on the use of English and French in the European Commission (i.e. the use of language as a
type of behaviour) shows that the main language of communication changed after the 2004
enlargement: French is no longer the lingua franca of the European Commission because
a large proportion of recruits from new member states is not fluent in French (Ban, 2010).
The data available in this study does not observe language in connection with citizenship.
However, the qualitative part of the study has established that, aside linguistic services,
enlargement does not aﬀect the way legislative assistance in carried out in the EP.
In respect to citizenship, a study on the European Commission has shown that geo-
graphical origin influences the role conceptions of oﬃcials: Commission oﬃcials from state
centric countries are more likely to support a state-centric EU, while Commission oﬃcials
from federally organised countries are more likely do adopt a supranational view on the EU
(Hooghe, 2012). The present study does not find any influence of geographical distribution
on behaviour. This is corroborated also with another study on the staﬀ in the EP, where
Egeberg et al. (2014b) have tested the eﬀect of geographical balance on the staﬀ’s concerns
and found no eﬀect.
There is also little evidence for the influence of gender. Gender aﬀects legislative
assistance neither directly nor through interactions with organisational variables. The
diﬀerence between genders was detected for individual cases. More female staﬀ reported
to attend meetings, organise activities for MEPs, perform research and provide MEPs
with policy ideas very frequently compared to men. The latter activity can be explained
by the fact that coming up with policy ideas is moderately correlated with conducting
research as the process where ideas are very likely to originate. In spite of this finding,
regression analysis shows that gender does not aﬀect how frequently staﬀ assist MEPs in
legislative assistance when controlling for organisational structures. The result on gender
is supported by previous research, which has shown that demography has a compositional
eﬀect (Pfeﬀer, 1997, pp. 82-83). This means that demography is more likely to aﬀect
behaviour where a characteristics is asymmetrically distributed to the advantaged of one
group in the organisation (Selden, 1997; Pfeﬀer, 1997, p. 82). People’s behaviour is aﬀected
by gender, when one of the genders is disproportionally distributed. Given the population
and the survey data, there is no such disproportionate distribution of gender. This may
explain why no statistically significant eﬀect has been found for this variable.
The study has also attempted to control for institutional values as the values that are
infused among staﬀ in the EP. Institutionalisation is even more diﬃcult to control for than
demography, because institutionalised values develop, change and phase out gradually. In
this study, variables measuring institutional values do not have a statistically significant
eﬀect on behaviour. This means that the concerns or considerations over Europe and the
EU do not aﬀect how staﬀ assist MEPs. This finding can be explained in two ways. First, it
might be the case that no eﬀect has been found, because there is no variation on the three
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variables that measure institutional values. Alternatively, the finding can also indicate
that staﬀ in the EP behave neutrally given their feelings towards the EU. It has to be
considered that institutional values other than considerations over the EU/Europe might
be at play. For example, personal believes on how specific policies might be amended
could influence the extent MEPs involve staﬀ in their work. However, identifying such
values is challenging. Even when such values are detected, they are subsequently diﬃcult
to measure. Moreover, we know little on how institutionalisation can help an organisation
achieve its goals (e.g. what is the eﬀect of values of decisions, how do informal norms aﬀect
formal goals or tasks).
10.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the organisation of legislative assistance in
the EP and statistically analyse its eﬀects on the assistance of MEPs. The approach has
built on organisation theory and its proposition that the organisation of administrative
structures aﬀects the behaviour of individuals. The eﬀect of organisational structures is
robust to variables measuring demography and institutionalisation. The findings show
that there is a significant connection between structural characteristics and tasks. Hence,
evidence is found for Hypothesis 4. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the EP
has been relatively successful in creating an administrative organisation, which combines
diﬀerent principles of specialisation. Organisation does matter in the EP also for the case
of legislative assistance.

Chapter 11
Conclusion
The central question of this dissertation has been how does the organisational form of
legislative assistance aﬀect the functioning of the European Parliament. In answering this
question, we have learnt two things. First, we have acquired knowledge on the organisation
of legislative assistance in the European Parliament from the 1950s to 2010s. Second, new
insights have been revealed on the behaviour of EP staﬀ. In order to achieve this, Chapter
1 presented the research question of the dissertation and highlighted the relevance of the
study. Chapter 2 summarised the existing literature on administrative assistance in the
EP. Chapter 3 reviewed the theoretical explanations of institutional design and its eﬀects
on behaviour. Chapter 4 outlined the empirical data and methods employed throughout
the thesis. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (Part I) employed the relevant theory to analyse the design
of legislative assistance in the EP. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 (Part II) studied the eﬀects of
organisation on the behaviour of staﬀ in assisting MEPs. This final chapter synthesises
the findings.
11.1 Synthesis of the Theoretical Arguments and Empirical
Findings
The main argument of the study is that the organisational form (design) of legislative
assistance aﬀects how staﬀ in the EP assists members of parliament. Diﬀerent forms
of organisations (structures) favour the involvement of diﬀerent administrative players.
While the behaviour of staﬀ is conditioned by the organisation of legislative assistance, the
organisation itself is conditioned by the institutional environment, functional needs and
the historic choices of the EP. The empirical findings are summarised in Tables 11.1 and
11.2. The findings are then contextualised in the following sections.
11.1.1 Eﬀects
The study has shown that organisational structures are significant determinants of legis-
lative staﬀ behaviour and the frequency staﬀ assist MEPs. The main reason to study the
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eﬀects of organisation was to gain new insights on what conditions the involvement of staﬀ
in assisting MEPs. The findings are the following:
• Behaviour is profoundly shaped by organisational structures compared to demo-
graphic and institutional factors. Except for the area of education, none of the tested
demographic characteristics has a consistently significant eﬀect on staﬀ’ behaviour.
• High-ranking staﬀ are more frequently involved in legislative assistance than low-
ranking staﬀ.
• Staﬀ, who are aﬃliated to a committee secretariat and staﬀ who follow the work of at
least one committee are in the position to assist MEPs the most frequently. Indirectly,
the finding means that research staﬀ and legal staﬀ assist MEPs on a less frequent
basis. Moreover, it signals that, while staﬀ in the so co-called committee secretariats,
are important administrative players in the legislative assistance of MEPs, political
advisors and accredited assistants have also a role to play.
• Hence, administrative aﬃliation is an important determinant for assisting MEPs.
Political advisors of the parliamentary groups in the EP are more frequently involved
in legislative assistance than secretariat administrators and accredited assistants.
• Staﬀ working in the area of citizens’ aﬀairs, where consultation procedure is applied
the most, carry out tasks pertaining to legislative assistance less frequently than
staﬀ working in areas of economic and scientific aﬀairs, where codecision procedure
is applied the most. Similarly, staﬀ working on budgetary aﬀairs are less involved in
assisting MEPs than staﬀ working in economic and scientific aﬀairs.
• Staﬀ who work for the ALDE and the S&D groups or MEPs are more frequently
involved in legislative assistance than staﬀ who work for the EPP.
Together these findings show that organisational structures have an eﬀect on the behaviour
of staﬀ.
11.1.2 Design
The study shows that diﬀerent phenomena condition the organisation of legislative as-
sistance: functionalism, isomorphism, decoupling and path-dependency. Functional ad-
aptation stands for the features in the organisation of legislative assistance, which are
connected to the mission of the EP. Isomorphism or mimesis stands for the adoption of
state-parliament characteristics following the federal idea of Europe. Decoupling stands
for the process where a form of organisation can be adopted because it is culturally accept-
able (albeit functionally ineﬃcient). Path-dependency indicates that the EP’s organisation
or some of its features are influenced by administrative arrangements made in the past,
in particular in the initial phase of the EP in the 1950s. The adoption of ideas around
parliamentary models, functional adaptation and path-dependency are the most discerned
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processes. In addition, the thesis has traced also elements pertaining to distributive pro-
cesses, even if the setting of the study does not allow identifying clear interests and all
actors. Distributive elements refer to the quest of control over administrative resources
and bargaining as the process through which resources are distributed in the EP. The
findings are the following:
Functionalism Functional considerations on the organisation of legislative staﬀ are vis-
ible in the early stage of European integration up to the 1970s. As the EP gained con-
sultative and budgetary powers, the administration changed in parallel. For example, the
central administration reformed its services and a new set of staﬀ rules for political ad-
visors were adopted after the Rome Treaty. Similarly, the entry into force of the budgetary
treaties in the 1970s was accompanied with a growth in the number of staﬀ working on
budgetary issues compared to other committees. Direct election caused an increase of staﬀ
expenditures for parliamentary assistance and the discontinuation of national parliaments’
secretariats for delegations of MEPs.
Functionalism, Isomorphism and Decoupling The first form of administrative or-
ganisation in the EP was the result of a combination between functional and ideational
elements. The Common Assembly was from its start in the early 1950s serviced by its
own secretariat, political group secretariats and national parliaments. All of these three
elements pertain to diﬀerent logics of institutional design. Establishing a general secret-
ariat, which was independent from the Council of Europe, is a manifestation of a functional
design. The administrative independence from the Council of Europe was in fact seen as
a requirement for the EP to exercise its functions with autonomy. The set up of political
groups and their secretariats is one of the fundamental characteristics of state-legislatures,
which provides evidence for isomorphism, but also decoupling. The functional purpose
of political groups secretariats is not clear in the 1950s, when, in fact, the members of
the Common Assembly were assisted by national parliaments. For all of these reasons the
first administrative form is best-explained following logics of functionalism, decoupling and
isomorphism at the same time.
Isomorphism and Path-Dependency The functional argument is not sustained in the
aftermath of the first European elections. The problems in the organisation of legislative
assistance accumulated and were finally addressed in diﬀerent waves of reforms throughout
the 2000s and 2010s. It is important to note that when change occurred in the 2000s
and 2010s, it reinforced the features common to state-legislatures. Hence, the isomorphic
adaptation of the EP continued albeit at a slower pace. Therefore, changes in the form
of legislative assistance are, from the 1980s onwards, explained also by the logic of path-
dependency.
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Distribution and Power Based on the collected evidence, but in absence of detailed in-
formation, the study has found traces of the distributional logic in the following examples:
the conflict between the Council of Europe and the ECSC/Common Assembly in the early
1950s, the debate over the allocation of funds to political groups between MEPs in the late
1950s, the attempt of political groups to control the general secretariat through (political)
appointments and the recent increase in administrative resources of MEPs. Distributive
elements were found in all the phases (creation and change) of EP’s legislative assistance.
The beginning of this dissertation has introduced the idea from the American Congress
that staﬀ are resources of power (Fox and Hammond, 1977, p. 1). Following the collected
evidence, it can be concluded that staﬀ are a source of power also in the EP. It is worth
noting, that the notion of staﬀ as resources of power does not necessarily mean that staﬀ
have power.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that given the lagged ad-
aptation to political reforms (e.g. SEA, Maastricht, etc.), the strengthening of legislative
assistance is a consequence of the political empowerment of the EP and not the opposite.
It is not legislative assistance or staﬀ resources that have aﬀected the legislative powers of
the EP, but rather the legislative power of the EP that (gradually) unleashed the devel-
opment of staﬀ capacity in the EP. Treaty changes are important, even if changes in the
organisation of legislative assistance do not promptly follow them.
11.1.3 Design and Eﬀect
In the beginning of the dissertation it was asked how does the study of organisational
design (Part I) contribute to the study of eﬀects on behaviour (Part II) and vice-versa.
Studying both, the design of legislative assistance and the eﬀect of design helps us to put
some of the findings in context. The findings in the first and second part of the thesis
complement each other, especially in the following cases:
Research Although the general secretariat of the EP has by far the most resources to
perform research, the second part of the thesis has shown that the accredited assistants of
MEPs carry out research more frequently compared to general secretariat administrators
(and political group advisors). This situation is clarified in the historical analysis of Part
I, which shows the uncertainties of the general secretariat to organise its research services.
From the ineﬃcient DG Studies in Luxembourg to the creation of policy departments in
Brussels with the reform ‘Raising the Game’, the general secretariat eventually managed to
establish a complete research department with DG EPRS in 2013. An important purpose
of DG EPRS is to address the research inquires from individual MEPs. In the absence
of such a service, it is natural that MEPs turned to their accredited assistants. However,
given the reform in 2013, MEPs’ reliance on accredited assistants is likely to diminish
compared to the situation, which was discerned with the survey data of this study.
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Budgetary Aﬀairs Throughout the thesis, the budgetary policy has stood out as an
idiosyncratic area of legislative assistance. Part II of the thesis has shown that staﬀ spe-
cialised on budgetary issues behave diﬀerently compared to others. Namely, the findings
showed that staﬀ specialised in budgetary aﬀairs are less frequently involved in legislative
assistance. The role of budgetary staﬀ becomes clearer in reference to Part I, where the
development of budgetary powers is discussed. It is observed that when the EP gained
budgetary powers in the 1970s, staﬀ of the Budget committee became increasingly im-
portant vis-à-vis staﬀ that worked in areas where the EP had a consultative power. More
importantly, Part I has described that staﬀ specialised in budgetary aﬀairs has diﬀerent
competences compared to staﬀ in areas of legislation. Overall, it appears that legislat-
ive assistance in the budgetary area is a special case to study. A study juxtaposing the
parliamentary functions of parliament in areas of control and legislation would reveal new
insights on the budgets’ staﬀ particularity.
Accredited Assistants The second part of the thesis has shown that accredited assist-
ants are in some instances more frequently involved in legislative assistance than secretariat
administrators and political advisors. This finding would be surprising in the absence of
the historical analysis in Part I. Historically, MEPs have always had limited financial re-
sources to employ APAs, who were also the last to be included in the administrative legal
framework of the EU. However, from 2000s onwards we have seen a gradual empowerment
of individual MEPs through their staﬀ allowance. This has allowed MEPs to recruit more,
but also better-qualified staﬀ. Hence, the role of accredited assistants has changed from
the past when they were not allowed to attend committee sittings and were considered as
mere paper-keepers or travel agents.
Political Advisors The second part of the thesis has shown that political advisors assist
MEPs more frequently in legislative assistance than secretariat oﬃcials. Again, the first
part of the thesis has shown that in the long run the general secretariat had significant
capacity compared to political groups and individual MEPs. However, in the 1990s the
political reforms (i.e. direct election, SEA, Maastricht Treaty) caught up with the EP, which
brought to a demise of the general secretariat and a rise of political group staﬀ. Hence,
secretariat administrators have lost some of the action scope vis-à-vis political advisors.
Future Developments Finally, the results of the first and second empirical parts can
inform us on how the future of legislative assistance will look like. While the second
part shows that political group advisors are involved in legislative assistance the most
frequently, this can change in the future based on two recent phenomena, which were
described in the first part. The first phenomenon is the increase of MEPs’ staﬀ allowance
and the improvement of working conditions for their accredited assistants. The second
phenomenon is the 2013 reform of the general secretariat, which made it more susceptible
to requests from individual MEPs and enhanced its research and scientific capacity. In light
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of these events, the role of political advisors can diminish in the future, accredited assistants
might continue to strengthen their position, while secretariat administrators might regain
some of the position that they had lost after the EP acquired legislative powers.
11.2 Implications
11.2.1 Theory
This thesis has demonstrated the explanatory power of organisation theory, which was
successfully used to predict how and how frequent legislative staﬀ assist MEPs. The concept
of organisational structures has proved a useful one to understand the organisation of
legislative assistance in the EP and its impact on behaviour. The conclusions demonstrate
that in the case of the European Parliament, the behaviour of legislative staﬀ depends on
the formal organisational structures that constitute the system of administrative assistance.
The findings of the study support the application of organisational theory in line with the
articles published by Egeberg et al. (2013, 2014a, 2014b). Therefore, behaviour should be
studied in consideration to the organisational characteristics in addition to theories, which
control for the relationship between the principal and the agent (Winzen, 2011; Dobbels
and Neuhold, 2013).
The most important theoretical implication of this study is in the area of institutional
change. The analysis of the organisation of legislative assistance has shown, what others
have already observed (Jupille et al., 2003; Rittberger, 2001; Tallberg, 2010): events are
better explained when diﬀerent institutional approaches are considered at once. By drawing
on one specific approach only, it is unlikely to address a phenomenon comprehensively (i.e.
organisation or behaviour in this thesis).
More importantly, the study has observed that legislative assistance changed (some-
times slowly) as a result of treaties reforming the political system of the EU. If both,
legislative assistance and the political system of the EU, are treated as institutional ar-
rangements, then the conclusion is that institutional change causes institutions to change
(i.e. institutional change produces change). In other words, it has always been the change of
political treaties that brought change to the system of legislative assistance. Even though,
legislative assistance has not always promptly adapted to treaty revisions, its change was
always dependent on political changes. It seems that not only are institutional changes
interdependent, but that there is an order between them.
11.2.2 Practice
11.2.2.1 Division of Labour and Human Resources Distribution
The qualitative analysis in Part I has shown that the general secretariat was the first to
develop administrative structures. In the long run, the general secretariat has maintained
a significant capacity, which consists of a physical structure, staﬀ and the general mandate
to run the EP, compared to political groups and individual MEPs. This can explain why,
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until at least the 1980s, the oﬃcials of the EP secretariat played an important role in the
assistance of MEPs compared to political advisors and accredited assistants.
The analysis of the survey results in Part II has shown that nowadays MEPs rely on
multiple administrative players, i.e. there is a so-called ‘market for assistance’. Given the
results obtained on the scale variable measuring legislative assistance, secretariat adminis-
trators do not appear to be the most frequent providers of legislative assistance anymore.
Advisors in political groups, which adopted administrative capacities already in the 1950s,
are the most frequent source of assistance. Resources for parliamentary assistants, which
were the last to join the EP ‘market for assistance’, increased in a significant way only after
direct elections and following the regulation on APAs. The tardiness in the development
of APAs’ role might explain the relatively unimportant role assistants played in the first
decades of the EP. The most recent reforms, combined with the survey results, indicate
an evolution of APAs’ role. Nowadays, APAs are frequent contributors in the legislative
assistance of MEPs.
The empowerment of APAs can be seen as a manifestation of a more general trend in
parliamentary politics, where political parties are loosing their appeal to voters (IPU, 2012).
In an attempt to be re-elected, members of parliament are pushed towards representing
narrower (constituency) interests. Therefore, members of parliament have an incentive to
develop their own personal brand rather than relying on political party labels. Assistants
are in a strategic position to aid their members in devising personal labels. In the European
context this is especially true for APAs in the EP, where MEPs benefit from the highest
staﬀ allowance compared to members in other parliaments.
In this respect, it is interesting that the general secretariat of the EP is transforming
some of its administrative units in order to better service individual MEPs rather than
collective bodies, such as committees, political groups, the Bureau, the Conference of
Presidents, etc. In order to maintain its perceived neutrality, the general secretariat has
to assist individual MEPs and collective bodies in a balanced way. A general secretariat,
where administrative structures lean towards servicing one set of political actors over the
others leads to the impression that it is taking up positions. Administrators in committee
secretariats, which are responsible to assist rapporteurs on individual dossiers, are a case
in point. Often they are seen as staﬀ of the rapporteur rather than staﬀ of the committee
as a whole, since they work closely with one committee member only (i.e. the rapporteur).
Therefore, the question is not only on the quality of assistance, but also how it is distributed
among all the political actors.
Based on the comparison of organisational forms of legislative assistance in the British,
French and German national legislatures (Chapter 5), it is possible to say that the EP
has always had a relatively high quality and well-funded administration. How has the
distribution of resources in the EP changed over time is, on the other hand, diﬃcult to
analyse. As already said, one of the reason has to do with the fact that administrative
issues are not at the forefront of the political agenda, which makes information scarce.
Even when information exist, the more than fifty-year of EP history, makes it diﬃcult to
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find it. Nevertheless, on the basis of the information in this study, it can be concluded that
the distribution of human resources attracted the attention of political groups after their
establishment in the 1950s. The number of staﬀ and the amount of expenditures reveal that
the relative distribution of human resources between the general secretariat and political
groups secretariats has overall been balanced and without excessive fluctuations in favour
to only one administrative actor. Nonetheless, it appears that in the wake of the budgetary
reductions and stuﬀ cuts in the EP, the distribution of resources is becoming an increasingly
contentious issue compared to the past.
11.2.2.2 Bureaucratisation
The evolution of human resources distribution is an important element in the debate on
parliamentary bureaucratisation (Christiansen et al. 2014; Neuhold 2014; see also Chapter
1). This debate involves a discussion on the appropriate level of staﬃng and the delegation
of activities. The aggregation of staﬀ or tasks in any form or direction puts democratic
decision-making at risk. In the case of this study, it has been shown that staﬀ of the EP’s
general secretariat have exercised disproportional influence over the activities of the EP
in the 1950s. From the 1960s onwards, new recruitment opportunities for parliamentary
groups started to curb the bureaucratic influence of EP’s oﬃcials. This can be considered
a positive development towards democratic decision-making, since more discretion was
transferred to elected MEPs through their partisan aids. However, results of the survey in
Chapter 10 show that parliamentary group staﬀ have to a certain extent taken over from
the administrators of the general secretariat even those tasks, such as advice on parlia-
mentary procedures, which are better left to non-partisan bureaucrats. This development
is problematic, since parliamentary rules should not be interpreted according to partisan
preferences, but according to parliamentary law. The involvement of bureaucrats, either
parliamentary group staﬀ or general secretariat staﬀ, is thus problematic for democracy
when staﬀ are involved in tasks for which they lack professional qualifications. When such
unprofessional involvement occurs opportunities for an abuse of power arise and democratic
decision-making is at stake.
Like previous research (Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014), this
study does not provide systematic evidence for bureaucratisation in the EP. What is found
are ‘traces’ of bureaucratisation. For example, access to high bureaucratic levels of ad-
ministrations is politicized (Chapter 5), groups staﬀ are given ‘easy’ access to the general
administration of the EP (Chapter 7), accredited assistants are acquiring new tasks and
competences (Chapter 7), etc. All of these processes have the potential to weaken demo-
cratic decision-making by side-lining the preferences of elected representatives.
However, in every democracy there is a certain level of ‘undemocratic’ (either politicized
or bureaucratic) practices (Rouban, 2007). What prevents these practices from becoming
systematic is the process of change. For example, politically democratic decision-making
is ensured through regular elections. In the case of bureaucracies, mechanisms of change,
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which act as deterrent to bureaucratisation, are regular recruitments, transparent compet-
itions, established open selection criteria, etc. The process of such changes is very visible
in the case of the EP administration, where the rise of one segment of administration has
been followed by its fall in terms of tasks and prerogatives. Moreover, this process is not
linear, but cyclical, which prevents any kind of bureaucracy to extend its competences
beyond its professional vocation. Change is therefore a source of democracy also in respect
to the problem of bureaucratisation.
11.2.2.3 Further Professionalisation
Change can vey well be achieved also through continuing professionalisation. There is no
definite division of tasks between general secretariat administrators, APAs and political
advisors. The survey results have shown that everyone can do everything. In the past,
secretariat oﬃcials used to advise MEPs on procedures. However, procedural advice is
now provided also by political advisors. Administrators tend to assist MEPs more often
than others only in legal advice. While legally the professions of secretariat administrators,
APAs and political advisors are well defined in the Staﬀ Regulations, their roles can be
further professionalised. This has been done in the past by creating the Legal Service and
it is likely to happen in the future with DG EPRS.
11.2.2.4 Inter-Institutional Relations
The EP has struggled to obtain legislative powers through which it could influence the
Council and the Commission. Neither the historical analysis nor the survey results show
a considerable reliance on staﬀ in inter-institutional relations. Through the organisation
of administrative assistance, the EP can target its resource deficit vis-à-vis the Council
and the Commission. This means that the way legislative assistance is organised can help
to sustain the EP as a unitary actor in inter-institutional negotiations. However, most of
the findings in this thesis are about the role of staﬀ in intra-institutional relations. The
activities that staﬀ do in inter-institutional relations do not transpire. In the absence
of evidence, this leads to the tentative conclusion that inter-institutional life in the EU
and the executive-legislative relationship are unlikely to aﬀect the organisation legislative
assistance in the EP.
11.3 Contribution to the Literature
Many scholars have written on the European Parliament (Hix et al., 2003). Few of them
have looked at the support that administrative players oﬀer to elected members. The
lack of interest and publications is evident from the most recent literature review on the
EP, which does not even mention legislative staﬀ as a (potential) area of research (Hix
and Høyland, 2013). This study has therefore contributed to an unexplored research area.
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The thesis has contributed to literature on the European Parliament and the debate on
parliamentary staﬀ in legislative studies.
Legislative Studies and the EP
Studying legislative staﬀ in the EP touches upon the traditional issue on the nature of the
political system in the EU (Hix, 1994; Kreppel, 2006; Cofelice and Stavridis, 2014). By
studying the organisation of legislative assistance in the EP, the study has shown that the
system of legislative assistance in the EP is similar to the system in national parliaments.
Members of the EP and parliamentary groups can all rely on the central service known as
the general secretariat. The EP secretariat resembles more to the central administrations
of European legislatures (the UK, Germany and France) than the USA in respect to three
factors. First of all, the civil servants in the central administrations of the EP have to
(oﬃcially) abide by the rules on neutrality. Second, oﬃcials in the EP take part in the
legal, procedural and text drafting assistance to MEPs. Third, parliamentary groups in
the EP have important financial and staﬀ resources for their functioning. All these aspects
characterise European legislatures more than the US Congress, where there is no clear
distinction between neutral and political staﬀ; and where administrative resources are
concentrated in the hands of individual legislators. It has to be pointed out that the latest
developments in 2000s have empowered individual MEPs as seen in the Congressional
model. More autonomy has been placed in the hands of individual members through the
increase of MEPs’ staﬀ allowance and through the creation of new services in parliament
(i.e. the library briefings, research services). In respect to all the characteristics mentioned
above, the study has shown that the EP has the essential characteristics of a democratic
parliamentary system rather than an EU’s institution in a sui generis system.
Legislative Staﬀ in the EP
The literature review (Chapter 2) has discussed studies, which deal with the impact of ad-
ministrators on the EU decision and policy-making. The issues that have been studied the
most are the conditions under which committee oﬃcials impact legislation (Winzen, 2011;
Dobbels and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels, 2014). The main aim of these studies
has been to address the bureaucratisation of democracy in parliament, where legislation
is adopted by unelected rather than elected oﬃcials. To problematise the rule by oﬃcials,
staﬀ in the EP is treated as a bureaucracy.
By focusing on the forms of organisation, the present study has analysed EP staﬀ as
an administration. The aim was not to problematise the bureaucratisation of democracy,
but to observe how forms of organisation can guide people’s behaviour in parliament. This
means that the role of staﬀ has not been theorised based on the personal goals or ambitions
of members of parliament, which has permitted to pay more attention to the characteristics
of staﬀ. As a result, the study has adopted an inclusive definition of legislative staﬀ,
i.e. administrators in the general secretariat, advisors in political groups and APAs. A
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definition that it not restricted to committee staﬀ has allowed observing the more known
role of oﬃcials in the central administration and political advisors, but also the role of the
less known assistants to the members of the EP.
In respect to previous research, the study is longitudinal, which has allowed showing
that the patterns of legislative assistance vary over time. The dissertation has explained
the patterns with functional-rational, sociological and historical institutionalism. For the
first time it has been showed that the respective roles of staﬀ have changed over the years.
While in the beginning of the EP the oﬃcials of the secretariat were important contributors
to the work of MEPs, their role has diminished over the years in favour to political group
staﬀ. Recent reforms in the late 2000s and 2010s have strengthened the role of accredited
assistants and possibly re-established the role of secretariat oﬃcials at least in the domain
of research. Given these developments, it can be said that change is cyclical rather than
evolutionary. Finally, compared to previous research focusing on the relationship between
staﬀ and politicians, the study has shown that organisational structures and historical
circumstances are also relevant for the understanding of staﬀ’s role.
11.4 Future Research
This study has looked at the staﬀ in the European Parliament that assist MEPs. Given the
limited research in the field of parliamentary administration, the scope for future research
is large. There are two basic ways in which future research is likely to develop. Researchers
may continue to analyse the role of the administration in the European Parliament as a
well-staﬀed legislature, and/or they can turn to study the role of administration in national
legislatures. Researchers may keep on studying the function of legislation and/or turn to
analyse the role of parliamentary staﬀ in representation, budgetary control, etc. The study
on some of these aspects has already begun.
Representation and Constituency
The purpose of the dissertation was limited to the control and legislative functions of
parliament. Our knowledge on administrative assistance in the EP would be enriched
by looking at the function of representation. An interesting question to address is how
staﬀ contribute to connecting members of parliament to their constituents. Research in
this direction should focus on local staﬀ (i.e. staﬀ in the constituency). In 2012, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union identified the organisation of constituency services as one of
the challenges facing parliaments. Voters in local constituencies expect from members of
parliament to provide them services, such as support in matters with the government,
development of local economies, etc. (IPU, 2012, pp. 58-71). The relevant questions are
how parliaments cope with these demands and to what extent are constituency oﬃces
equipped to address the relationship between members of parliament and citizens.
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Elections and Communication
The electoral connection between MEPs and citizens is extremely weak or almost non-
existent (Hix and Høyland, 2013, p. 184). In order to find new evidence on the electoral
connection, research could focus on the role of local staﬀ in election campaigns. It is
not only the role of local staﬀ that might be of interests, but also the administrative
capacity of institutions, such as the European political parties and the EP. Prior to the
2014 European election there has been a call to strengthen European political parties
(Priestley, 2011). However, European political parties do not have extensive resources for
campaigning. On the contrary, the EP has greater capacity to communicate with European
citizens. Nonetheless, a communication department within the EP general secretariat was
set up already in 1957. In this respect it would be interesting to study the role of the
Directorate General for Communication (DG COMM) in the EP’s general secretariat.
Rather than analysing the individual campaigns, research could focus on the role of DG
COMM in respect to the role of political parties and similar departments in national
parliaments. Among the issue that could be addressed is the legitimacy of DG COMM in
promoting and communicating the political decisions of the EP.
Staﬀ as Resources
In terms of electoral behaviour, research could investigate the dichotomy between local and
parliamentary staﬀ. This kind of research would not only address the legislative function
of MEPs in relation to their representative function, but it could give new insights on
the behaviour of MEPs. By studying how MEPs distribute their staﬀ in parliament or
constituency, new information could be gained on the ambitions and motivations of MEPs.
The logical hypothesis would be that MEPs who want to impact EU legislation employ
more staﬀ in parliament than constituency. On the opposite, MEPs who seek re-election
employ more staﬀ in constituency. The distribution of assistance might also be aﬀected by
the electoral system, where open list system would incentives MEPs to have more staﬀ in
constituency than MEPs in countries with closed lists (Farrell and Scully, 2007).
National Parliaments and Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation
All of the above mentioned topics could be dealt with on a comparative and national level
as well. In respect to the EP and national parliaments, it would be interesting to research
administrative inter-parliamentary cooperation. This research has shown that historically
there has been an administrative link between national parliaments and the EP even be-
fore inter-parliamentary cooperation was set up in the late 1980s with the Conference of
Parliamentary Committees for the Union Aﬀairs of the EU (COSAC). A study involving a
historical overview on the relations between national parliaments and the EP, which would
address also the time before the first COSAC meetings, could shed new light on the rela-
tionship between the EP and national parliaments. The specific historical context of the
relationship between the EP and national parliaments can contribute to our understanding
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on the recurrent character of institutions as argued by historical institutionalism (Orren
and Skowronek, 1998).
Aside the relations between national parliaments and the EP, an interesting area to
explore is administrative inter-parliamentary cooperation in specific policy areas. It has
been observed that administrative contacts are one of the most successful forms of inter-
parliamentary cooperation (Fasone, 2012). While some research has been done on the role
of national oﬃcials in the scrutiny of EU’s legislative proposals (Högenauer and Neuhold,
2013; Winzen, 2014), less is known about other areas of legislation, where competence
remain in the hands of national governments. In particular it would be important to
address administrative inter-parliamentary cooperation in foreign and fiscal aﬀairs as two
policy areas where the activity of parliamentary cooperation has been recently intensified.
Moreover, research should focus beyond the EU framework to include other thematically
relevant organisations (e.g. OECD, OSCE).
Towards a More Enlightened Age: Legislative Assistance in the EP
Finally, the research on the eﬀects of organisation on legislative assistance that was presen-
ted in Chapters 9 to 10, should be replicated in order to obtain longitudinal data. Based
on survey results the dissertation has provided an analysis of legislative assistance in the
aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. A comparison between the present situation and the past
situation was possible given the historical analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, and previously
published research. Replicating the survey in the future would provide a quantitative
benchmark based on which the eﬀects of organisation can be assessed. An analysis that
studies the behaviour of staﬀ in adjacent time periods can further support the explanatory
power of organisation theory.

Appendix A
Survey
Dear participant
You are kindly asked to participate in the PhD research on legislative staﬀ in the European
Parliament. The survey focuses on activities and attitudes of staﬀ in the European Par-
liament. It is part of my PhD dissertation in Political Science at the University of Luxem-
bourg.
1. What is the research about? The research is about the behaviour of legislative staﬀ,
notably administrators, advisors in political groups and assistants to members of the
EP, which are involved in policy work and or assist members of the EP. The objective
is to investigate variations in behaviour exhibited by staﬀ in the legislative decision-
making of the EP. In order to compare behaviour I take into account variables such
as age, policy area, nationality or contract type among others
2. What will I be asked to do? You will be asked to voluntarily read and answer
questions pertaining to your job position.
3. How long is it going to take? Total survey time should be approximately 10 minutes.
4. Do I have to answer all questions? No. There are 5 mandatory questions, which are
marked with an asterisk.
5. What type of personal information will be collected? No personal identifying in-
formation will be collected in this study, and all participants will remain anonymous.
Should you agree to participate, you may voluntarily choose which and how many
personal information to reveal.
Legal Notice on Data Protection: Personal data is treated in line with Data Protec-
tion Act adopted in 2002 (modified 2006, 2007) by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
In accordance a notification to inform on the processing of personal information has
been sent to the National commission for the protection of data of the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg.
6. And if I want more information? You can visit the website of the project.
Your participation is greatly appreciated!
Andreja Pegan, PhD Candidate
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Click on the Next button to proceed.
INTRODUCTION
1. What is your current position in the European Parliament? * Please choose only
one of the following:
• Permanent Administrator in the EP Secretariat
• Temporary Administrator in the EP Secretariat
• advisor in an EP Political Group
• Accredited assistant to an MEP
• Assistant in the EP Secretariat
• Seconded National Expert in the EP Secretariat
• Contract Agent in the EP Secretariat
• Special advisor in the EP Secretariat
• Local Assistant to an MEP
• Other (please specify):
2. Please select your service. Please choose only one of the following: [Not displayed:
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Question 1: Permanent
Administrator in the EP Secretariat, Seconded National Expert in the EP Secretariat,
Contract Agent in the EP Secretariat, Special advisor in the EP Secretariat, Other]
• Secretariat of a committee
• Policy department
• Secretariat of a delegation
• Legal service
• Presidency
• Other:
3. Do you follow the work of at least one parliamentary committee in the European Par-
liament? * [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Question 2, answer Secretariat of a committee, Policy department, Legal service]
• Yes
• No
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4. Please select the EP political group you are currently working for. Please choose only
one of the following: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions
are met: Question 1, answer advisor in an EP Political Group]
• EPP
• S&D
• ALDE
• ECR
• Greens/EFA
• GUE/NGL
• EFD
• Non-attached member
• Other:
5. Please select the political group of the MEP you are currently working for. Please
choose only one of the following: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following
conditions are met: Question 1, answer Accredited assistant to an MEP]
• EPP
• S&D
• ALDE
• ECR
• Greens/EFA
• GUE/NGL
• EFD
• Non-attached member
• Other:
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Working area
6. What is your main working area? * Please choose only one of the following:
• Economic and Scientific Policy
• Structural and Cohesion Policy
• Citizens Rights and Legal Aﬀairs
• Budgetary Aﬀairs
• Foreign Aﬀairs
• Legal Service
• Legislative Coordination and Conciliation
• Translation and Interpretation
• Policy making in general
• Other:
7. What is your secondary working area? Please choose only one of the following:
• Economic and Scientific Policy
• Structural and Cohesion Policy
• Citizens Rights and Legal Aﬀairs
• Budgetary Aﬀairs
• Foreign Aﬀairs
• Legal Service
• Legislative Coordination and Conciliation
• Translation and Interpretation
• Policy making in general
• Other:
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Job activities
8. How often do you do the following tasks while working on a legislative proposal? *
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
Scale:1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Regularly, 5 Very often
• Provide advice on parliamentary procedures
• Provide legal advice
• Provide advice on the line to take on a policy (e.g. Advise MEPs on how to vote,
argument in favour of a position, assess if there is a majority, etc.)
• Contribute to policy ideas (e.g. Develop policy solutions/alternatives, etc.)
• Research (e.g. Draft briefings/background notes/studies, etc.)
• Draft amendments (Including compromise amendments)
• Draft legislative or own-initiative reports
• Negotiate with political groups
• Negotiate with Commission/Council/Presidency
• Coordinate MEPs positions (e.g. Find a compromise, etc.)
• Prepare voting lists (e.g. Position amendments/other voting items, etc.)
• Organise (e.g. Schedule meetings, prepare timetables, info circulation, etc.)
• Attend meetings
• Other (Specify later):
9. What other tasks do you do apart from the ones selected? Please write your answer here:
[Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Question 9:
Other, answer on the scale from 2 to 5]
Your present job
10. Specify your grade.
• Please write your answer here:
11. How long in years and months have you been working in the EP? * Please write your
answer(s) here:
• Years:
• Months:
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12. Do you work full time or part time? Please choose only one of the following:
• Full time
• Part time
• Other:
Job experience in the European Parliament
13. Have you ever had another job position in the European Parliament at any time
in the past? Please choose only one of the following:
• Yes
• No
14. Which position(s) did you have in the European Parliament at any time in the past?
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:[Not displayed: Only answer this
question if the following conditions are met: Question 43, answer Yes]
Scale: Never, Less than 1 year, 1-5 years, 5-10 years, More than years 10 years
• MEP
• EP Administrator
• advisor to a Political Group in the EP
• Seconded National Expert
• Assistant to MEP
• Trainee
• Other (Specify later)
15. What other jobs not listed in the previous question have you had? Please write your
answer here: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Question 25, answer Other, on scale from 2 to 5]
Job experience outside the European Parliament
16. Except for your job in the EP, have you had any other job after completing your
studies? Please choose only one of the following:
• Yes
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• No
17. Where did you work prior your employment with the EP? Please choose the appropriate
response for each item: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions
are met: Question 27, answer Yes]
Scale: Never, Less than 1 year, 1-5 years, 5-10 years, More than years 10 years
• Government
• Political party
• Public or semi-public organisation (e.g. hospital, public transport, education)
• Private sector
• Non governmental organisation(s) (NGOs)
• EU body other the the EP
• International organisations (other than EU)
• Other (Specify later)
18. What other jobs not listed in the previous question have you had? Please write your
answer here: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Question 27, answer Other, on scale from 2 to 5]
Education
19. What is the highest level of education you have completed? Please choose only one
of the following:
• High school diploma
• Bachelor’s degree
• Master’s degree
• Doctoral degree
• Other:
20. What have you studied at the highest level of your education? Please choose only one
of the following: [Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are
met: Question 30, answers Bachelor’s degree , Master’s degree, Doctoral degree.]
• Law
• Economics and/or Business
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• Social Sciences
• Arts and Humanities
• Engineering
• Life Sciences
• Other :
21. Have you studied abroad? Please choose only one of the following: [Not displayed:
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Question 30, answers Bach-
elor’s degree , Master’s degree, Doctoral degree.]
• Yes
• No
Your background
22. What year were you born? Please choose only one of the following:
• Options given from 1933 to 1994
23. What is your gender? Please choose only one of the following:
• Female
• Male
24. Do you have dual citizenship? Please choose only one of the following:
• Yes
• No
25. What is your country of citizenship? Please choose only one of the following:
• [List of EU Member States]
• Other:
26. What is your other country of citizenship? Please choose only one of the following:
[Not displayed: Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Question
36, answer Yes]
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• [List of EU Member States]
• Other:
Aﬃliation to organisations
27. Are you member of any of the following organisations? Please choose the appropri-
ate response for each item:
Answer options: Yes or No
• Political party
• Think-tank
• Labour union
• Other (Specify later):
28. What other groups are you member of? Please write your answer here: [Not displayed:
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Question 41, answers Other,
Yes]
Conclusion
29. Is there anything you would like to comment on the survey? Please write your
answer here:

Appendix B
Survey Data
Table A.1: Total Number of Observations
Variables (1) Legis-
lative
Staﬀ
(2) Sec-
retariat
Oﬃcials
(3)
Political
Advisors
(4) APAs
Advice on parliamentary procedures 363 119 67 177
Legal advice 358 119 64 175
Advice on the line to take 364 118 67 179
Contribute to policy ideas 366 120 67 179
Research 363 119 66 178
Draft amendments 364 119 67 178
Draft reports 362 119 66 177
Negotiate with political groups 365 120 67 178
Negotiate with EU institutions 361 117 65 179
Coordinate MEPs positions 363 118 67 178
Prepare voting lists 364 119 67 178
Organise 381 125 68 188
Attend meetings 380 124 70 186
Other 159 53 32 74
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Table
A
.2:
C
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M
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Tasks
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P
roc.
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C
ontribute
R
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D
raft
a.
D
raft
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N
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g.
N
eg.
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C
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V
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l.
O
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A
ttend
m
.
Legala.
1.0000
P
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a.
0.4095⇤
1.0000
V
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0.1057
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1.0000
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1.0000
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1.0000
C
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0.1388⇤
0.3820⇤
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1.0000
V
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1.0000
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 
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0.3056⇤
0.2718⇤
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0.2136⇤
0.2124⇤
0.2930⇤
0.2896⇤
0.3742⇤
1.0000
N
otes:
N
=
341,*
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at
0.05
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